

THE LIVING AGE



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for December, 1933

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THE LIVING AGE was established by E. Littell, in Boston, Massachusetts, May, 1844. It was first known as LITTELL'S LIVING AGE, succeeding *Littell's Museum of Foreign Literature*, which had been previously published in Philadelphia for more than twenty years. In a prepublication announcement of LITTELL'S LIVING AGE, in 1844, Mr. Littell said: "The steamship has brought Europe, Asia, and Africa into our neighborhood; and will greatly multiply our connections, as Merchants, Travelers, and Politicians, with all parts of the world: so that much more than ever, it now becomes every intelligent American to be informed of the condition and changes of foreign countries."

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THE GUIDE POST

IF 'EUROPE'S Greatest Racket' had been written by a couple of Germans it would not possess much significance, but coming, as it does, from France, it constitutes a highly important document. Jean Galtier-Boissière is the editor of *Le Crapouillot*, and he quotes such French soldiers as Foch and such French statesmen as Daladier, Paul-Boncour, and Pierre Cot to prove that Germany was completely disarmed by 1927 and that since that time French armaments have increased steadily. The villain of the piece is our old friend the 'Secret International' of munition makers, who, not content with arming France to the teeth, are now using Hitler to increase Germany's military expenditures. Thus responsibility for the war that all Europe anticipates and dreads rests squarely on the shoulders of half a dozen big armament concerns.

FLANKED on the west by the militarized Europe that MM. Boissière and Lefebvre describe and on the east by Japan, who is spending more money on military preparations than ever before in her history, Soviet Russia has built up a powerful military machine. Lieutenant Colonel Reboul, a dispassionate French military expert, describes the organization of the Soviet Army, dwelling especially on its air force and its experiments with poison gas. Not only is France said to be arranging a military alliance with Russia, Litvinov's visit to the White House, which has not yet terminated as we go to press, suggests that the time may come when the Russian army will be a topic of more than academic interest to the United States.

OUR three articles on and from Nazi Germany offer a pretty complete picture of the country's present state of mind. The first, by Hans Thierbach, is a scholarly and persuasive statement of the case for continental autarchy. The author argues

that the large continental area is going to replace the highly organized centre of shipping, banking, and industry as the decisive factor in world affairs. He foresees great possibilities for the Soviet Union and the United States and points out that England and Japan have awakened to the need for extensive bases on the mainland. It is a sane, thoughtful, and convincing essay representative of the German mind at its best.

ERICH HAEUBER'S description of Germany's new social policy contains more surprising and dubious elements. Although the Third Reich has been hailed as the 'Totalitarian State' and although Hitler's movement calls itself socialist, here is a leading organ of the new régime not only preaching rugged individualism but actually listing the steps that have been taken to cut down such social services as unemployment relief. A former editor of *THE LIVING AGE* writes us from Europe that the article has created a sensation on the Continent as the most outspoken declaration of 'devil-take-the-hindmost' policy that has yet come out of Germany.

THE essay on 'The New German Spirit' represents the Nazi mentality at its worst. Karl Rauch, its author, succeeded Willy Haas as editor of the *Literarische Welt* and he has transformed it from a lively, readable weekly that was perhaps a shade too much obsessed with the social implications of literature into a turgid, bombastic presentation of the theories of National Socialism. Mindful of Edmund Burke's warning not to indict a whole people, we hesitate to describe Herr Rauch as the quintessence of the new German spirit of which he writes. But he does give us a chance to observe the Nazi mind in action.

(Continued on page 376)

THE LIVING AGE

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The World Over

THE same foreign journals that were prophesying the American bank crash and calling attention to the futility of Hoover two and three years ago are now taking the New Deal much more seriously than most Americans do. It required no supernatural intelligence to discover that the N. R. A. broke down badly during October, but commentators in other countries did not for that reason conclude that the Roosevelt experiment has failed for good and all. And their opinion deserves attention for two reasons. In the first place they are almost as vitally interested as we are in the American experiment of controlled, or state, capitalism, and for another they can see the United States in perspective. Even the President's gold-buying policy was treated with sympathetic understanding by the *Conservative Week-end Review* of London:—

What makes it so difficult for Wall Street or the City to understand the President's standpoint is that they instinctively assume their own survival in more or less their present form, whereas Mr. Roosevelt does not assume it, and, so far as Wall Street is concerned, contemplates eventual changes that will be most unattractive to the banking and stockbroking community. When Mr. Montagu Norman goes to see the President and assures him that Hitler has saved Europe for the creditors, what can the President do except politely pass him a cup of tea and observe how fine the weather is? There is nothing in common between the assumptions of the bankers with their worship of international lending and an international currency standard at any price, and the assumption of the debtors who hold that money was made for man and not man for money.

The same paper also maintains that 'the American elections of a year ago represented not merely a change of government but a revolution,' which is described as follows:—

The initiative and the administration passed from the hands of the creditors to the hands of the debtors. In the United States these two groups happened to be exceptionally sharply divided by the operation not only of the depression, but of the huge profit inflation that had preceded it. In its political implications this division between creditor and debtor in America reinforced and, to some extent, took the place of the antagonism between employer and employed, which runs through a large part of European politics. But for various reasons the elections did not give a clean issue between a debtors' party and a creditors' party. Both parties had large doses of both these elements, only it so happened that the Republican Party had become hopelessly identified with the creditor interest, while the Democratic Party, after some hesitation, adopted a debtors' man.

Of course, the English Tory is just as much opposed to the Roosevelt policies as his American equivalent—witness these direful paragraphs by Ignatius Phayre from the *Saturday Review*:—

Everything is lacking for the success of so stupendous a scheme, one that runs directly counter to the rugged individualism of American tradition. There is no true 'national unity,' no trained bureaucracy to sustain and carry out so colossal an experiment. And yet I must agree with Professor Rexford Tugwell, of Columbia University, who became the President's chief Socialist adviser after Raymond Moley was sent back to the study of crime. 'We are bound to try it,' Dr. Tugwell says, 'before it is too late. Otherwise we are surely committed to revolution.'

And it is against this upheaval that the authorities of every large city in the United States are to-day preparing with covert armaments of rifles, machine-guns, tanks, and tear-gas bombs. America will indeed be 'in the news' when the snows are out, and zero temperatures reign in a vast continent of eight wholly desperate regional 'empires' between the two oceans, and from British Columbia's border clear down to the rice and sugar lands of the Mexican gulfs.

That one man—and he a mere 'up-state' New Yorker, trained in the astute and tortuous Tammany school—should gaily essay the rôle of Herakles, the healer of ills, in so complex and turbulent an immensity that here, indeed, is the most reckless gamble of all in America's singular story of a hundred and fifty years.

And so it goes. Because the *Week-end Review* advocates state capitalism and national planning, it endorses the Roosevelt policies; because the *Saturday Review* wants all countries to return to the gold standard and opposes all tendencies toward socialism, it prophesies disaster. In like manner, *Le Temps*, semiofficial organ of the French Foreign Office, proclaims, 'The American experiment has not been slow to prove itself a failure. None of the hopes have been realized that it aroused in those who were solely preoccupied with their misunderstood immediate interests.' This is the prevailing tone of European comment.

AFTER ruling France for the better part of a year, the Daladier Cabinet succumbed to the same conflict that has destroyed every Left-wing government since the War. As a Radical Socialist, Daladier represents the interests of the French peasant, who is anti-clerical, republican, and passionately attached to his land and to a sound currency. But since the Radical Socialists do not control a majority of votes in the Chamber of Deputies, they allied themselves with Léon Blum's Marxian Socialists, who represent the industrial workers. Now the Marxian Socialists have less respect for private property and a sound currency than the Radical Socialists and attach more importance to maintaining wages than to balancing the budget. Daladier went as far as he could in proposing further taxation of large incomes and corporation dividends, and one wing of the Socialists supported him, but most of them followed Léon Blum into the opposition, demanding inflation and an unbalanced budget. Albert Sarraut, Daladier's successor, faces precisely the same problem with precisely the same set-up, and it is hard to see how he can remain in office. The conservative press is urging a national government, extending from the Radical Socialists to Tardieu's more reactionary Republicans. Most of the country wants the franc to remain on the gold standard, and, if the real business recovery that has at last begun in Europe continues, the franc may be saved without recourse to an emergency government, such as Poincaré formed in 1926.

OUR leading article on 'Europe's Greatest Racket' makes it abundantly clear that Germany was more sinned against than sinning when she withdrew from the League of Nations. With the French admitting in one breath that Germany had been effectively disarmed by 1927 and demanding in the other more money for armaments, the big industrialists who now rule Germany have made successful propaganda for increased military expenditures. Paul Scheffer, former Moscow, London, and Washington correspondent of the *Berliner Tageblatt*, justifies Germany's withdrawal from the League as follows:—

Neither England nor France wants Germany to return to her natural position among the nations of Europe. That is the fundamental fact. France will not abandon a single detail in her military superiority over Germany, for this superiority she regards as the basis of her existence. As for England, her policy has always been directed against the strongest continental power. It was Germany in 1914, and England now is determined to prevent Germany from regaining that position. France dominates the continent only by the grace of England. The hegemony of France can be broken at any moment, and we well understand that England prefers this condition to a strong Germany. All the demonstrations of good will, all the manœuvres and proclamations in behalf of peace that have been staged for our benefit, this whole gigantic test of our patience—all these things served merely to conceal the brutal fact that the allied powers in their

heart of hearts will not relent. England may have hoped that somewhere in the world a practical solution might be found. France, with her logical talents, indulged in various daydreams, and always came to the conclusion that complete understanding between France and Germany was the solution. But a sharper fear always held France back. It was of no avail that up to the last moment Germany let it be known in Paris that she was ready to consider any open offer.

TWO letters written from Germany in early October and published in *International Press Correspondence*, a Communist organ, declare that the underground revolutionary movement is more than holding its own against the Fascist terror. One, dated Cologne, October 7th, says that of the three thousand employees in the Deutz motor works, only four hundred attended a recent 'punishment meeting' of the Nazi trade union, that most workers refuse to pay their compulsory, union-membership fees, and that even the contribution collectors will not carry out their duties. The letter continues as follows:—

The mood prevailing in the factories also finds expression in the working-class quarters and among the general public. How susceptible great parts of the population are to revolutionary agitation and propaganda is shown on the most varied occasions. In Central Cologne there took place at the end of September a street demonstration of revolutionary workers. Judged by former demonstrations, this was a small affair, being participated in by sixty workers. But the sensation aroused by this demonstration of courageous anti-Fascists was a hundred times greater than at former demonstrations, when the anti-Fascist movement was still legal. The news that a demonstration had been held spread through the whole town like wildfire and was the subject of talk and discussion in the streets and taverns.

Disaffection is also setting in among the Nazi storm troopers, one of whom was recently pursued over the Dutch frontier and shot down. A letter from Freiburg describes the Nazi leaders as follows:—

The Freiburg Nazi leaders are for the most part students who have failed to pass their examinations and officials without posts, as well as sons of the big manufacturers. The workers play no rôle. The population of Freiburg, for the most part middle class, easily succumbed to the illusions of National Socialism. The monotony of life in the small town makes them welcome any parades or military displays as a change and diversion. Up to May and June last, flags were to be seen practically everywhere. In the last two months, however, there is to be observed a very great falling off in enthusiasm. The novelty is getting worn off, and the illusions dispelled.

LAST month we reported that the German Reichsbank had embarked on the same policy of 'open market operations' that our own Federal Reserve Banks have pursued, and was buying government bonds against which currency is issued. But back in 1931 Germany suspended the clause requiring a 40 per cent gold reserve, and fears are now

expressed that inflation is on the cards. Already Germany is paying her foreign interest charges in scrip and the *London Spectator* fears that inflation will follow:—

For long Germany's exchange restrictions have made her gold standard purely formal. External pressure on her currency is not a possible risk, and most people would agree that Germany disciplined by the Nazis would not dare to endanger it internally. Hence justifiable suspicions in the City that Germany may inflate. Inflation would be the only way for the Nazis to redeem their promises to the agrarians that prices would rise, and to the workers that they would not lower wages, and it would ease the application of a public-works scheme. It is psychologically offensive to a party built on a middle class whom inflation ruined. But inflation by Dr. Schacht, who stabilized the mark, would be more acceptable than by anyone else; and it would be within the pretence of a gold standard. The alternative, which since it is more reputable Dr. Schacht parades, is a loan-conversion. That would not, however, exclude inflation afterwards, and it is in fact probable that he will carry it out.

The banking situation looks serious, as shares in three large banks—the Deutsche Bank and Disconto Gesellschaft, the Dresdner Bank, and the Berliner Handelsgesellschaft—lost between August and October 22 per cent, 23 per cent, and 18 per cent of their respective values.

THE Spanish Revolution of two years ago has frequently been compared to the French Revolution of 1789 because in both cases a feudal society dominated by land-owners, a monarchy, and the Church of Rome was displaced by middle-class groups who rode into power on a wave of mass support. To-day, however, the situation in Spain is being compared to that of France in 1848 on the eve of Napoleon III's *coup d'état*. 'A Correspondent Recently in Spain' writes in the *New Statesman and Nation*:—

All external signs point to the near approach of a conflict between the proletariat, part of which is fully 'class conscious,' and the republican bourgeoisie, just as occurred in Paris in June 1848. Over the frontier, expectant and already counting their chickens, wait the Church and the Emperor—though Don Carlos and Don Alfonso elbow each other angrily to secure the place that is ticketed 'Napoleon III.'

But the revolutionary elements in nineteenth-century France were not so strong as the corresponding forces in modern Spain:—

The advanced forces in 1848 were muddled, disorganized, and—to put it bluntly—led by fools. The Spanish left wing deserves none of these epithets. Señor Azaña is not only incorruptible—not an everyday thing in Spain—but a politician of great determination and considerable skill. His colleagues to the left are even more formidable. The Spanish Socialist Party is the only party in Spain that is organized on modern lines. It possesses an immense power for that reason. Its only rivals, the Anarchists, are busily destroying themselves. It possesses the unquestioning support of the powerful trade-union organization, the U. G. T. It

has over a million disciplined supporters, and powers of resistance the men of 1848 never knew. The hope for a continued advance of the Spanish Revolution lies within its ranks.

Blocking this 'continued advance' stand the Church and the Army, both of which formerly supported the monarchy, but which may presently defend the new bourgeois republic against a revolutionary working class. 'Violent and bloody national strikes' are the immediate outlook.

DURING 1933 a new major power has emerged in Europe. Last February Czechoslovakia, Rumania, and Yugoslavia, the three members of the Little Entente, agreed to form a solid diplomatic front and to consult each other on all questions of foreign policy. In September their Permanent Council met at Sinaia in Rumania to discuss political and economic problems. To-day their Economic Council is in session at Prague, trying to work out specific trade agreements for next year. Recent events in Germany have gone far toward forcing the Little Entente into a united front. It was the Hitler revolution that caused Russia to sign nonaggression treaties with every nation in Eastern Europe and thus place all members of the Little Entente in the same relationship toward the Soviet Union. It was also the Hitler revolution that forced one faction in Austria to demand the *Anschluss* with Germany and another to demand union with Hungary under the Hapsburgs. And here again the Little Entente found itself in agreement, since all its members want both Austria and Hungary to remain in their present condition of subjugation. But it is doubtful how long the wishes of the Little Entente can prevail. It is not a self-sufficient unit economically, and Yugoslavia has the most unstable government in Europe. Albert Mousset, who has just returned from a trip to the three Little Entente capitals, sums up their attitude as follows in *L'Europe Nouvelle*: 'The Little Entente will, in any case, not abandon the half-defensive, half-constructive policy of which Prague to-day represents the brains, Belgrade the will, and Bucharest the execution.' M. Mousset also comes to the same conclusion that we arrive at in 'Population Portents,' to wit, that the East European countries are taking the initiative away from their western neighbors.

MUCH of our 'As Others See Us' department is devoted this month to English, French, and German comments on American recognition of Russia. The point they all emphasize is that the restoration of normal relations between the two countries has much more political than economic significance, and *Izvestia*, the official government daily published in Moscow, takes the same view. After alluding to the failure of the Disarmament Conference, it comments as follows:—

The step that the President of the American Republic has taken will be welcomed not only by the public in the U. S. S. R. and the U. S. A., but by all friends of peace as an act to promote the development and strengthening of normal relations between the two countries, whose dealings will henceforth be based on peaceful collaboration. One cannot but agree with President Roosevelt's statement that the lack of direct contact between two great nations is quite abnormal. We know that public opinion in the United States has long followed the tremendous success of our economic and cultural construction with unwavering attention and that the heroic efforts of the working people of the U. S. S. R., who have transformed our country in a short time from a backward, agricultural state to a leading, industrial power, have aroused interest and sympathy among the widest circles in the United States. More books have appeared in the United States about the Soviet Union than in any other country. No other country has sent so many tourists, scholars, technicians, journalists, and politicians to the U. S. S. R. as the U. S. A. has. This growing interest of Americans in the Soviet Union reflects an ever-growing conviction that the most favorable possible conditions exist for extensive collaboration between the two countries in the most varied fields.

THE brief sketch of Stálin in our 'Persons and Personages' department concludes with the statement that Russia has been courting the friendship of France in order to weaken the tacit alliance between France and Japan. But to judge from a leading editorial entitled 'More French Help for Japan' in the *China Weekly Review* of Shanghai, this will be no easy task. During the summer a certain André Ollivier, representing the French *Association Nationale d'Expansion Economique*, arranged to invest one billion francs in Manchukuo along with some enterprising Japanese promoters, and the *China Weekly Review* commented as follows:—

For the past quarter of a century the Franco-Japanese Entente has been a most important point in Japan's imperial policy. These two allies have since 1907 coöperated loyally in supporting each other in the regions of China 'adjacent to the territories where they have the rights of sovereignty, protection, or occupation.' The Russo-Japanese Alliance came to an end with the Russian Revolution, and the Anglo-Japanese Alliance was dropped in 1922 and was in abeyance for six years, but the close understanding and coöperation between French and Japanese imperialism has never been interrupted, but on the contrary has extended to world questions far beyond the limitations of the Far East, as shown at League of Nations sessions, 'disarmament' discussions, and elsewhere. Neither in China nor elsewhere do the interests of the two governments, one the greatest military power on the continent of Europe, the other the greatest Asiatic power, conflict.

The same paper has also featured an illuminating series of dispatches by the American newspaperman, Richard Burton, on French penetration of Yünnan—the district immediately north of French Indo-China. One moral of these articles is that France is setting up a 'sphere of

influence' in Southern China just as Japan has done in Formosa, Korea, and Manchuria and that the two nations have agreed to help each other along whenever possible. In 1907 they signed a convention which states that, 'having a special interest in having order and a pacific state of things guaranteed, especially in the regions' of China 'where they have the rights of sovereignty, protection, or occupation,' the French and Japanese governments 'engage to support each other for assuring peace and security in those regions.'

BORDERED on the north and west by the Soviet Union, on the south by British-controlled Kashmir, and on the east by China, the province of Sin-Kiang has become one of the chief danger spots of war in Asia. Nominally controlled by Nanking, Sin-Kiang and its predominantly non-Chinese inhabitants have gradually been drawn into the Soviet system, thanks to the completion of the Turksib railway across the border in Turkestan. To-day trade that used to flow eastward into China flows westward into Russia, and at the same time Sin-Kiang has become the connecting link between Chinese and Soviet territory. An uprising of Mongolians supported by Russia ousted the local Chinese governor early in the year, and the British and Japanese have both made efforts to check the spread of Russian influence, England by supplying other native groups with arms and Japan by offering to aid the Nanking régime in reestablishing Chinese rule. The Japanese-owned *Manchuria Daily News* of Dairen devotes a leading editorial to pointing out that if Russia wins permanent control of Sin-Kiang, the Communist cause in China will be greatly strengthened. Since the present Chinese Government has shown much more vigor in fighting Communism than it has in fighting Japan, there seems to be a real prospect of Chinese-Japanese collaboration.

MR. RYOHEI UCHIDA, President of the Black Dragon Society, an ultra-patriotic Japanese organization, has written a pamphlet described as 'an appeal to the American Government and people on the pending questions between Japan and the United States.' All that he asks for is admission of Japanese to the United States on a quota basis, a free hand for Japan in Asia, and naval equality with America. A considerable portion of his pamphlet is devoted to the 'anti-Japanese immigration act' and to a plea that 'all racial discrimination should be abolished.' He hopes that America, which fought the Civil War to abolish slavery, will 'hammer down this monument of anachronism' called the Immigration Act of 1929. As for China, America 'is still indulging in time-honored illusions,' and has embarked on a policy 'that constitutes unwarranted interference with Japan's actions and

antagonism toward this country that might precipitate a clash.' According to Mr. Uchida, the function of preserving 'peace' in the Far East belongs exclusively to Japan and no outside assistance can benefit China:—

If America entertains the 'unholy design' of penetrating the Far East at the expense of Japan, this country will not be seized with trepidation. If China sides with America or even if the whole world is pitted against Japan, that will not alter our determination, by one jot or iota, to proceed with our sacred mission of establishing peace, order, and prosperity in the Far East. What we dread, however, is that such an exigency might prolong the confusion in China and spell great distress to the millions of that land whom we desire to rescue from their woes. Besides, the spark of another world war might be ignited, plunging the entire world into chaos.

To avoid war Mr. Uchida demands that the world be divided into three parts—Europe for the Europeans; North, South, and Central America for the United States; and Asia for Japan.

NIKOLAUS BASSECHES, Moscow correspondent of the *Neue Freie Presse* of Vienna, is another firm believer in the irrepressible conflict between America and Japan:—

More and more people are inclined to regard Japanese activity in China and Manchuria as a vast strategic preparation for a future Japanese-American conflict. It is assumed that Japan's occupation of Manchuria and her penetration of China are in the nature of strategic plans directed not so much against the Soviet Union as against America. According to this view, Japan wants to win a firm foothold on the Asiatic continent in preparation for the coming struggle for the Pacific Ocean. Vladivostok and the Pacific coast of the Soviet Union are of no great importance strategically. Japan will be satisfied if these districts remain neutral.

Meanwhile, Japanese exports have increased by a third since last year, and imports are up seventy-five per cent. The commercial adviser to the Japanese Foreign Office has revealed grandiose plans to increase the Manchurian flocks tenfold and the Manchurian cotton acreage 300-fold in the next twenty-five years. Next spring Japanese goods will appear on the markets of Latin America to be exchanged for wheat, wool, cotton, meat, and leather on far more favorable terms than any Western power can grant. Rayon will be an important item of export, Japan having climbed from the position of the fifth largest producer of rayon in 1931 to the next largest this year.

Two French journalists show how the international munition makers first armed France while Germany lay helpless and now plan to arm Germany as well.

EUROPE'S Greatest Racket

By JEAN GALTIER-BOISSIÈRE
and RENÉ LEFEBVRE

Translated from *Le Crapouillot*
Paris Topical Monthly

WHEN the Russian Revolution stabilized itself after the Polish-Russian war, it was evident that the new Soviet Republic had embarked on too great a domestic task to be able to harbor aggressive ambitions abroad, and the munition makers had to find a new pretext not to fulfill the clauses of the Versailles Treaty. It was then that newspapers began printing news stories and articles about German's 'clandestine armaments,' not to mention the daily quota of rumors and false information. In a big country like Germany it would have been extraordinary if even the strict control of inter-Allied commissions could have prevented a few arms from remaining in hiding after a war that lasted five years and a very violent civil war that lasted one year. Nevertheless, every half-dozen rifles discovered in a cellar, every box of hand grenades unearthed

in somebody's back yard was displayed like an insect on a pin by certain French journalists. And these details made the public completely forget that 14,000 airplanes had been demolished, 107,000 machine guns destroyed, 83,000 cannon melted down, and that the German fleet had been sunk in Scapa Flow.

Was Germany disarmed after being defeated? In order to answer this question it would seem wisest to disregard the cries of alarm that went up in a press known to be controlled by selfish interests and to seek the advice of the supreme commander of the French army, the former generalissimo of all the Allied armies, a man who could hardly be suspected of harboring any special benevolence toward the 'Boches.' On February 17, 1927, Marshal Foch, who had closely followed the operations of disarma-

ment control, declared to the French Army Commission: 'On January 31, 1927, I affirm that the disarmament of Germany was effective.'

Accepting the solemn affirmation of the highest French military authority, the reporter for the war budget declared: 'The disarmament of Germany is almost complete,' and concluded, not without prudence but with perfect clearness: 'Consequently, we confront a Germany that in a military sense possesses no really powerful force of trained men who have been prepared and organized. We are confronting a Germany that is disarmed. Obviously, there are some things we do not know about Germany. They have been mentioned here too often and with too much emotion for me to be able to forget them. We do not know about its aviation or about its chemistry. We are certainly obliged to take account of such things and to take precautions, and it is hard to estimate the exact value of unknown quantities. But if we merely consider the apparent and controllable situation in Germany, the position of the country, in comparison to our own, offers no danger that obliges us to maintain excessive defenses or to indulge in a useless demonstration of expensive forces.'

The same year, Paul-Boncour, French delegate to the League of Nations, said at Geneva: 'It is true that the preamble to Part Five of the Versailles Treaty views the limitation of armaments imposed on Germany as a condition and a forerunner of a general limitation of armaments. That is what distinguishes this limitation quite clearly from the limitations that were imposed after other wars in history and that were generally revealed as

ineffective. This time what gives the stipulation its entire value is that it is not merely a condition imposed on one of the signatories of the treaty; it is a duty and a moral and legal obligation on all signatories to proceed with general limitation.'

II

In the light of the solemn declaration of Marshal Foch before the Army Commission and in the light of what the French delegate at Geneva said, one might have assumed that the French war budget would decline. But not at all, it simply grew year by year to such a point that M. Daladier, former Minister of War, to whom I am going to return, declared in the Chamber of Deputies on December 9, 1929: 'I believe that from 1908 to 1912 the average military expenditures of our country amounted to 860 million francs, which would prove, if my calculations are correct, that the average present expenditures represent twice as much as the expenditures during the normal pre-war period. The result is that victorious France, which applauds speeches in honor of Locarno and the Kellogg Pact, has imposed on itself military expenditures at least equal to, and in many years greater than, those the country had to meet when it was threatened by the most redoubtable invasion that ever assailed it in the entire course of its tragic history.'

'In the entire French national budget how much money goes into all forms of national defense, including the army, aviation, colonies, and the navy? These expenditures represent a total of 12,207,000,000 francs, and when you have eliminated from your

budget the sums needed to pay the debt that is weighing our country down and consider only the expenditures on productive ministries and on the civil service, you will find that all of these do not total more than 12,098,000,000 francs. I have just listened with the greatest pleasure to discussions about foreign armies and the war budgets of foreign countries and I should like someone to inform me on this point: what country in the world, except France, is spending more money on national defense than on all its productive and civil expenditures put together?"

If the munition makers have succeeded in causing more and more money to be spent on armaments, it is partly because they are directed by the most eminent people and because the great newspapers are in their pay. Remember that when Clemenceau was thrust into power during the War his brother Albert was a lawyer for Creusot and his brother Paul, a former consulting engineer for Creusot and Vickers, was also a director of the Dynamite Centrale and a member of the syndicate of manufacturers of war material.

III

Just as Vickers traditionally selects the war minister in England, so in France the heavy industries always have one of their members in the government, a Manaut, a Gignoux, or a Charles Dumont, and the French ambassador to Germany is always designated by the rue de Madrid. Charles Laurent, who was associated with the Rathenau group before the War, had been president of the Union des Industries Métallurgiques et Minières. François-Poncet was an attaché

of the Comité des Forges when he went on the Allied economic mission to the United States headed by Eugène Schneider, and, during the occupation of the Ruhr, he was head of the information service. When he presented himself for election in 1924 he was director of the Société d'Études et d'Informations Économiques created by the Comité des Forges, and he was a member of the board of directors of the Mines et Usines de Redange-Diling-Sarre, along with Théodore Laurent and Baron Reille, representing France, and His Excellency Count Siegmund Von Beckheï and Baron Von Hammerstein-Loxten, representing Germany.

While England was being represented at the Disarmament Conference by the brother of a director of Vickers, the French delegate was Charles Dumont, president of the board of directors of the Russo-Japanese Bank, which is controlled by Schneider and which is interested in the big Japanese armament firm of Mitsui—all of which occurred while the Chinese-Japanese conflict was at its height. The Comité des Forges even places its puppets on the pinnacle of the state, the presidential chair. The career of a Poincaré can be explained only because for thirty years he was the docile executor of the desires of the Lorraine industrialists. President Millerand had been the defense lawyer for Creusot in the famous Ouenza case. President Doumer had been a director of the Laminoirs, Hauts Fourneaux, Forges, et Fonderies de la Providence, a subsidiary of the Comité des Forges. After President Doumer had been assassinated, the Comité des Forges launched a particularly perfidious campaign in

Le Temps, barring the road to Briand and supporting Albert Lebrun of Lorraine, a former member of the board of directors of the Aciéries de Micheville, which is a member of the Comité des Forges.

IV

How did the war industries succeed in persuading the French immediately after a victorious war that their country was still threatened, although the highest military authorities stated that their enemy was totally disarmed? Through the press.

Even before the War the cannon merchants used to subsidize newspaper campaigns, and the fantastic budgets that they built up during the world slaughter made them able to create a veritable press trust in France as well as abroad. 'Rare indeed in our time are newspapers edited, controlled, and owned by pure journalists,' declared F. de Tessen in a report to the League of Nations on false news. 'Interested coalitions often dominate newspapers or else great magnates make themselves complete masters, more concerned with their individual interest than with the public interest. It may even happen that in an entire region the press is dominated by a trust or is merely the pliant tool of some superior organization.'

In Germany we know that the Hugenberg trust includes more than a thousand publications, a telegraphic agency, and a news service that controls almost the whole provincial press. Although in France the trust may be less in evidence, it is enough to follow the campaigns on certain chosen subjects during the past ten years, including Germany's clandestine arma-

ments or the Saar question. Such instances as these reveal the interests behind certain publications. We have always known that the *Journal des Débats* is the property of François de Wendel, and that the Comité des Forges controls the *Journée Industrielle*. But there was quite a sensation when *Le Temps*, the great bourgeois journal, also passed, on October 23, 1931, into the control of the Comité des Houillères and of the Comité des Forges, the former being represented on the newspaper's board of directors by M. Chastenét and the latter by M. Mireaux.

The big newspapers have completely deceived French public opinion ever since the victory by panic propaganda that has no relation to reality, falsifying those figures that could most easily be controlled and accumulating the most flagrant lies. For instance, the newspapers have made a feature of German commercial aviation, declaring that commercial airplanes can be transformed into bombing planes within a few hours. Strictly, this is true, but the editors omitted to add, first, that a commercial plane cannot possibly be transformed into a pursuit plane, and, secondly, that whereas Germany is forbidden to construct military airplanes and possesses only a commercial fleet, France, over and above its commercial fleet, possesses 2,800 military planes.

Next to the United States, with its 3,000 airplanes, France in 1931 had more military airplanes than any other nation in the world. England and its dominions came third with 2,400, Russia had 1,700, Italy 1,500, Japan 1,000. Moreover, if we add to the French planes 400 Belgian planes, 1,000 Polish planes, and the 1,550 planes of the Little Entente, France

and its allies had 5,750 military planes with which to confront Germany's commercial planes.

V

Misrepresentation in respect to navies was just as flagrant. At the beginning of the Disarmament Conference, the official French tonnage was 628,603, compared with 125,780 for Germany, yet what newspaper printed these figures? Every time the Germans launch a new battleship all the newspapers protest together, leading the reader to believe that the Versailles Treaty is being violated. On February 22, 1933, when a deputy raised the usual cry of alarm, Prime Minister Daladier asked how many cruisers of the *Deutschland* type Germany possessed.

'Three,' shouted the well-informed deputy, and then he specified: 'One in service, one that is being tested, and one on the ways.'

'And do you know the number of cruisers of this type that the Versailles Treaty granted to Germany after the destruction of its grand fleet?'

'No.'

'Well, the Versailles Treaty authorized six. The German navy is therefore three ships behind the programme allowed by the treaty.'

We know that in accordance with the treaty German ships are not allowed to displace more than ten thousand tons. But the French newspapers declared that the Germans have accomplished technical marvels and that these pocket cruisers are much more rapid and redoubtable than the mastodonlike dreadnoughts of the French and English navies. This is quite possible, but if small

cruisers are more terrible than big ones, does n't it seem rather illogical to start building the *Dunkerque*, a twenty-seven-thousand-ton cruiser?

VI

The repeated investigations of the Saar valley always include the same errors and the same false judgments. Because the masters of French heavy industry want to put pressure on their German colleagues, they are trying to make the Saar territory, which was never considered part of France before 1914, into a new Alsace-Lorraine that Germany wants to take from us and that is desperately stretching out its arms toward beloved France.

The first German who spoke openly on possible German rearmament was Arnold Rechberg, the potash king, but he advocated economic *rapprochement* and a military Franco-German alliance. Since 1919, Rechberg has been obsessed with organizing the big French and German industries into a single alliance. He discussed his project with Lloyd George, who looked askance at it. 'The English,' declared the German magnate, 'have certainly never wanted France to become a great independent power as a result of her victory. On the contrary, they wanted France to be bled white, to be forever intimidated, to be subjugated to Anglo-Saxon capital in such a way that the French will work for the Anglo-Saxon as the serfs worked for their lords in the Middle Ages. To achieve this purpose the Anglo-Saxons want the financial decomposition of France to be complete and do not want the fall of the franc to be halted.'

His programme, which he outlined in the course of a dispute with Émile

Buré in *L'Eclair* in 1925, was as follows: First, liaison between the key industries of France and Germany. Secondly, a Franco-German military agreement, France and Germany to guarantee each other's frontiers against any aggression by a third power and the French and German armies to possess a five to three relationship to each other—that is to say, if the French army numbered 500,000 men, the Germans should have 300,000. Rechberg declared that Marshal Foch was convinced that the realization of such a Franco-German military agreement would make any new Franco-German war materially impossible and that the Franco-German military alliance would guarantee peace to all of Europe.

Rechberg added in conclusion: 'We French and Germans have a chance that presents itself only once in a thousand years. We can now establish an empire like that of Charlemagne without firing a gun. We can do it in such a way that French influence and German influence on the European continent and the absolute security of France as well as of Germany will be guaranteed for as many centuries as the human intelligence can foresee.'

Between 1919 and 1929 Arnold Rechberg conversed with numerous prominent Frenchmen. On the recommendation of our Ambassador, M. de Margerie, he met Robert Pinot and Charles Laurent of the Comité des Forges and M. Loucheur and M. Coty, who published his plan in *Figaro*. He was also given a special interview by Poincaré and by Marshal Foch, who received from his hands the plan of attack on Soviet Russia outlined by General Hoffmann and who appeared to give his approval to the project of

a Franco-German army of a hundred thousand men destined to wipe out Bolshevism. Arnold Rechberg subsidized the Young German Order, a rival of the Steel Helmets and the Nazis. This group shared his views and its political director, August Abel, declared: 'We invaded France in 1914 and we wanted to annex the Briey basin to unite French iron and German coal. We were mistaken. We were defeated. France invaded the Ruhr and wanted to take our coal to join it with her iron. She had to withdraw, defeated by reality. We are quits, and two armies like ours can hold Europe in check.'

Conversations went on continuously between representatives of German and French heavy industry with a view to developing Rechberg's projects of agreements between oligarchies and German rearmament, the first of which was carried out. Some of the negotiations, those between Arnold Rechberg and the Hugenberg representatives on the one hand and Paul Reynaud, former minister in the Tardieu cabinet, on the other, were published by the organ of the Stresemann party and by the official review of the Young German Order, both of which opposed the policies of Hugenberg, who was subsidizing propaganda in behalf of German heavy industry.

Stresemann, whom the extreme German right called a traitor after Locarno, experienced a malicious pleasure in catching his calumniators red-handed in clandestine conversations with the French. And the Order of Young Germans, which had campaigned for the Franco-German alliance, was enchanted to reveal its powerful rival, the Steel Helmets, the party of revenge, negotiating with a

French deputy while their official publications were insulting France. It was revealed that Paul Reynaud, after having been received several times in Paris by Arnold Rechberg, had had secret conversations in Berlin, notably at the home of General Von Lippe with the famous Captain Ehrhardt, head of the 'Consul' organization, and with Von Medem, Klein, and Kloene, representing Hugenberg, the leader of the German Nationalist Party and the advocate of Hohenzollern restoration, who was subsidizing not only the Steel Helmets and Hitler, but also right-wing terrorist organizations that had murdered more than three hundred liberal leaders.

VII

These mysterious negotiations had their counterpart in France when the left-wing journals overwhelmed the right-wing press, notably the *Eccho de Paris*, with sarcastic comments for attacking the German Nationalists while one of their own political favorites was dealing amicably with these Germans. While the German parties of the left and centre grouped behind Stresemann were trying to guarantee peace by Franco-German *rapprochement*, the most reactionary Germans kept hoping for a holy alliance between France and Germany—an industrial alliance of coal and steel, and a military alliance in which the re-armed German soldier and his French soldier 'comrade' would conquer the world, beginning with Russia.

It seems that negotiations continued via François-Poncet and his factotum, Max Hoschiller, and that the sharpest kind of bargaining occurred between the German and French magnates, who were attempt-

ing to fix the conditions of German rearmament, that is to say, the part that French heavy industry would take in reëquipping the German army.

In January 1932 August Abel, who was very close to the heavy industries, wrote as follows in the organ of the Young German Order: 'Disarmament would represent a grievous loss to the armament industry. That is why we are going to see at Geneva the lackeys and straw men of the leaders of heavy industry playing an active part along with the politicians and journalists. Of course, they will not figure as conspicuously as the statesmen and the representatives of public opinion, but they will be no less active in their work of sabotaging disarmament. We have heard from an absolutely authoritative source that the masters of French heavy industry have come over to the idea of German rearmament in their own interests, and because of this fact public opinion throughout the world demands that the Disarmament Conference yield some success no matter how small, and in particular that the enormous difference between disarmed Germany and a France that is armed to its teeth be remedied a little.

'Of course, German rearmament would be rather limited at first and would be permitted only under certain political conditions. According to our information, which comes from good sources, the chief political obligation on Germany would be to recognize that the Young Plan continues to apply. The masters of French heavy industry will investigate Germany's demands for the technical motorization of the Reichswehr, the motorization of the cavalry, and so on. There is even talk of giving Germany the right to build heavy artillery, and an increase in the

size of the Reichswehr is also under consideration.'

It was inevitable that Germany should one day plead that the promises made in 1919 be kept and that disarmament be general. Invoking the testimony of inter-Allied commissions and of General Foch, Germany had a good chance to point out that she had observed the treaty to the letter on this point, whereas her former adversaries had not conformed at all. At first the protests of the German statesmen were expressed in moderate tones. 'What profoundly moves our people,' declared Chancellor Brüning in the Reichstag on October 19, 1930, 'and particularly our young people, is that after the first painful disillusionment caused by the fact that President Wilson's Fourteen Points were not observed, we now see that our adversaries are not conforming to those clauses of the Versailles Treaty that are favorable to ourselves. The promises that we had been given, in accordance with which voluntary disarmament by the other powers would follow obligatory disarmament by Germany, have not yet been kept. Numerous countries are continuing to arm themselves without regard to the treaties, thus imperiling the peace and security of the world. This state of affairs cannot last.'

VIII

How was the French government justifying one-sided overarming? 'France,' it announced, 'suffered from aggression in 1914 and her territory was devastated. She has the right to conserve her arms and to fortify herself against the return of such a catastrophe.' But, as the former Belgian

Prime Minister, Vandervelde, remarked: 'The notion of security should be the same in principle for all countries. If the security of France can be assured only by armed force, by unlimited development, how can the security of other nations be guaranteed by a strictly limited army? This is an illogical thesis.' France's substitution of her own special formula of security based on armament for the formal disarmament clause in the Versailles Treaty gave the Germans a decisive argument in behalf of their own rearmament, for they had only to apply the official French thesis to themselves.

The munition makers of France and England have replaced the armament race of pre-war days with the system of unilateral armament, which masquerades as defense, precaution, 'security,' but is really a pretext to enlarge the state budget and thus their own profits. As Eugène Schneider said to his stockholders when announcing a twenty-five-per-cent dividend in 1932: 'The defense of our country has yielded to us satisfactions that one cannot describe as indifferent.' As the president of Hotchkiss, which makes arms, munitions, and war materials of every kind, reassured his stockholders in the same vein in May 1933: 'In so far as concerns the future, which, as a stockholder said, is rendered uncertain by the questions of disarmament and the control of the private industries that make war materials, the board of directors holds that these two eventualities cannot be clearly defined to-day and, that, in any case, the policy it is following is of a kind to give every satisfaction to its stockholders.' After these cheering words, and without mortgaging the future, Hotchkiss dis-

tributed sixty francs per share and put fifty millions into its reserves.

But this unheard-of situation of a nation spending one-third of its budget to protect itself against a disarmed neighbor could not last indefinitely. Vincent Auriol, discussing the budget in 1932, declared: 'Here are the percentages of the different expenditures, the different "prodigalities": the public debt consumes twenty-six per cent of the budget; pensions to functionaries, four per cent; payments to war victims, fourteen per cent; *military expenditures, thirty-one per cent*; social expenditures, five per cent; expenditures for national education, seven per cent; expenditures for agriculture, one per cent; expenditures for public works and the merchant marine, six per cent.'

Meanwhile, the resignation of one government after another in the German Republic did not please the munition makers. The campaigns about German armaments were no longer being taken seriously. Real armament was needed, and it was then that Adolf Hitler entered the scene.

'The armament industry,' declared Richard Lewinsohn in *Geld und Politik* written in 1930, 'certainly based great hopes on Hitler's forward march.' The seizure of power by that supernationalist agitator signified to German industrialists the assurance that German rearmament was close at hand and to foreign industrialists the impossibility of general limitation of armaments. Once more the interests of the international munition makers were in accord, as they had been in accord before and during the War. For, as Francis Delaisi has said: 'The commerce in arms is the only one in which an order obtained by a competitor increases all

his rivals' business. The big armament corporations of the hostile powers confront each other like pillars that hold up the same vaulting. One of them cannot be strengthened without all the others being strengthened, and opposition between their governments makes them all prosperous.'

That is why the Hitler movement was not financed by Hugenberg alone as the distributor of propaganda funds for German heavy industry, but also by Pintsch, a Berlin firm controlled by Vickers in England, which has from the start had an agent on Hitler's general staff. The Czechoslovakian firm of Skoda, which is controlled by the French Schneider-Creusot group, also contributed to Hitler's funds. As *L'Éclairer du Soir* of Nice emphasized with amiable frankness on February 2, 1933, 'people agree that the presence of Hitler in power, provided he is solidly backed up by a group of generals, as is the case, guarantees a long period of progressive armaments from which business cannot fail to profit.'

IX

The international cannon merchants must be given credit for having staged the show very skillfully. Hoisted into power by the magnates of the big German metallurgical industry, with the assent of their French and English confrères, Hitler has played his rôle remarkably. Not only has the *Führer* restored the atmosphere of July 1914 to Germany and other countries by catering to his nation's love of militarism; his racial persecutions have succeeded in throwing the international Jews into the arms of the militarists. In every country they had placed

themselves at the head of the pacifist movement, but they now seem ready to urge every nation on into the final struggle between democracy and Fascism in order to defend their threatened race.

The munition makers know that the enormous disproportion between present German armaments and the armaments of the former Allied powers renders impossible any international disarmament agreement, which would have to be based on the spontaneous destruction of war materials and costly fortifications that are possessed by one side only. The race that the Franco-English munition makers offer to their German colleagues is in the nature of a handicap.

'It is not a secret to anybody that the makers of guns and munitions foment international disagreements or make quarrels more venomous so that they may secure larger orders and profits. It is no secret to anybody that certain press campaigns have been paid for by men who are preparing for war and are making others do the

same.' Who expressed himself in these terms? Pierre Cot, deputy, member of the Foreign Affairs Committee and subsequently a member of the Daladier Cabinet, a man who is in a good position to understand and who added that the private manufacture of and commerce in arms and war machines constitute 'a permanent war danger and an intolerable scandal.'

War: to divest one's neighbor of his iron and his oil, to smash his industry and his economic power, to capture his business and take his place. For sincere love of country, for national policy and social welfare, French, German, and English industrialists are shamelessly substituting their private interests. They are trying to impose on each nation their own short economic views and are identifying the destiny of the nation with their own voracious appetites, which are patriotically disguised by an insidious propaganda. Will not politics some day take its revenge, recapture its true value, and reduce these new and arrogant feudal lords to their proper place?

A dispassionate French military expert describes the composition of the Soviet Union's Army, and emphasizes especially its reliance on warfare in the air.

The Soviet ARMY

By LIEUTENANT COLONEL REBOUL

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WE IN France know little about the Russian army. This is due not so much to its remoteness from us as to the rather special forms it has had to adopt on account of the difficulties it faces. In peace time there is the difficulty of training its personnel, and in war time there are the greater difficulties of transporting its large units to the theatre of operations, of feeding them, and of getting the necessary equipment from Russian industry.

Three things are responsible for these difficulties. First, the enormous extent of Russian territory; secondly, the scarcity of population; and, thirdly, the inadequate facilities for rail transportation. Under these conditions, it is obvious that the Russian army cannot be organized like the French. It is, in fact, faced with the following tasks. Before war breaks out it must transport to the frontiers some of the forces that would be employed in war time. It must take special meas-

ures to train people who live far away from the regular instruction centres. It must reduce the training period for at least some members of the younger generation in order to keep military expenses within the nation's financial resources. Finally, the Russian army must be erected on a different framework from our own. In France we do not treat the infantry regiment as a fighting unit that functions by itself. We always consider it as part of the division. Hence it is the division that we strengthen as much as possible. In Russia it is quite different. Because of the enormous frontiers the regiment must be able to fight by itself, and for that reason it is highly organized and possesses real artillery in addition to what is necessary for repelling tank attacks.

The recruitment and organization of the Russian army are governed by a succession of laws no one of which completely annuls its predecessors, so

that the subject is a complex one. Theoretically, all citizens of the Soviet Republics are compelled to serve between the ages of nineteen and forty. At the same time, only workers can see active service, and those who do not fall into this category belong to a special reserve. Finally, in the two years before the young men are summoned they must receive military and political instruction one month a year in regional centres.

Russian military requirements are not based on equal service. Thus, of the contingent fit for service, a little less than one-third is incorporated in the active units. The land forces serve two years, the air forces three years, and the naval forces four years. One quarter of the contingent is delegated to territorial units. The young people in this group undergo various periods of instruction ranging from three months during the first year to one or two months in the following years, with the provision that the total length of service shall not exceed ten months. The rest, that is to say, about three-fifths, of the contingent are considered as extra enlisted troops. These young people receive not more than six months' instruction within a five-year period.

But this complicated military law has been made still more complex by numerous modifications of its details. For instance, the Soviets have organized an industrial military service. Workers in certain factories, and, more generally, all those designated by the People's Commissars when the census is taken, can fill their two years of service by working in factories for national defense and receiving a minimum of military instruction. On being released from this service, they

are assigned to these factories as reserves in the event of mobilization.

II

An active civil service has also been instituted. Bourgeois members of this group do not have to pay for their exemption from two years of service. Instead, they receive training in special units devoted to public works.

Another new measure, contained in Article 23 of the law of September 1, 1930, provides for a census of women between the ages of twenty-two and forty who have served in the army as commissioned or noncommissioned officers or as privates (women may enter the administrative service, the political service, the health service, and the veterinary service), or who have taken the Osoviakhim courses in military instruction, nursing, or midwifery.

These are the principal measures that have been taken to modify the basic laws for recruiting the Russian army. Everything is based on inequality. For instance, the Commissar for Military and Naval Affairs can, in special cases, keep men for three extra months after they have finished their term of active service. He can send men on leave before their service period expires. He can recall all categories liable for active service. He can order mobilization and fix its time limits.

Recruits may receive instruction in either regimental or territorial units. These units are all constructed in the same way except that the territorial units have only a skeleton organization of officers, their companies, squadrons, and batteries being reduced to one or two men except in periods of activity. But as soon as the recruits are summoned to their train-

ing course the unit's personnel becomes identical with that of an army unit in time of war.

The Russian army includes 21 army corps, 29 regular army divisions, 41 territorial divisions, 10 divisions of cavalry squadrons, and 10 independent cavalry brigades. The infantry division, like our own, is composed of three infantry regiments, but it has less artillery and supplementary services. In addition to its infantry, it has only a cavalry squadron, a regiment of light artillery, a liaison company, and a company of engineers. But the Russian infantry regiment, on the other hand, is stronger than ours and always includes a chemical section, a camouflage section, and a section of engineers. It has a regimental staff, a detachment of cavalry scouts, a liaison detachment, a band, and a clerical staff. Each of the three battalions includes a liaison section, a section of 58-millimetre mine-throwers and 37-millimetre guns, three companies of rifles, and one of machine guns.

Each company of rifles also includes machine guns. Theoretically it ought to have twelve light machine guns and four heavy ones, and the machine-gun company should have twelve heavy machine guns, but these figures have not yet been reached. The infantry regiment also includes two artillery batteries with three 76-millimetre guns each, an administrative service, a health service, a veterinary service, and a highly organized regimental school. Thus the Russian regiment is equipped to live and fight independently. It is the basic cell of the army. Its troops can be detached from one division and added to another. The Russians attach less importance than we do to the normal constitution of

the military groups. Thus the army corps virtually does not exist there. The region, on the other hand, and the infantry corps, which includes from two to four divisions, have a much more definite existence.

III

Although this army is recruited from many different races that are trained by different methods, it possesses a certain homogeneity and is instructed as well as possible. The Russians, like the Italians, have carefully organized the premilitary training of their young people. This is done by three organizations, the Pioneers, the Young Communists, and the Osoviakhim.

At the age of nine the children of workers and peasants begin military exercises with the Pioneers, whose numbers are increasing every year. They take part in all reviews and all parades. More and more of them are bearing arms. On May 25, 1932, *Izvestia* reported that seventy thousand of them had figured in the demonstration of the gymnastic societies of Moscow on Red Square the day before. Last year more than a million of them went to special camps where they were subjected to strict discipline and learned to handle arms.

At the age of thirteen the young Pioneer joins the young Communists, the 'Comsomols.' They include young people under the age of nineteen, and on January 1, 1933, they numbered nearly three millions. Their membership is grouped in cells that go through manoeuvres under the orders of reserve officers, and every year they provide candidates for the military schools.

The Osoviakhim, which helps strengthen the Russian army, is especially devoted to aviation and is composed of three different societies that joined forces. The special function of the Osoviakhim, which on January 1, 1933, had more than six million members, is to develop two vital industries—chemistry and aviation. It stands ready to replace the Red army, if for any reason that army cannot accomplish whatever purpose it has in mind. The Osoviakhim includes a great number of women, more than six hundred thousand, most of whom receive technical instruction in order that they may be useful in time of war.

In spite of the large number of men who were organized and brought to the front during the War, Russia did not play a leading part because its industry could not supply the necessary war materials. In January 1917, the Russians had only two million rifles for their 8,500,000 troops, and this in spite of extremely heavy deliveries of equipment from the Allies. To mention but a single figure, the Allies supplied 188,000 of the 272,000 rifles that Russia was able to put at the disposition of its troops during December 1915.

By 1918 these shipments, together with the country's pre-war purchases, had led to a very heterogeneous equipment. A lot of the present material is so old-fashioned that it would no longer be able to give a good account of itself on the field of battle, but Russia is none the less retaining it. Up to now, insufficient industrial and financial resources have prevented the old equipment from being replaced with more up-to-date armaments. Nevertheless, the Russians have started making an automatic gun, the Fed-

erov, with a calibre of six and a half millimetres, which has been distributed for experimental purposes to some of the units, but intensive production has not yet begun. And this seems a wise decision. Russia is trying to get in such a position that if war comes it can manufacture the replacement material that its armies will need and can keep them abundantly supplied with munitions.

In respect to the mobilization of industry, Russia has made real progress. All industries that might be useful in case of war have been put into a single group to which the Five-Year Plan has been chiefly devoted. Iron production increased 38.1 per cent between 1923 and 1928 and the Soviets planned to raise it from 5,700,000 tons in 1927-28 to 15,000,000 tons, or perhaps even 17,000,000 tons by the end of 1933. As for petroleum, they state that they will produce at least 68,000,000 tons in 1933 and probably 75,000,000 tons, whereas in 1927-28 they produced only 35,000,000 tons.

In spite of these undeniable signs of progress in certain branches of industry the Soviets would still face obstacles in the event of war. A recent number of *Izvestia* tells us, for instance, that 'the bad condition of the locomotives and the bad coördination of railway services, from traffic management to station and train employees, have kept deliveries of goods under the plan down to 60 or 70 per cent.'

All these considerations would prevent the Russian army from being able to acquit itself on the field of battle with an effectiveness proportionate to its enormous mobilizable reserves. But it wishes to increase its effectiveness within the limits of its

abilities. Since its efficiency is hampered by lack of rail transport and low steel production, it has attempted two powerful schemes that are independent of railways and blast furnaces. These schemes have to do with aviation and chemical warfare, on which the country is concentrating its attention.

IV

Russia has joyfully set out to develop aviation, and the Government and newspapers are always harping on this theme, *Izvestia* having declared that 'the development of air communication is the common duty of all workers.' *Krasnaia Tataria*, published in Kazan, announces: 'The best young people go to the aviation schools,' and goes on to describe the opening of a new civil aviation school, adding this commentary: 'The training of squads of aviators composed of the best young proletarians presents one of the most important problems. The Osoviakhim, the Comsomols, and the professional and party units should all participate in solving it.' To aid this effort Russia plans to make considerable use of aviation in agriculture. 'The airplane over Socialist fields'—that is the way the Soviet press describes how airplanes should be used to destroy the larvæ of invisible insects, notably cotton parasites, and how they should attack grasshoppers. All of which is merely an easy camouflage for military aviation.

Under these circumstances it is not surprising that the Soviets are hastening to develop their air service. They have increased the number of factories devoted to this industry; they have studied various types of airplanes, especially those able to carry heavy

loads; and they have built a great number of flying fields so that they can concentrate their air forces at any point.

In 1928 there were only twenty-eight airplane factories in Russia, but at the end of December 1932 this number had increased to forty-five. The airplane industry is now sufficiently equipped to produce all the motors and planes that the Soviets need, and some of their factories are highly organized. The Dolgo Prutai factory can make two dirigibles with a capacity of 194,200 cubic feet at the same time and can produce big fighting planes capable of developing 3,250 horse power and carrying seven tons of explosives.

The Soviets do not spare either credits or research work in their efforts to develop their aviation service, and they have already created several special schools at both Moscow and Leningrad. To enable young pilots to perfect themselves they have also opened a whole network of air lines. Professor Tupolov, director of the Aëronautic Institute, praised the accomplishments of Russian aviation as follows before the Fifth Congress of Engineers and Technicians:—

'We began by constructing airplanes with 100-horse-power motors; we are now able to build motors of 3,000 horse power; and we are experimenting with a motor of 6,000 horse power.' The development of Russian air travel has also been extremely rapid. The air routes covered 16,000 miles in 1930, 30,000 miles in 1931, and over 40,000 miles in 1932. Some of the lines are very long. The one from Moscow to Kamchatka is about 6,400 miles, or twice the distance from London to India. During 1932 Russia de-

voted most of its efforts to Central Asia and opened more than thirty air lines in that area alone. Regular service has been established between all the great centres and has permitted the Soviets to govern their immense territories more effectively.

All the equipment used on all these lines has been made in Russia. *A. J. R. 7*, the airplane that flew 202 miles an hour in November 1932, was Russian, and the amphibian plane, *Cb-5*, was also a purely Russian product. This plane can be flown in arctic regions and likewise used for sanitary and agricultural purposes. It can carry ten passengers besides a pilot and mechanic. Its two motors are built on the wings. Fully loaded, it can rise to a height of 325 feet in three minutes and a half. The *Ant-14*, now under construction, is supposed to be able to carry half a section of fully armed men and a large supply of ammunition. Several dirigibles of huge dimensions—615,650 cubic feet—are in the process of construction.

Russia will certainly make great use of its aviation in any future conflict. It is also organizing a defense against hostile air attacks. Through the Osoviakhim Russia has created centres of anti-aircraft defense everywhere, and many mobilization exercises have been held. These are not carried out in any frivolous spirit, and at Baku the following decree was promulgated: 'Anyone who does not strictly conform to the orders given is liable to a fine of 100 rubles or two months at forced labor.'

V

Counting as they do on their air force in the event of war, it is natural

that the Soviets should also try to perfect their chemical equipment, since gas warfare is generally considered the indispensable complement of air warfare and may lead to a rapid military decision. The Soviets make no secret of the fact that they are equipping themselves. Their Commissar for War is constantly emphasizing the necessity of technical studies for the army. In an order issued on May 1, 1931, to officers who were completing their studies in the superior academies of the army and navy, he said: 'Comrade Stalin's instruction that Bolsheviks must possess a great technology applies to the Red army and above all to its commanding officers, whose principal task at the present time is to gain complete possession of military technique and to familiarize themselves with the complex and unexpected forms of modern warfare, even those one ordinarily does not dare to foresee.'

In a report on the Red army submitted at the end of 1932 this same Commissar for War stated in the course of a discussion of chemical armaments: 'We can say that in the event of chemical warfare we shall not be unprepared, but shall know how to defend our troops against every attack.'

To be sure, this is not a clear admission of preparation for chemical warfare, but it can be taken as such. And it must be so taken in the light of numerous declarations made by Germans. In the valley of the Volga, far from any great centre, the Reich has built asphyxiating-gas factories in order to develop on a greater scale the more modest experiments in East Prussia. And on these immense, sparsely settled plains, far from all

control, protected by the absolute secrecy that the Cheka is able to impose, it has experimented with how long different gases last, how they act under different conditions of wind, rain, cold, and humidity, how they affect animals and men provided with different kinds of masks.

Many statements have been made on this subject. The Socialist newspaper, the *Leipziger Volkszeitung*, has frequently printed the declarations of German workers who have been employed in these factories. 'The German concern of Gefu,' one of these workers said, 'at the end of December 1925 sent sixty qualified German workers to a mustard-gas factory in the Volga valley a few stations before Subranov. This factory had been set up entirely by German companies, notably Siemens Schuckert, which had

provided all the electrical equipment. The workers left the factory after they had put it in perfect running condition and the Soviets can now do as they please with it.'

It is therefore possible that some day the Soviets can order their airplanes and their artillery—but preferably their airplanes, which are not impeded by great distances and are not affected by lack of rail communication—to drop tons of asphyxiating gases on hostile centres of population and thus try to win a rapid decision that they could not hope for if they used only their land forces. This is the direction that the Russian army has taken. No doubt everything is not perfect. Its organization does not give complete satisfaction. But even as it exists at the present time it possesses a value that is not to be ignored.

Three Nazis expound economic nationalism, rugged individualism, and spiritual exaltation as the distinguishing features of modern German civilization.

New Germany SPEAKS

A NAZI
SYMPOSIUM

I. THE CONTINENTAL EPOCH

By HANS THIERBACH

Translated from *Die Tat*, Jena Nazi Monthly

THERE have been long periods in world history when control of the sea was more important than possession of extensive territory, when the seacoast was more important, politically and economically, than the hinterland. Indeed, one can speak of a certain rhythm with which the centre of gravity shifts from the seaports to the inland cities and then back again to the periphery of ocean trade. The Mediterranean countries went through this development. After the Phoenicians and Greeks had dominated the sea, the Roman Empire entered upon its career as a peasant state and then, in the Punic Wars, measured its power for the first time with a maritime state. It then embarked on a grandiose conquest of the Mediterranean until the

entire coast of that sea came under its control.

But the more its provinces became organic parts of a world empire, the more the focus of economic life shifted back to the hinterland again, until the German succession states, as purely continental powers, destroyed the last remains of Rome's former maritime mastery. The Holy Roman Empire that the German nation created traded exclusively by land until the Crusades opened new pathways for Mediterranean trade, and then Venice and Genoa dominated Italy's second maritime expansion. But again the centre of power shifted from the seacoast to the interior when the Turks conquered the coastal settlements of the north Italian cities by land. Mediterranean

trade declined still further when America was discovered. And the growth of the modern national states caused a change in the European balance of power, which was purely continental until Napoleon's domination of the Continent was shattered.

If we disregard the histories of the Atlantic maritime states, Spain and Holland, England, who after the Congress of Vienna dominated the sea almost without opposition, was the first to inaugurate a new maritime epoch by her rapid progress in shipbuilding technique. During the nineteenth century it was possible for the first time to transport goods in great quantities by ship. Thus began that division of labor between the various continents resulting in the development of backward colonial countries with the aid of machinery. Instead of pirate raids for precious metals, instead of trade in luxuries of all kinds, there began a rapidly increasing production of raw materials that were exchanged for industrial goods.

At last it seemed that the seacoast and the hinterland had been welded together. The steam engine was opening up unexpected trade possibilities by water and land and was thus linking the interior and the coast more closely than they had ever been linked before in any period in human history. Until the outbreak of the World War, sea power reigned supreme, accompanied as it was by the exploitation of the various continents. Such great channels of trade as the Suez Canal and the Panama Canal were built. England, by creating a marvelous system of naval bases, became the sole world-encircling power. The German Reich also tried to escape from its purely continental situation via the

open sea ways of the world, and it seemed that land and sea power were on their way toward achieving harmonious synthesis in our country. The growth of Hamburg and Bremen as seaports coincided with the development of the Ruhr and of the industrial districts in Saxony and central Germany.

Japan also tried to create a strong army as well as a powerful fleet and succeeded in defeating Russia, a purely continental power, in the Manchurian fighting of 1904-05. In short, the coördination of world trade, which rests primarily on sea traffic, was advancing just as rapidly as the development of domestic industry, which was constantly opening up new sources of national wealth in every country through the construction of railways.

The World War was the first great attack on that ingenious structure—the international division of labor. Hundreds of millions of people were cut off from the world market. Peaceful exchange of merchandise ceased. Goods in the form of war materials worth millions of dollars poured into Europe, but no goods were paid back in exchange. Only war credits were given, and most of these ultimately turned out to possess no value. Because the industrial countries were cut off from their sources of supply they had to produce their own raw materials artificially, and at the same time countries specializing in raw materials had to industrialize themselves more and more rapidly.

The decisive battles between 1914 and 1918 were not fought on the sea but on land. The enlistment of every last citizen in armies that ran into the millions was the most impressive demonstration that land weapons had

become more important than naval weapons. It was not a Nelson but a Hindenburg, a Ludendorff, and a Foch that played the decisive rôles as arbiters of the military destinies of their countries.

II

But the second and perhaps even more important loss that maritime trade has suffered is the unexampled world economic crisis, which has now lasted as long as the World War. Between 1914 and 1918 only Europe's economic system was thrown out of gear, while all the other continents bent every effort to increase their share in world trade. But what characterizes the present crisis is that every last corner of the world is affected, and now there is hardly any seafaring nation, with the possible exception of Japan, whose foreign trade has not been reduced by one-half or even two-thirds in the course of the last few years.

As a counterweight to this unparalleled decline in world trade, every government in the world is now endeavoring to stimulate domestic consumption with state aid. The better organized the nation is and the more undeveloped possibilities it possesses, the greater its opportunities are and the greater is the chance of success that awaits this new economic formula. It is enormously significant that wherever new leaders and governments have replaced old ones the new men have at once recognized the planned organization of domestic economy by the state as the greatest need of the hour and have embarked on this course with the most ruthless determination.

The period of maritime power

brought forth the type of cosmopolitan merchant who trusted his own judgment and took his own risks and became the prime cause of world economic progress. In this respect the British, Venetian, and Hanseatic merchants were all alike, and the cities and states that specialized in sea power had the same political forms. England, Venice, and the Hanseatic League had a nobility, an aristocracy of merchants, which was able to rule in a completely individualistic way. Private initiative was everything and officialdom played a clearly subordinate rôle. How different are the powers that decide the political destiny of continental states, where everything depends on the organized coördination of great areas and great masses of human beings. Authority of the leader and subordination of the led are prime essentials for a closely integrated state. The tasks that fall to the officials administering this state become more and more extensive, and the important thing is that men who want responsibilities eagerly throw themselves into this activity because it offers them their greatest opportunity for creative work. We recall Baron vom Stein, who began his career as the administrative head of a district in Prussia, and of the great number of Baltic noblemen who found opportunities for themselves in the Russian state service, since only there could they administer a really extensive country.

In this connection it is important to note that in Germany all officials from the president to the local councilor have again come to possess a very special importance as leaders in labor's battle against unemployment. Under William II the German people still

visualized its future on the sea. Men like Ballin and the so-called merchant princes of Hamburg and Bremen played a dominant rôle. The change in economic leadership since the War is symbolized by the rise of the continental powers and the political and economic decline of the purely maritime nations. How strong this tendency is is shown by the fact that even the two most purely naval states, Britain and Japan, are now ceasing to base their power on their insular situation. In the one case, England is trying to develop closer coöperation with its continental dominions of Canada, South Africa, Australia, and India, while Japan, by the conquest of Korea and Manchuria, has set out in a direction that is more and more continental and is relegating sea power to a secondary position.

During the last year the author of these lines made a trip around the world, traversing the United States, Japan, Manchuria, and the measureless territories of Siberia. The strongest impression I brought back, which everything I saw fortified, was that of the awakening of hitherto passive continents to a new form of life, the exploitation of vast territories by men who are for the first time able to apply modern technique on a large scale.

In a Canadian town in the great wheat prairies of the West stands a monument to the most highly valued pioneer of that region. It is a locomotive. The fact is that anyone who travels in North America, and, even more so, anyone who spends endless days and nights on the Siberian railway, traveling from Vladivostok to Moscow, will comprehend the overpowering significance of the railway in the development of a country. Siberia

in particular is a land that has grown up around a single great railway line. It might be called a 'strip' state, so great is the contrast between its undeveloped northern and southern districts and its single vital nerve, the narrow strip of inhabited, cultivated land along the railroad.

But now man has invented a new machine that was not developed until after the World War—the tractor. Just as England, through building great ships of many thousand tons at the beginning of the nineteenth century, inaugurated an era of maritime supremacy, so to-day the development of the tractor, from the point of view of agricultural economy, means that new expanses of land are constantly being opened up, whereas the railway could push forward in a single dimension only. One must see with one's own eyes the unprecedented transformation that the tractor has brought about in the whole economic development of western North America in order to grasp the change that has come over the economic and social institutions of the American rural population. It was harvest time when I started on my long automobile journey from New York to the western coast of Canada. We drove through hundreds of miles of waving grain fields where harvesting machines were at work that our grandfathers would have gazed at in astonishment and regarded as works of the devil or as miraculous achievements. The so-called 'combine,' for instance, is a technical masterpiece that combines all processes from mowing to threshing and that is pulled by a great caterpillar tractor. This machine has led to these four consequences:—

1. Man is relieved of physical labor

on the land to a much greater degree than has ever been the case before. The farmer is replaced by the mechanic, who appears on the field only a few weeks a year to sow and to reap. The land is becoming increasingly depopulated and settled farmers are disappearing.

2. Each farm unit specializes in the cultivation of a single agricultural product. Several different kinds of grain are no longer raised on one farm and a farm that raises both grain and live stock, as the European peasant still does, is now considered irrational and is being abandoned.

3. Large-scale enterprise is progressing at the expense of small-scale enterprise, for only large territories can afford to maintain the big, expensive harvesting machines.

4. In large, thinly settled countries cultivation of extensive areas has become the only form of agricultural production. What has been lost by the lower yield per acre as compared to the intensely worked soil of the old, thickly settled nations of Europe is compensated for by ever-increasing exploitation of hitherto uncultivated districts. Thus the tractor and the combine force men to expand increasingly. For instance, varieties of grain have to be developed which ripen in such a short time that they will grow as well in northern latitudes, with their short summers, as ordinary varieties do in more favorable climates. The numerous experimental stations in Canada have succeeded in pushing the limits of cultivation for the most important kinds of grain farther and farther north by systematically developing hardy, quickly maturing varieties of grain.

And now the Russians are resorting

to the same methods and opening up new areas by adopting agricultural machinery and improved grains. Russia at first had difficulty because it lacked the necessary equipment and did not have enough machines or trained tractor drivers. After all, one cannot overcome the primitiveness and stupidity of the Russian peasant within the space of five years. But in Siberia a new pioneer type has developed in the course of the last decade, an alert, intelligent, capable peasant whom I have seen standing beside his tractor on the rich black earth of western Siberia. The Russian leaders of the so-called planned economy may have made all kinds of mistakes. Whole factories may have been built wrong, but the vitality of these people of Siberia seems to have remained unbroken.

III

The terrible distress, especially the lack of food in all parts of Russia, is forcing the government to desperate measures. Along the Siberian railway and especially west of Lake Baikal, rapid industrialization has occurred in all the cities, which often lie hundreds of miles apart. Russia learned something from her defeat in the war with Japan. At that time the Siberian base of operations against eastern Asia was an empty, uninhabited district. Now, however, the country all along the railway running from fertile West Siberia is being filled with people and industrial plants. The centre of future armament industries is to be situated between the Urals and Lake Baikal. There is a great project to bring the ore of the Urals and the coal from Kuznetsk together. This is a gigantic

economic scheme, a complete novelty in the economic history of the nation, for up to now the ore has usually been transported to the coal by cheap water routes, as is the case in North America. Large quantities of coal could not be transported thousands of miles by railway except in a country whose economic system does not attach any importance to private profit.

Let me cite just one example to show how planned economy functions in Siberia. In Semipalatinsk, the terminus of the new railway to Turkestan, a tremendous packing house has been built along Chicago lines. For years the Semipalatinsk district had been renowned for its cattle, but their meat could not be made available to the rest of the country because there was no packing house available. At the breakneck speed which seems to characterize all construction in the Soviet Union, a tremendous packing house was erected.

But meanwhile a new agrarian political policy had been decided upon by Moscow which completely transformed the agricultural relationships within the country. The overhasty collectivization of agriculture, which was put through with absolutely insufficient means, caused the peasants to slaughter their live stock to prevent them from being expropriated without compensation. Now one can plant a field of grain within a year, but it takes many years to develop great healthy herds of live stock. The huge packing house at Semipalatinsk can therefore certainly be regarded as one of the most impressive Russian achievements and propaganda can be made about it all over the world, but after it was completed, with all its American fixings and machinery, it stood com-

pletely useless in the endless empty steppes of southwestern Siberia.

But it would be a mistake to underestimate the tremendous effort that the Soviet Union has made to develop its heavy industry, especially its armament industry. Industrial plants are now arising in the Urals that amaze even people who are familiar with the United States. Factories of gigantic size are equipped with the most modern machinery, but the men who work in these modern factories dwell in earthen huts and wooden barracks. That is typically Russian. Man is less valuable than the machine. No country in the world, no capitalist would dare to provide his workers with such poor living conditions as are to be found in all the industrial cities of the Soviet Union without exception. Life there has a primitiveness and hardness that only the Russian can stand. Foreign engineers must be given special quarters, and, judged by Russian standards, luxurious quarters, in order to be persuaded to work in Russian factories. I received this impression in all parts of the Soviet Union.

When one tries to come to some conclusion in the light of these individual examples it seems clear that a tremendous shift of the economic centre of gravity is now under way in the Soviet Union. The removal of the capital from Saint Petersburg to Moscow, from the periphery to the interior of the country, symbolizes the moving of the centre of gravity of the country to its interior. The great industrial plants are hastening this process, and the chief industrial centres are moving more and more to the east and south. This tendency is due in no small measure to strategic considerations. Within a few decades the

true economic centre of the country will no longer be Moscow but some city in the Urals.

The United States has undergone a very similar development. The original thirteen American states were all spread along the Atlantic seaboard, but decade by decade the American pioneer, the real standard bearer of the young nation, moved farther and farther west. The huge stores of mineral wealth, petroleum, and coal in the centre of the North American continent hastened the westward movement of industry. When one looks at a map showing the geographical distribution of crops in the United States, the western spread of cotton planta-

tions from 1890 to 1933 leaps to the eye. The first plantations were along the Atlantic Ocean. Then they moved west of the Alleghenies. To-day the chief cotton-growing area is west of the Mississippi, in Texas; and the same process can be observed in respect to wheat and corn, oil and iron.

These facts are the best indication that the present historical epoch is characterized above all else by a marked development of the continent. Economically, this means that the vast continental states have a greater future than the sea powers, and politically it means that the world's political centre of gravity is moving, too.

II. GERMANY'S NEW SOCIAL POLICY

By ERICH HAEUBER

Translated from the *Berliner Tageblatt*, Berlin National-Socialist Daily

THE social policy that Bismarck created as an essential part of general state policy was degraded by the psychosis of the class struggle to a portion of party policy and falsely turned into an object of purely egotistic and material interests. Ever denser became the impenetrable thicket of 'social ideology,' which overgrew the body politic with a poisoning and paralyzing effect. Social phraseology soon distinguished only between 'social revolutionaries' and 'social rectifiers' and thus discredited everything that social policy stood for. In a party state that finally came to recognize the pay envelope as the sole central value, so-called social policy necessarily had to assume an independent existence that overstepped the bounds laid down for it

by reason, by the requirements of a sound state policy, and by the means at its disposition.

This year's revolution has destroyed the social phraseology of Marxism. The overcoming of the class struggle has freed social policy from the falsification and the misuse to which it was subject. A new social movement has been set in motion that flows from the true wellsprings of the people and corresponds to their innate vital requirements. Therefore what is 'social' to-day is no longer an intellectual problem or a theoretical system, for it has become the natural principle underlying all the measures of the new Administration.

First of all, the German people and every individual must be weaned again from the thought that 'the

state' must help in every emergency, that every man has an inborn claim to the unconditional safeguarding of his existence. This thought has paralyzed the energy of the individual and of the entire people. Therefore limitation of the means of communal welfare is indeed a hard law dictated by our impoverishment, but perhaps also the only path to the self-education and rehabilitation of the German people. The danger that this may lead to indescribable misery for countless innocent people certainly exists; indeed, it is tremendous. But this danger can no longer be averted by the state alone without imperiling the future of our people.

Therefore the Government has called for a unique programme of self-help. The 'winter relief against hunger and cold' appeals to the fellow feeling of all German people. It does not speculate with the readiness for sacrifice of the quickly enthused masses but calls upon each individual's sense of duty toward his fellow men. Therefore a person's more or less active participation in this relief work is not an indication of some particular party affiliation, but is a measure of the degree in which he is truly bound to his people.

Even if the winter relief programme succeeds—and it will succeed because in this question nothing can stand between the Government and the people as a whole—the path of social policy is not yet free from problems. A half century of 'social movement' in a given direction does not ebb away overnight. Its waves still continue to oscillate in the depths and sometimes rise to the surface, showing clearly with how many of yesterday's tensions and problems we still have to contend.

The social activity of the past decade reared a superstructure of social policy whose pressure still weighs upon the economic system with a paralyzing effect. But the danger that this will be carried to its conclusion in the form of the complete triumph of autonomous social thought for the sake of the principle of organization seems to have passed over. Nevertheless, public attention must remain alert. The grandiose plan of combining all social insurance into a single huge organization to which a single social contribution would be made was passionately discussed for too long a time. A kind of statistical intoxication that recalled the figures of the inflation seized too many people and inspired them with the idea of erecting the most gigantic social structure in the world. And everyone cannot lay aside such schemes all at once.

The idea was for twenty-five per cent of the total national wages, including the new trade-union contribution, to be paid to this one organization. A total annual contribution of from eight to ten billions was counted on and in better times this would rise to twelve or fifteen billions. And all this money was to be handled through the organization's own banks. Thus, within the state, a social state would have arisen whose separate life would have overshadowed and stunted all other life.

Although the idea of complete centralization must be abandoned because it would lead to an absolute bureaucracy, all steps toward a central organization cannot be avoided, in so far as they serve to simplify, clarify, and reduce the costs of government. To draw the correct line

here will be one of the most difficult tasks of the immediate future.

II

The further problem, to what extent and in what form the self-administration of the insurance societies shall be maintained, has also remained unsolved. That is closely connected with the question whether, and if so in what form, social elections shall still take place. The concept of self-administration seems in no wise to have been definitively buried, but will experience a new revival and restoration so that it can again be set into activity when it has undergone the necessary purification. We should welcome such a development because we consider it perilous to let things take their own course in this domain of bureaucracy. For in this very province it is a question not so much of purely administrative activity as, far more, of a predominantly economic task.

Far more difficult than these problems of organization are the financial problems, especially in regard to annuity insurance. The technical insurance balance sheets of disablement and employees' insurance drawn up by the Reich Labor Ministry present a very threatening picture. Of course this will become somewhat more favorable when the economic situation improves, but even then complete recovery is not to be looked for of itself, without the adoption of radical measures.

In the period lying behind us recourse was had first of all in such instances to the expedient of increasing contributions. But even then it had to be acknowledged that the screws

had been applied too closely, and that therefore increased contributions in one sphere of insurance were possible only if the contributions in some other sphere were moderated. Such a possibility still exists to-day only in the field of sickness insurance at best. And even here new economical measures would be applied almost entirely at the expense of the healing professions—doctors, dentists, apothecaries, and so on. And these measures, in addition to the sacrifices already incurred, would cause these professions to sink definitely into the proletariat or to be satisfied with a considerably lower level of accomplishment. Since such a development runs counter to the Government's desire to reestablish a correct relationship between achievement and compensation, the reinstatement of the technical insurance principle of achievement and compensation must be considered first of all for sickness insurance and then wherever annuities are insufficient and a real need exists to pay increases out of the general tax resources.

In order to avoid overburdening the public funds, the new administration has entered upon a new path in this domain also, and is pursuing it with determination. It has reactivated the social community of the individual enterprise and of the family in its economic and social policy. In social policy especially, it has made a beginning by disqualifying domestic servants for receiving unemployment insurance. A second, most decisive step was then taken by disqualifying all agriculturists for receiving unemployment insurance. In this way the partnership of the employer and the employee in the individual enter-

prise, to which the employer has always been ready to point, has again been introduced into practical life.

These efforts are now to be continued in the field of industry. The watchword has gone out that the struggle against unemployment will not have made real progress until it has become possible to maintain during the winter the millions of employees who are reabsorbed into the production process in summer. Naturally this programme is being put into effect very slowly and cautiously in order to avoid the serious economic disturbances that might arise in the separate industrial concerns.

The situation is much more difficult in industry than it is in agriculture, where it is largely a question of supplying natural products. But barter and the patriarchal labor system will be resorted to only after it has been proved that, as a result of the price pressure on the markets and the necessity of first turning goods into money, a money economy cannot support labor. Agriculture may also hope that increased consumers and the opportunity to supply food-stuffs directly to the agricultural worker may in time have favorable economic consequences.

But the most essential and original

part of the Government's whole scheme is its effort to shift social policy as much as possible back to the industrial and domestic community. This fact gives evidence of the Government's determination and it corresponds to the national state's conception of the partnership between the employer and the employee, the social function of the individual enterprise, and the idea of self-help and of the national community. The idea of state welfare has been relegated to the background in favor of the independent activity of the various elements of society. Hence the possibility may also arise of abolishing part of the social bureaucracy. Already we are seeing that a big new social apparatus is not being erected to handle the winter relief programme, but that the state is making use of the mutual-aid societies and other relief organizations already in existence.

If one considers the path upon which social policy has entered, one recognizes that new ideas are being set in motion which promise practical results. And one can rest assured that they will be carried out systematically and brought to a satisfactory conclusion, untroubled by the ideas and wishes derived from the old 'welfare state' and the Utopia of Marxian centralism.

III. THE NEW GERMAN SPIRIT

By KARL RAUCH

Translated from the *Literarische Welt*, Berlin Literary Weekly

Germany is the decisive world power, not only because of its position on the border of Asia, which is now the most important continent from the standpoint

of world politics, but also because the Germans are still young enough to mould and to determine the world historical problems that they are facing,

whereas other nations have become too old and rigid.—OSWALD SPENGLER.

'WAR is madness,' said Reichsminister Dr. Goebbels in one of his great speeches, thus expressing what every German feels to-day and what every responsible man must feel. Germany wants peace, so Dr. Goebbels continued, for Germany needs peace, and the world should not talk of war or think of war as long as it still suffers from the bitter consequences of the last war. Will the world, will the countries of the earth hear and believe this message? Will France get over its mad obsession that the Germans have no other thought than to fall upon their Western neighbor and right by force of arms the wrong that has been done them?

Ah, it is a case of bad conscience, a guilty feeling of the undeniable injustice that was done at Versailles when France tried to achieve security in a thousand different ways and succeeded only in destroying order in all parts of the world. It is the constant throb of that evil conscience which keeps France awake at night and raises ever new fears and distrust. At last it is clear that the entire order of things that was decreed at Versailles was not a natural order but an order that was forcibly imposed, and it is gradually being recognized that life cannot continue down a false path forever, that inevitably the day must come when healthy vitality will shatter the present condition of diseased bondage, and that no mechanism of security even a thousand times stronger than the present one can prevent this outburst of life. And the Frenchman suspects that every step, every movement from the right bank of the Rhine,

marks the beginning of that vital outburst, of that real life which France calls chaos.

Yes, it will come some time, this outbreak of organic life, and when all the mechanical evils of Versailles collapse a new world order will be established in accordance with natural justice to all nations and to their peoples. But—and here is the supreme, decisive denial of all rigid Western thought—Germany seeks the path of natural settlement. It believes that time will prove the impossibility of the Versailles system. The power of a united national will must assert itself without resorting to a war that would destroy all human culture. One great European nation after another will understand that in this direction and in this direction only lies the healthiest future for all peoples.

Germany must still bear and suffer much before all the other nations learn that this German way, which they are all called upon to understand and to pursue themselves, leads to the birth of a new order. Misunderstanding spreads, ill will rages and rages with increasing intensity. It will require years and decades before the world understands the meaning and spirit of the new Germany.

II

Meanwhile, in the states around Germany credence is being given to those unnatural renegades who announce that they alone incorporate and represent the true German spirit, although they abandoned Germany at the moment when, after defeat, confusion, and upheaval, it was just beginning to be itself again. They reviled and cursed as long as they

breathed German air, and now they are doing the same thing abroad. Leopold Schwarzschild is trumpeting in Amsterdam that the political transformation now in progress in National Socialist Germany is a minor affair and that the important thing is the suppression of civilized society and the return to an atavistic stage of development. And Joseph Roth, whose dubious shifts from right to left we well remember, is crying out against the exchange of French and German students, which is driving the literary Jews of Vienna wild with rage at Hitler's Germany.

'All that the French children can learn in the Third Reich is to throw hand grenades, to persecute Jews, to despise Latin peoples, including their own, to admire brutality, treason, injustice, and unrighteousness.' That is the way Roth rants, and he continues in this vein: 'Let everyone who loves France protect her children from the danger of singing the Horst Wessel song, of honoring murders and murderers, of despising the cross and reshaping it into the swastika, of marching in squads, and of reviling God and humanity. Let no children be quartered in infected barracks.' Before the 'generosity of the French people and its belief in the indestructible eternity of what is human' Roth prostrates himself in the dust. He goes cringing about France, heaping all kinds of praise upon the country. Historical facts like the bloody French Revolution do not exist for his brutal fanaticism. The bestiality of the official France of 1933 he does not recognize. But 'the language in the Third Reich is no longer the German language. It is a barbaric stammering combining Prussian slang, the language of illus-

trated-newspaper advertisements, and the dark verbiage of racial mystics.' These words were written in Holland by Joseph Roth, whose novel, *Radetzky-Marsch*, was one of the best-selling books in Germany during last year's Christmas season. He praises France and recommends that it exchange children with Austria, which he describes as a country 'that was German when the March of Brandenburg still spoke Kashube, a language that modern Prussia has forgotten how to speak without having learned the language of Germany, the country it pretends to represent.' Must we turn to fugitives in Amsterdam to discover what is German and what is not?

The foul spirit of these emigrants must be allowed to work itself out in the world. Even foreigners who do not understand the German spirit at all must instinctively recognize the hollow arrogance and malicious falsehood that lurks in every interpretation of Germany that has emanated from people who have lived outside the country during the past few months and who pretend to speak for the present desires of Germany now that they have assured their own personal safety. So be it. But, unfortunately, the daily outcries of these *émigrés* who have un-Germanized themselves often make an impression on people of sound judgment, and their most insane lies find believers who do not realize that awakened Germany asks only for its natural right to live in the family of nations. Thus the most infamous methods are being used to erect an ever-growing wall of psychological misunderstanding such as rose up at the beginning of the War.

Only because such a psychosis exists is it possible for a man like

Romain Rolland, who antagonized his fellow countrymen when, as a Frenchman, he openly protested against the injustice of Versailles, who has always been demanding revision of that dictate and has urged complete equality for Germany among world powers, only because such a psychosis exists is it possible for this determined friend of Germany and fighter against oppression and misunderstanding suddenly to range himself on the side of the opponents of the new Germany and to describe the ascending will to life of the German people as it manifests itself in the National Socialist movement as 'egotism, ignominy, and error.' How painfully little the world must know of the existence of Germany, of Germany's need and necessities, if even this distinguished spirit, who has always proclaimed that he loved the land of Germany and German culture, suffers from such immeasurable confusion and blindness.

III

Germans whose names are respected throughout the whole world of culture have stepped forward and answered Rolland—Rudolf G. Binding, E. G. Kolbenheyer, Wilhelm von Scholz, and others. They have cried out to this man whose work and personality have always been dear to them: 'You are mistaken, you are blinded; what you see is not Germany!' They said this to Rolland, they said it to him in the press and in pamphlets that were circulated throughout the world. Binding spoke the most clearly: 'For fourteen years we were kept from feeling ourselves a nation. The Versailles dictate brought this state of affairs about and'—so he

went on, speaking quite personally to Romain Rolland—'if you had lived with us during the last fourteen years you would perhaps, with your temperament, have become one of the most nationalistic of revolutionaries.' While Rolland was making an abstract German idol out of air and paper and telling us we should take it as our model, Binding was explaining to him that the revolution was the 'sovereign life expression' of a people, and he explained that National Socialism was a 'religion of the ability to bear arms.' He said clearly that 'the world cannot overestimate the profound religious sense of this revolution.'

In such a manner does Rudolf G. Binding, a mature man of rank, merit, and distinction, oppose Romain Rolland. He stands as a fighter and advocate for the rights of his people in the world. Perhaps the thirty-eight members of the German Academy of Poetry should have answered Romain Rolland in a body, as the representatives of poetry, art, and the spirit in the new Germany. They did not do so, and those of their members who expressed themselves as Binding did and took their places at his side acted as individuals. It might have been a fine thing if, after the merely decorative passivity of the old Academy, the new one had launched a united attack against the wall of lies and misconceptions and made the world see the great unity of Germany in spiritual matters. But Binding rode forth alone and a few other writers jumped to his side to defend German right and German honor. And probably this was the best course. For against the phalanx of the entire Academy the hydra-headed, lying international press would merely have risen up with increased

suspicion. It would not have hesitated to describe such an announcement of the Academy as having been made under pressure of the Government.

But since Binding's avowal and Gottfried Benn's severe denunciation of the emigrants were made in complete independence, let us hope that they will be believed at least by those foreigners who are not completely deceived. And, for Germany's sake, for the sake of world peace, it is necessary that this testimony should be laid before the world by men who are known and esteemed outside the lying emigrant group.

Let us make ourselves as clear as possible: The situation is tense in the extreme. 'Germany is not an island. No other country is so much wrapped up, for better or worse, with world destiny. Its geographical situation alone, its lack of natural boundaries, condemns it to this position. In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries it was *Mitteleuropa*; in the twentieth century it has again become what it was in the thirteenth century, a land bordering on Asia, and no people are more compelled to think politically and economically far beyond their boundaries than the Germans. Everything that happens at a distance has repercussions inside Germany.' These sentences appear in Oswald Spengler's new book, *Jahre der Entscheidung*, and whatever doubts some of his theses may arouse, Spengler is certainly correct in this description of the position of Germany. To recognize it is our first and last duty from the point of view of realistic as well as spiritual policy. Any act that does not take into account the incontrovertibility of this statement damages the German cause.

One of the most obvious weaknesses

of the defenders of the Weimar Republic was that they recognized only the weak elements in the position of Germany. Thus they made Germany the football of foreign powers and betrayed its own essence. Due to incomprehension and incapacity, they tried to come to an understanding with the rest of the world at the cost of complete surrender. The aim of National Socialism in respect to Germany's position in the world is not one of miserable surrender of its own value and will, a surrender that would cause our people to be humiliated by other nations, nor is it what certain anxious people fear who believe lies and swallow the universal libels against us to the effect that we intend to bend other nations to our will and to conquer the world.

IV

Germany at all times in its history has always been ready and eager to understand and respect the peculiarities and qualities of other nations. This kind of understanding is so deeply rooted in Germans that no force can change it, no determination can uproot it. But the awakened German people of 1933 now expect, desire, and demand from their neighbors, from other nations, and from the world that same understanding of others, of those nearest and those furthest away, that same determination to understand other types, which they themselves possess to a fanatical degree. In so far as such understanding exists among all nations, in so far as such a real, equal understanding between one nation and another becomes the watchword of future world policy, to precisely that extent will a new order be erected

in the world and banish the fear of war through the power of profound humanity.

Misunderstanding always disrupts relations between man and man. The happiest marriage is not immune to it. The most loyal friendship can come to grief overnight. When anything of that sort threatens, conversation removes the danger and restores the old order. Silence and dumb self-containment merely raise more doubts and finally lead to complete hostility. For two decades an icy silence has prevailed between the real Germany and the rest of the world. In 1914, the old ties were broken and all the people who have attempted to create substitute ties since 1918 were unfit for the task and incapable of defending or representing the German spirit, the one exception being Count Brockdorff-Rantzau, who refused to sign the Versailles Treaty. The hostility between the rest of the world and ourselves can be dispelled only by the words and testimony of those of our fellow countrymen who are real representatives of the German spirit and are recognized as such outside of their country.

The important thing is not the written or printed word but the spoken word, the oratorical personality. This has been amply proved by the last few years of German domestic politics. But it would be a mistake to make a list of our propaganda orators and methodically send them abroad to preach official sermons to the rest of the world. That is what Bolshevik Russia did with the political purpose of Bolshevizing other nations by world propaganda, and the attempt failed because the national peculiarities of each people rebel against this mechanistic attempt to make all na-

tions the same. Germany does not think of a conquest of power, it does not think of conducting a propaganda campaign of National Socialism in other nations. Every nation has its own style and must find its own way and its own form. That is one of the fundamentals of the new German movement. Nothing is more remote from us than lecturing other nations or 'making proselytes.'

V

But the world must learn to understand Germany—its situation, its tragedy, its danger, its meaning, its task, its necessity—in relation to the rest of the world, and it will understand these things soonest if we send out our best and worthiest individuals to explain logically and understandingly to foreign nations that have been blinded by the lies of the emigrants what Germany is and what Germany wants. Binding, who is esteemed in England as a German writer and an officer during the War, was among the first Germans to be received after 1918 in London's academic and political circles, where he described the spirit of Germany. Hence he is well qualified to refute in person, in London, Oxford, and Cambridge, the misconceptions that Romain Rolland has spread. Gottfried Benn, author of *Letters to Emigrants*, seems the man to tell the Parisian public about his people and his nation in the hope that he may find some understanding and prepare the way for better relations. Walde-mar Bonsels should certainly go to London, Paris, and Brussels, and he would also find attentive listeners in the Scandinavian capitals.

Obviously, we must renounce all

mental inertia. Since Paris, London, and New York have lately been regaled with such dubious figures as Heinrich Mann, Emil Ludwig, and Lion Feuchtwanger, who have had the audacity to represent themselves as spokesmen of the German spirit, it is now up to us to call the attention of the world to some other individuals who properly represent the German spirit and who are equipped to expound it. I have already mentioned some of them. Here are a few more: Hans F. Blunck, Bruno Brehm, Friedrich Schnack, Wilhelm Schäfer, Walter von Molo. And the English universities should invite a man like Hans Grimm and hear from his own lips his doctrine of the 'nation without room.' The reverse process should also occur, so that, while men like Huxley and Wells are fraternizing with little emigrant cliques, German literary circles should invite such writers as R. H. Mottram, author of *The Spanish Farm*, and Rolf Gardiner to visit and lecture

to us as representatives of young England.

The rootless, Jewish, intermediary layer that has long pretended to represent spiritual Germany in all parts of the world while none of us has ever protested is about to abdicate of its own free will the perch where it has been sitting, spinning lies. Gradually even the most stupid foreigner will come to see the truth of what one of the greatest of French publishers said to me in December 1932 when I was paying a short visit to Paris: 'We can no longer believe that Arnold Zweig and Jacob Wassermann represent the really important literature of Germany.' And to this statement the publisher added a request that I would acquaint him with the names and books of those German writers that I considered representative of our people. 'The point is,' as my Paris friend said, 'to learn to know the real Germany and to make it visible to ourselves.'

Persons and Personages

'DOGS BARK'

By MONTAGU NORMAN

From *The Times*, London Conservative Daily

IT IS a little hard, it seems to me, that first the Lord Mayor should speak and then the Chancellor and then Mr. Churchill and then poor me. It is a little hard. The company is too high for me, and I must remind you of the particular difficulties with which, I think, any amateur speaker finds himself, especially in such a company as this. It is recorded in the immortal pages of *Alice*: 'He neither means what he says, nor says what he means.' And that is one of the great difficulties. . . .

We here have seen during this year changes take effect that a short time ago would have seemed unbelievable. I need not enumerate them, but obviously if the business on which this city is built up and on which this city must largely depend—business that we received from our fathers and that we hold in trust: a tradition that we did not make, that was passed on to us—if that business is to continue, we await the coming of other changes and of less changes than the sort we have watched, during the coming year [*sic*].

We here above all things have progressed slowly, deliberately, carefully, and successfully, by a process that I may call evolution. We have perhaps done so more than they have in other countries, but, generally speaking, finance, banking, and merchanting have progressed slowly and regularly and not by jerks. The process that some generations ago was named the theory of evolution by Darwin, although purely a biological treatise so far as he was concerned, nevertheless is largely analogous to the process that has been adopted in this city. It would not be far wrong to say that evolution has been succeeded by revolution.

None of us whose businesses lie about the streets round the Mansion House can deny that we have seen during this year changes take effect that a short time ago would have seemed unbelievable. I need not enumerate them. The Chancellor of the Exchequer has described the reason for isolation, instability of the exchanges, the great uncertainty that has been seen in certain countries more than others, but generally throughout the world. All those are a menace to us to-day.

We do not see surrounding us those traditions upon which the business with which we have grown up can safely be expected to proceed. We have been accustomed to proceed by experience. We have taken a fresh

step in whatever business was ours as soon as, but not sooner than, the last step was secure. We have made changes knowing that those changes were the giving up of something that would not work in favor of something that would work. That is a result of long experience. It is on that that the position of London is based, but experience has given way to experiment. The difference in letters is small; the difference in result is incalculable. Look where we will, we have seen on all sides this last year one experiment succeed another, and of none of those experiments can we yet see the end.

I am not speaking politically. I am speaking of those matters that vitally affect the business interests of this community—I say vitally affect it, because we are not only members of a city and of an island, but members of an Empire, a continent, and a world. If our business is to proceed, as I believe it will again, we need an adjustment of those conditions. Having at home so hopeful and so firm a background, we may, I believe, look forward to some gradual improvement elsewhere, but it will be piecemeal and its course is uncertain. We shall have many difficulties, we shall have much criticism, we shall have many disagreements, I doubt not, at home and abroad, but I console myself with this thought—that ‘dogs bark but the caravan passes on.’

STALIN AT WORK

By W. J.

Translated from the *Neue Zürcher Zeitung*, Zürich German-Language Daily

THE *Sozialistische Boten*, a publication issued by Socialist *émigrés* that always is very well posted on Russian conditions, contains some interesting information about the ‘unusual life’ that Stalin leads in the ‘unusual’ headquarters of the Communist Party. Anyone can gain admittance to the enormous building in the sixth story of which is the office of the General Secretary and Dictator, anyone, that is, who can show his party membership card. People are constantly running in and out of the two lower floors, where everything is dirty and dusty. It is hard to tell the visitors from the officials. Here the details of the Party are handled and the ‘Party Plebs’ impress their stamp on the office work. But from the third floor up visitors are less numerous. Here are the quarters of the ‘Orgraspred,’ the organizational department of the Central Committee, on which all appointments of party members, all demotions and advancements depend. Visitors automatically lower their voices. The officials on this floor still wear the democratic Russian blouse, but nobody would dare to talk confidentially to them, as is done

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on the floors below. Above the fourth story, where the department of cultural propaganda is quartered, a different and highly qualified personnel is installed and special papers are needed for one to secure admission.

All of the sixth and top floor is devoted to the party Secretariat. The offices of Postishev and Kaganovich, the two undersecretaries of the Party, are near the entrance and Stalin's room is farther away. He occupies an entire 'Stalin's half' of the floor and one door only connects it with the other rooms. This door opens on the room of Stalin's private secretary, who is thus able to keep track of everyone who goes in or out of 'Stalin's half.' Whereas Kaganovich and Postishev receive a comparatively large number of visitors,—at least several dozen a week,—Stalin sees at most two or three people a day. Thus every audience Stalin grants is a subject of much discussion. There are no unexpected guests. At a prearranged time and without any waiting the visitor is ushered in to Stalin. The staff here is well dressed and well drilled. It is like the reception room of a European minister.

Special significance is attached to the archives in 'Stalin's half,' which contain secret information about important party members and list their misdeeds and offenses. There is a 'conduct list' in the headquarters of the Central Committee covering every party member, but Stalin has no great faith in a big staff and therefore he himself keeps under lock and key the documents pertaining to the Communist worthies. They are his best weapon to turn against all oppositional ambitions in the Party. Besides the 'black list,' the archives contain a mass of other secret material that has been prepared and catalogued by Stalin's secretary. Stalin himself reads only the most important items, but he must be kept posted in regard to all entries that are made and every document must be readily available.

Stalin's office is the holiest of all the suites in the building. He spends all day here until late at night, receives visitors, and comes to his own decisions. He likes to attack each problem by having the relevant material from the rooms of the Secretariat and from the different People's commissars left in his own office, where he arrives at his final decisions without assistance. He does not write down his conclusions in his own hand but dictates to the secretary who is on duty. The secretary has to enter the room without a word, write down in complete silence what Stalin says, and leave the room without saying anything. When some matter of unusual importance is under consideration Stalin walks about the room as he dictates, puffing at his pipe—an old habit that has remained with him from the time when he used to be in prison.

Stalin's political interests are of particular importance in relation to the present Russian policy of nonaggression pacts and in connection with

the increased tension in Eastern Asia. The contributor to *Sozialistische Boten* explains that since hostilities broke out in Manchuria between China and Japan, Stalin has concentrated his attention on foreign policy. Since 1930 no diplomatic step has been taken without directions from Stalin. The Dictator has been profoundly disturbed by the repeated humiliations to which Japan has subjected Russian prestige in the Far East. He certainly counts on a Japanese attack. His whole strategy is therefore directed toward creating the most favorable attitude possible toward Russia in Europe in order to be able to meet the danger of Japanese provocation with as little risk as possible. Litvinov's nonaggression treaties and Radek's visit to Warsaw were definitely arranged by Stalin, and the Dictator is very pleased with the results. He advocated the *rapprochement* with France and the drift away from Germany not so much because he hated Hitler as because he was forced to depend on the friendship of France in Eastern Asia. The Kremlin now believes that Russia is sufficiently well insured not to have to accept any more of Japan's demands lying down. Stalin has decided not to capitulate but to fight.

BUCHMAN MEANS BUSINESS

By H. R. S. PHILLPOTT

From the *Daily Herald*, London Labor Daily

THE Bishops are battling about the Buchmanites. If there were no more to it than that it really would n't matter much, because it is easy enough to get the Bishops to battle about anything. Birth control, beer, and the Book of Common Prayer supply three modern examples. But does it mean more than that? If it does, it may possibly mean that we are on the edge of the most remarkable religious movement that we have known for many years. If it does not, it means nothing.

When it was announced that the Buchmanites (which is a much fairer name for the new evangelistic movement than 'The Oxford Group'—because it has no more to do with Oxford than with Ottawa) were going to capture London, and that the Bishop of London and the Archbishop of Canterbury—to say nothing of the Lord Mayor—were going to speed their efforts, the Bishop of Durham dashed in to warn his ecclesiastical brethren that 'the movement's teaching is gravely suspect and its much-vaunted achievements have been openly denied,' that 'scandals are hushed up,' that 'spiritual exhibitionism plays a large part,' and that 'the darkest shadow on the movement is the trail of moral and intellectual wrecks that its progress leaves behind.'

Other Bishops and lesser clerical figures leaped to the defense. The Lord Mayor carried on. So did the Bishop of London. So did the Archbishop of Canterbury, who received the Buchmanites at Lambeth Palace and delivered an address to them that was not reported. And the Buchmanites have been loosed on London to try out, with a modernized technique, a campaign similar in many respects to those of John Wesley, Sankey and Moody, and Gipsy Smith, but very dissimilar in personalities, in methods of attack, and in the social classes to which that attack is primarily directed.

Dr. F. N. Buchman himself is a cute, shrewd, bald, spectacled American. And, lest that description should have the savor of an antagonism that is not intended, let me add that he is a charming man to meet, such an agreeable conversationalist that he is apt to make one miss an appointment, has the strange characteristic of magnetizing and repelling almost at the same moment, is the possessor of a sense of humor that helps him in his human calculations, and has a knack of being able to flick a meeting almost contemptuously at one moment, to make it laugh at the next, to cry immediately afterward, and then to bow its collective head. Rather like Gordon Richards steering strange mounts past the post and winning the stakes.

He may be the champion revivalist. Or he may not. That is just about to be put to the test by the launching of the great campaign by his team of between four and five hundred young men and women whose material organization is centred in a West End hotel, but whose real direction, they claim, comes from God himself.

I have met many of them and am convinced of their sincerity. They believe that during a 'quiet time,' when they sit silent with notebook in one hand and pencil in the other, the thoughts that come to them and that they write down are divinely inspired messages. To use their own word—'guidance.' For my part, I find that a little difficult to accept. To sit relaxed and quiet is an admirable thing. To accept one's subconscious thoughts as the direct voice of God seems to me to be going dangerously far.

WHEN I was at the International House Party at Oxford early in July there were two incidents that rather shook what budding faith I might have had in this particular form of guidance. One was when an enthusiastic Groupist dashed up to 'Frank' (Dr. Buchman), said he had received 'guidance' to carry out a certain plan in his town, and asked 'Frank' if he thought it would be all right. I failed to understand why it was necessary to get the human 'Frank's' approval of divine 'guidance.'

In much the same way I failed this week-end to understand why the

human Bishop of London should 'commission a team' in St. Paul's Cathedral to carry on with the God-guided campaign in London. Which takes me back to the other incident in Oxford. I was told one day that the London campaign was being prepared. The next day at a Group meeting a young man stood up and said that during his 'quiet time' in the morning he had received 'guidance' that a London campaign should be undertaken. From the point of view of 'guidance' it seemed to me that the cart had been put before the horse.

'Sharing' is likely to bewilder London. The Buchmanites stand up and openly confess their sins. Many of the confessions reveal only peccadillos; others much more. Some of the confessors are thought to plead guilty to sins they have never committed. Many who have committed the sins to which they confess sometimes mention second parties who can have had no knowledge that the revelations are being made. I am not arguing whether that is good or bad; it just takes place.

Restitution, love, and many other fine things figure in the programme of the Buchmanites. They have no separate church organization, no membership roll, no regular meeting places, no published accounts. Yet in a few years their activities have spread all over the world, their adherents may possibly be numbered by the million (no one knows), they have undoubtedly 'changed lives,' and they may, of course, have left, as the Bishop of Durham says, 'a trail of moral and intellectual wrecks.'

The Buchmanites I have met have been of the jolly, 'hearty' type, a little self-satisfied, a little too obviously conscious of the fact that they live on a different plane from that occupied by the rest of us, and apparently undisturbed by the fact that the poor and the uneducated make up but a tiny proportion of their numbers. But they are putting it over, and they mean business. 'Frank' is a clever man, and the key to it all may lie in a remark he made a week or two ago: '*The time is ripe for a great revival of religion.*'

It probably is. A worried, puzzled, harassed humanity is waiting for something, not knowing what that something is. The Buchmanites think they have it, but whether they have or not they are going to try to make a great religious stir during the next few weeks. And if they really have the something for which the world is waiting, I hope they will break away from their usual geographical practice and try out the drab, tragic postal districts of E. and S.E. as well as the more comfortable W. and S.W., in which so many of their activities are carried on.

Here is a radio debate between two British scientists, Julian Huxley and Hyman Levy, on whether the methods of science can be applied to social problems.

Science *and* SOCIETY

By HYMAN LEVY
and JULIAN HUXLEY

From *The Listener*
Weekly organ of the British Broadcasting Corporation

PROFESSOR HYMAN LEVY: So, Huxley, I hear you are rushing round the country making a survey of scientific activity.

JULIAN HUXLEY: Yes, Levy, the British Broadcasting Corporation asked me to do this very interesting, and I might say arduous, job and I have started trying to find out something about the different ways and means by which scientific research is being carried on and its results applied. So I have already been to Scotland and Wales, and shall go on for some time visiting various laboratories and research institutions. The idea is to attempt to discover how far science to-day is helping to cater for the needs of the people of this country.

H. L.: Do you mean you propose to show how science is serving the needs of British industry?

J. H.: No, that is only a fraction of

what I had in mind. After all, science is helping government departments like the Post Office, and it is being used to improve the nation's health. I want, too, to see what is being done in regard to pure science.

H. L.: Of course, all these come within the ambit of science—and more—but the question I was raising was whether in the main, historically if you like, the driving force of science is n't its use for production, and whether all these other aspects are not really subsidiary to that.

J. H.: I don't know that I had thought about the problem along those lines. Perhaps we ought to clear the ground a bit and get down to fundamentals.

H. L.: All right, let us first examine what is this science you are going to study. I suggest that the proper way to approach that question is first to

examine what science has done in social life, its relation to man's needs, and the methods it has developed for handling the raw material of nature. Secondly, if we wish to understand why science has taken on the complexion it has, we shall have to ask ourselves some questions about what the forces were that directed scientific attention to certain fields to the exclusion of others. For example, why so many scientists turn to the properties of dead matter and so few to social problems, why we know so much about cold storage and so little about how the community is run.

J. H.: Certainly these are aspects of science. But I generally like to think of it as a body of knowledge. The knowledge is organized, and it is based on the scientific method. And the scientific method consists of testing your results by observation and experiment, and in publishing your facts and your procedure in full, so that others can check your conclusions. This knowledge can, of course, always be applied to controlling nature, but most scientists, I think, would say that there definitely is something that can be called *pure science*, which has a momentum of its own and goes on growing, irrespective of its applications.

II

H. L.: I think that, stated in this way, a false emphasis is being laid on pure science. There can be no essential division between it and applied science. They are interdependent surely, and differ only in remoteness from application.

J. H.: What about Greek science, for instance, which had hardly any applications?

H. L.: The fact is that the Greek state was catered for by ample slave labor, and therefore there was no need for mechanization, for labor-saving devices. Thus the interests of the Greeks were those of a leisured class, and therefore their science was mainly philosophical in complexion. Whatever application there was, was mainly to war.

J. H.: Yes, I see that. I suppose that is also why Greek science differed so radically from modern science in having little experimental foundation, and why the ancient Greek scientists, unlike modern scientists with their detailed technical publications, seem not to have been interested in the methods by which they reached their results, but only in their conclusions. As a matter of history, I would say that modern science began in earnest less than three hundred years ago with Francis Bacon, and his emphasis on the need for objective testing.

H. L.: Agreed. But surely this underlines my earlier point that science takes its complexion mainly from the social and economic life of the times. There was little experimenting among the Greeks because there was little need for application; whereas at the time of Bacon, social life had changed considerably, transport and navigation to distant parts of the earth had come in with commerce, crude slavery had all but passed away. All these things were stimulating that deliberate and critical study of nature which we call experimental science.

J. H.: That's all very reasonable. But what about pure science to-day? There are surely plenty of practical problems for science to deal with now, and yet we find scientists spending a great deal of time on very abstract and

remote questions like the quantum theory, the habits of deep-sea fish, the expanding universe, or the internal constitution of stars that we can never hope to influence at all or to control in any way.

H. L.: Ah, that arises, it seems to me, from the peculiar nature of modern conditions, where science, unable to find an outlet for its accumulated energy in industrial practice, turns rather to more speculative fields. That, however, is another story. Anyhow, even these matters you mention are associated with others that themselves have applications—for instance, the quantum theory has applications not very remote from the state of affairs inside the ordinary wireless valve. Scientific work interlocks from one end of the scale to the other.

III

J. H.: Yes, I see your point, but there are difficulties in this severely practical view. Surely a great deal of scientific work gets done just to satisfy the interest of the scientists who carry it out? And, if so, is n't it being carried out for its own sake, as an end in itself?

H. L.: Yes, to the individual scientist it appears so; it gratifies an individual desire and provides a personal satisfaction. So to him it appears an end in itself. That is, of course, a practical but personal aspect. The scientific work he does, however, is taken up by someone else, and so he has played his part in the movement we call science. He has his personal interpretation of the small part he has played, but *we* have to see science in wider perspective, as a social affair fulfilling, however inadequately, certain

social needs or providing some of the machinery for their fulfillment.

J. H.: What about the keen amateur scientist—the amateur astronomer or insect-collector or bird-watcher? He surely is making his observations an end in themselves?

H. L.: In that sense, yes. His work is satisfying a personal need, certainly. But because it is so personal, its scope is restricted.

J. H.: I think we might see how far we agree now, after all this argument. How will this do as a formal definition? Science in the modern sense is a body of knowledge that has been tested by experiment. Historically it has grown as a result of several factors, which affect man both as an individual and as a social animal: firstly, our need to exercise some control over the forces of nature; secondly, our urge to understand man's place in the universe; and, thirdly, the pleasure we get out of the use of our faculties in the process of observing, understanding, and changing nature. Would you agree to that?

H. L.: Yes, I think that will do, although you are still thinking of it as a body of knowledge. But now, agreeing that science and the scientific movement have emerged out of the growing needs of society, we ought to examine what stress has been placed on the various aspects of it, the purer as opposed to the more definitely applied. What, for example, settles how much money shall be devoted to scientific work in the universities in comparison with severely technological work outside of them? Is there any deliberate control of the scientific movement, as a whole, or does it just develop chaotically?

J. H.: That is a very difficult ques-

tion—so many factors are involved. For one thing, so much of the work done at the universities interlocks with practical applications, I agree, that one can hardly draw a sharp line between the two fields.

H. L.: Would you then agree that the universities and purely academic institutions are doing work essential to industry which industrialists don't or won't do for themselves? For example, Faraday's electro-magnetic discoveries and his investigations of the constitution of benzine, conducted at the Royal Institution, were ultimately accepted by industrialists, but not initiated by them, fundamental as that work was.

J. H.: That, I think, is certainly true. In the present condition of world affairs, it looks definitely as if industry were unwilling and apparently unable either to provide the broad scientific background of research out of which new applications grow, or to undertake large-scale and fundamental investigations that don't promise fairly immediate returns. On the whole, it is fair to say that the universities provide the background, and government institutions (like the National Physical Laboratory and other branches of the Department of Scientific and Industrial Research) carry out the long-term investigations.

H. L.: So you agree that universities, whatever else they are doing, are unconsciously playing their part in assisting industrialists to carry on their business?

J. H.: Yes, that is so; of course, the universities, like any other social institutions, can't help mainly serving the ends of the society in which they have grown up. But that's only one aspect of the matter. They may help

to cheapen production so that prices can be brought down, and also help to stimulate new inventions and so to cater for needs that have hitherto not been satisfied.

H. L.: Yes, science has been used in this way, but even this analysis of yours is surely incomplete. There is a real distinction between two possible modes in which science operates. First, science may serve certain social needs directly, by stimulating our intellectual and philosophical interest. It may expose the false basis to many of the beliefs we have inherited from the past, and provide us with assured knowledge on which to reconstruct our view of life and of society. It assists, in fact, to sharpen our critical sense. Secondly, science may be used by those who have made it their business to cater for more immediate practical social needs. Before this aspect of science gets to society it has to be worth these people's while to use it. For the moment, however, we will leave that. Meanwhile, I should like to hear more of what you intend to do in your survey.

IV

J. H.: I shall, as I said above, be trying to find out what science is doing in this country to cater for its social needs. And the way I propose to divide up the field is roughly this. I shall take obvious needs like food, clothing, building and shelter, transport and health, and then see what science is doing to help there; then there is the relation of science to industry in general—where the funds come from, and how the research is planned and controlled; there is the assistance that scientists are giving in preparing for war, and the question of

what the psychological side of science is doing to ease the mental tensions set up by society. And, of course, there will be something to say as to the scope of what we have just been discussing, namely science for its own sake—what is being done in the way of pure science in the universities, and of amateur science carried on as a hobby.

H. L.: Then does n't there still remain the question of how science is actually organized to do all this work?

J. H.: Yes, I was coming to that. Some is done in laboratories attached to private firms, some in universities, some in government institutions, some through scientific societies, some in research laboratories financed by industries, some with the help of international organizations. In particular, I want to see if I can find out something about the imperfections and gaps in our scientific organization. I shall, of course, be able to deal only with a small part of each field. All the same, I think I shall be able to make a survey that will give a useful general picture of the whole subject, and will bring out the coördination of all the scattered work as far as it is coördinated at all. And at the end I suppose you will want to come back and ask me some more of these troublesome questions!

V

H. L.: If I ask you troublesome questions, it is because science is associated with troublesome things. But I should really like you to discover during your survey the answers to one or two difficulties I have. You know how glibly people talk about science being open, published for all, and working for the benefit of human-

ity. I wonder if you are n't likely to find that a good deal of research for private firms is conducted in secrecy, so that the scientific knowledge is kept within the factory walls and used for private profit only, while these same firms are busy, as you have agreed, in absorbing the fundamental scientific work that is done outside their walls in public institutions? And then, again, I wonder how much research is conducted for national purposes, information, and ideas that this country must keep to itself in order that British industrialists and British War Departments may compete successfully against the foreigner? I am raising the question because, if what I am hinting at is true, we must give up all this claptrap about science always being the benefactor of humanity at large and international in its aspect.

Then there is another point. You and I seem to be assuming that industry can absorb as much science as scientists can produce. I wonder how far you may find science running to waste? What I mean by that is just this. The scientific movement measures success in the application of its work when it produces the machinery for plenty: but nowadays we are beginning to realize that success in industry often demands scarcity and high prices. You talk about scientific applications to agriculture, but at the same time politicians and industry are restricting production and *that* side by side with unsatisfied needs and even starvation all over the world. Does it not look as if those who undertake to utilize science to supply the needs of the community are in a cleft stick? They dare use science only in a very restricted form.

VI

J. H.: Let me get this clear. Are you implying that science is responsible for overproduction, in fact, that the world is suffering from too much science?

H. L.: No; that is the wrong way to put it. There is plenty of scope for science. But, just where science is most needed, the present order of society is incapable of absorbing it. Agriculture is a case in point, but there are plenty of other examples.

J. H.: Naturally, that is important, and I shall certainly keep an eye open for examples of that sort. But, meanwhile, we live in a capitalist world, and science and scientists have to take the organization of industry as they find it.

H. L.: Yes, naturally. But I think it is important we should see the contradiction between the ideals that the ordinary layman and the scientist have about science and the way it actually functions. Take this question of nationalism, for example. The Department of Scientific and Industrial Research is a government organization that exists definitely to promote British industry as against the industries of other countries. I am not complaining about that, but I think it is important that we should see that science is being definitely used for this nationalist purpose.

J. H.: That, too, I suppose is inevitable, so long as the world is organized into national sovereign states. And this has a further consequence, namely that every nation has to devote a good deal of its scientific energy to research that is to be of use in war.

H. L.: So that science here plays a vital part in a consequence of na-

tionalism, namely war. Are you then also proposing to look into this side of scientific research?

J. H.: Naturally, that can't be left out. But meanwhile don't let us forget that research which is undertaken or financed primarily for war needs may have results that are useful for all sorts of peace-time purposes. Aviation would never have developed as rapidly as it has if it had not been for the Great War. Research in the optical-glass industry has a background of war-time ends: but it gives us better field-glasses and camera lenses and microscopes in times of peace. Or, again, the need of understanding and curing the thousands of so-called 'shell-shock' cases during the War was responsible for a remarkable advance in psychological science that is now being of the greatest service in dealing with peace-time disorders.

H. L.: All of which is perfectly true, but it is not necessary to justify war that way. Actually war follows naturally out of the struggle for markets, and I anticipate that we shall see how science is being used to intensify the one and prepare for the other. But let us pass to a less unsavory subject, from the destruction of human life to its conservation. Do you propose to see whether science is being used to its full extent for the health of the community? Is it the case that research into, say, industrial fatigue is conducted in the interests of the workers or primarily for the increased efficiency of production?

J. H.: That is going to be rather a difficult question to answer. But I expect to have something to say on the more general problem of whether scientific knowledge, in this field of the nation's health, is really being used to

the fullest possible extent, and as a matter of fact I can tell you beforehand that it is n't.

H. L.: I guessed as much. And now, Huxley, let us hear a little more about the international aspect of science. It is peculiar that it should have this aspect, considering the fact that, as we have seen, it is used so much for national purposes. There would appear here surely to be two conflicting currents at work.

J. H.: There are, of course, plenty of examples ready to hand. For instance, one of the most efficient remedies for African sleeping sickness is a drug called Bayer 205. This was discovered in a German research laboratory, but finds its chief use in British, French, and Belgian colonies. Then there is the famous example of the synthetic aniline dyes that scientists produce out of coal tar. The original discovery of the methods was made in England, but Germany was the only country to make commercial application of them for many years afterward.

H. L.: Yes, that is so. But the reason for that is interesting. We must remember that Britain at that period held a well-assured position in the world markets, while German manufacturers were struggling to secure a foothold. Thus they were on the alert to use science at once for that purpose, backed by the German state. Thus in Germany, under the drive of her industrial needs, industrial research institutions came into existence earlier than here. So when you say that science is international, is n't it the case that it is simply those elements of science very remote from industrial application that are international? There are of course many of them, as scientific journals testify.

VII

J. H.: Yes, but in spite of all you say about nationalism in science, I don't think many laymen realize the extent of the international side of science—the interchange of brains from one country to another by means of research fellowships, exchange professorships, and so on, the congresses at which scientists of all nations take part, the way in which a discovery made in one country is taken up almost at once in another. What is clear, I think, is that science is trying to work on a lot of different levels, so to speak—sometimes in the service of a single firm, sometimes in that of a single industry, or again in the service of a single nation or empire, and finally on the international level, where discoveries are announced freely and published fully so as to be available to humanity at large.

H. L.: So to that extent science, like the scramble for trade, is riven by conflicting tendencies. International publication, national secrecy, trade secrecy.

J. H.: Yes, I'm afraid that is so. And I shall try, if I can, to lay my finger on particular cases where competitive secrecy is interfering with scientific ideals.

H. L.: Do you propose also examining where the gaps lie in the field of scientific study?

J. H.: What exactly are you thinking of?

H. L.: Well, if one of the main driving forces that determines the direction of research—I don't say it is the only one—is this need for science on the part of those who undertake production, then the scope of scientific inquiry is likely to be affected by this

fact. For example, do scientists know why production has gone down to such a low ebb, in spite of the marvelous achievements of science? Before the War, it has been argued, we had crises associated with overproduction, and now at the present moment, in spite of the refinements of science in production, we have a world-wide crisis with actual underproduction and widespread restriction of output. The Economic Conference brought that out, at any rate. Have scientists reached agreement on that issue, or do you think it is n't even a suitable subject for a scientific study?

VIII

J. H.: Why, certainly, any subject is capable of being examined by the scientific method. For instance, most industrial research is aimed at making production more efficient. But why should n't the state, through the Department of Scientific Research, set going a really scientific investigation on the problem of how to stimulate consumption? Consumption is just as much of a problem for scientific research as is production. Only, owing to our economic system, it has been nobody's business to apply scientific ideas to it.

H. L.: Yes, but I should like to see added to that problem this: should it be found possible to discover the underlying causes of all these contradictions, is it likely that those who have the power to act, to resolve them, will agree to taking the necessary steps? It may hit them badly, you know. Even scientists themselves are not likely to be unbiased in such matters.

J. H.: I quite agree: it means that

we must regard society itself and the various kinds of social machinery such as economics as proper subjects for scientific treatment—which is a rather revolutionary idea. At the moment, for instance, educational policy has no scientific basis, but is determined by all sorts of unscientific motives, such as political pressure, religious feeling, and mere tradition. And the point you make about general bias—that is something so unconscious with most people that I don't think they are even aware of it. Even scientists with a few exceptions are n't aware of the fact that they are biased and would be indignant if you told them that they were. And, of course, whenever people get indignant about anything it is a sign that they have n't thought scientifically on the subject. The scientific movement is an outgrowth of society and cannot help being influenced by the form of society from which it springs.

H. L.: Yes, for that reason the more fundamental social problems have been kept in scientific darkness. The light has not been turned on problems of social structure, causes of war, the social bias in education, the basis of religious belief, the rationale of sex, and so on. In fact, this form of society has rendered them almost taboo to what you call scientific treatment.

J. H.: Yes, what we need now, it seems to me, is a change of outlook—a feeling that science *should* be asked to help in tackling such problems, that we ought to arrange for more of the best brains to go into the study of society, that the Government ought to organize research on social subjects as it already does on industry and agriculture and health. That would be a revolutionary change.

H. L.: It would indeed, but you may recollect that you agreed that institutions reflected the bias of the society in which they developed. Government and the state are such institutions; they tacitly assume the permanence and structure of present-day society, and therefore their use of science necessarily also reflects their bias.

J. H.: Yes, that is true enough, but you must have a beginning somewhere, and a change of this sort would be revolutionary. What is more, there are signs that at last the scientists themselves are coming alive to the existence and importance of this problem. For instance, the British Association has just decided to devote a

large part of its time at next year's meeting to considering what science can do to become socially effective. Don't you think that is an interesting symptom?

H. L.: It is clearly a very important matter and one that strikes radically at the whole problem of the use of science in society. It is as critical for science as it is for society.

J. H.: Yes, I agree. But meanwhile I shall have to get on with the survey, and I think we must leave this question to be dealt with in our final discussion, with all the facts in front of us. It may turn out that this is after all the most important social need for which science could possibly cater.

Epitaph for Our Children

By A. S. J. TESSIMOND

From the *Week-end Review*, London

Cradled in chaos; accustomed, each day, to observing
The lava-line lower by a foot on the range above them;
Expecting, one morning, to find feet nightmare-shackled,
To see, any sunbright morn, their shadows leave them;

Having played their habitual games among gutted ruins,
Their follow-my-leader on a stair that ended in air:
They have tried to turn arc into circle, complete the pattern,
With little conviction. The odds were scarcely fair.

The Editor of THE LIVING AGE surveys the population trends in the major powers and indicates some of their probable consequences—moral and political.

Population PORTENTS

By THE EDITOR OF
THE LIVING AGE

ONE of two difficulties confronts anyone who tries to anticipate the course of events. Either concrete information about present conditions is lacking, or some future eventuality may produce incalculable results. Thus in the course of the present series of articles it was literally impossible to measure with real precision the strength of organized religion in every country or to prove to the hilt that post-war German literature contained more revolutionary elements than the post-war literature of France. The most that could be done was to point out certain indications of declining religious faith in various parts of the world and to compare certain German and French writers with uncontested large followings. In discussing the future of money and the future of the farm there was no lack of precise information, the difficulty in those two cases being that a new manufacturing process or a new piece

of farm machinery may at any time hasten the rate at which bankers are losing control of industry and individual farmers of their farms.

But there is one subject on which we not only have precise information; we also have information that is not going to be made obsolete overnight by a new mechanical gadget. For no engineer or inventor can double the world's population in a single year and nothing short of the Black Death—not even a new war—can wipe out half the human race in a single summer. In other words, population is something that can be foretold almost as accurately as it can be measured. Furthermore, population changes are an unfailing portent of other changes. Thus India and China with their dense but constant populations have remained as unchanged throughout the centuries as Arabia and Central Africa with their sparse but equally constant populations. But the United

States, whose population multiplied tenfold within the past century, and Germany, England, and Italy, whose populations quadrupled, have all undergone enormous transformations.

Now population varies as the birth- and death-rates vary, and these rates are usually expressed in the number of births and number of deaths that occur each year per thousand of population. Turning, then, to the birth- and death-rates in Western Europe and the United States, we discover that something very remarkable began to happen at the turn of the century, even before migration, the only other factor in population change, had virtually ceased. Whereas the population of all the chief Western powers except France increased at unprecedented speed throughout the nineteenth century, since 1900 the rate of growth has everywhere declined and several countries will actually begin to lose population within a few years. If the unexampled increase of the world's white population during the nineteenth century went hand in hand with the spread of Western civilization, culminating in the world dominance of the white race, surely the prospect of a stable and even a declining white population is a portent of impending change.

II

Dr. J. J. Spengler, writing in the July 1932 issue of *Scribner's* on 'The Birth-Rate—Potential Dynamite,' estimates the birth-rate required to maintain a stable population and thus establishes a fixed point of reference:—

'To-day, on the average, man lives three times as long as formerly. Yet

if everyone lived, on an average, to the age of sixty years, then of each 1,000 persons an average of 16.7 would die each year. If the average number of years of life were increased to sixty-five, 15.4 of each 1,000 living persons would die on an average each year. At present in the United States and in practically all parts of the world man averages less than sixty years of life. And in light of what the studies of medicine and physiology reveal, twentieth-century man cannot live on an average even the proverbially allotted threescore and ten. In fact, man will be lucky to average more than sixty-five years of mundane life. It is obvious, therefore, that if man averages sixty years of life and 16.7 persons in 1,000 die on an average each year, 16.7 children must be born annually to each 1,000 persons. Otherwise, deaths will exceed births and the population will be threatened with extinction.'

Therefore countries with a birth-rate of more than 16.7 per thousand may anticipate an increasing population and those with a birth-rate of less than 16.7 per thousand must anticipate a decline.

The German birth-rate fell steadily from 36 per thousand in 1900 to 15 per thousand in 1932—a drop of more than fifty per cent. Not only is this rate too low to maintain a stable population, but an article in our September issue, 'Births and Deaths in Germany,' states:—

'According to the estimates of Director Burgdörfer of the Reich Statistical Office, 3.4 children must be born to every married couple if the population is to remain constant. But the average birth-rate in the Reich is far below this figure. We now have an

average of 2.7 children per couple, and Berlin shows the smallest number of all—.93 child per marriage.' The same article also states: 'At the turn of the century every third woman under forty-five had a baby every year. Today, the latest census shows that only one woman in nine under forty-five has a baby each year.'

The birth-rate in the United States fell from 25.1 per thousand in 1915—the first year for which complete figures are available—to 17.8 per thousand in 1931, a drop of 28 per cent in sixteen years. It is therefore hardly surprising that the chapter on 'The Population of the Nation' in *Recent Social Trends* prognosticates a declining population for the United States fifty years hence. After estimating minimum and maximum future populations in the light of existing information, the authors conclude: 'The maximum and minimum assumptions above described indicate a population between 132,500,000 and 134,500,000 in 1940, between 140,500,000 and 148,500,000 in 1950, and between 145,000,000 and 190,000,000 in 1980. . . . The birth-rate has been declining in the United States since 1810, hence it seems more likely that it will continue to decline until 1970 rather than become stationary in 1945, as the maximum assumes.' Even in Germany, with its lower birth-rate, it is calculated that the population will have increased 6 per cent by 1945, but by the end of the century it is estimated at 80 per cent of the present figure. The chief difference between the two countries is that the German decline will set in sooner.

England's birth-rate has dropped 42 per cent since 1900 to a present figure of 15.3 per thousand, and the

country looks forward to a declining population by 1940 because by that time the proportion of older people will be so great that the number of deaths will suddenly increase. Up to now, medical progress in Germany, England, and the United States has continually lengthened the life span and thus offset the effects of a declining birth-rate but, as Dr. Spengler has said, 'twentieth-century man can not live on an average even the proverbially allotted threescore years and ten.' These words do not, however, yet apply to France, the classic home of the low birth-rate, which is still lengthening the life span as Germany, England, and the United States did a generation ago and is maintaining an almost stable population with a birth-rate of 17.2 per thousand.

III

But this is nothing new. Since 1870 the population of France has remained almost constant, due to the 'two-children system,' which was described in a recent issue of the *Vossische Zeitung* as follows: 'The "two-children system" was neither a doctrine nor a political principle in France; Malthusianism and neo-Malthusianism were never propagandized in France as they were in Anglo-Saxon countries. The French do not like to subscribe to any principles in this sphere. The two-child marriage seemed to them the natural individual solution that was in closest accord with the principle of the greatest possible well-being. Furthermore, there was enough inheritance to take care of two children. When the parents died, whether they lived in the country or the city, they left enough behind them

for two offspring, and France still attaches very great value to inheritance. Yet the two-child marriage was by no means universal, as figures show. Before the War there were about 11,700,000 families in France; 1,700,000 had no children, 3,000,000 had one child, 2,500,000 had two children, 1,500,000 had three children, 900,000 had four children, and 1,100,000 had five children or more. For almost a million families no statistics are available.

Italy is the one major European power that can look forward to a continuing increase of population for at least twenty years. With 990,000 births in 1932 as against 975,000 in Germany, whose population is half again as large, Italy is growing at the rate of 400,000 inhabitants a year. But this is due to a falling death-rate, not to a rising birth-rate. Under the Fascist régime improved medical care brought down the death-rate from 16.1 per thousand in 1927 to 14.7 per thousand in 1931, and there is room for still further reduction. The birth-rate, however, is also declining, having dropped from 31.7 in 1913 to 27.1 in 1927 and to 23.3 in 1932. Thus Fascism, while lowering the death-rate, has not been able to check the decline in the birth-rate, and the trend of both rates indicates that Italy is following in the footsteps of Germany and England and is not heeding the advice of Mussolini to multiply like the seed of Abraham.

Russia, with a birth-rate of more than 44 per thousand, is the one major power that can look forward to an indefinite period of population growth. The death-rate for children in Russia dropped from 29.7 per thousand in 1910 to 16.4 in 1928. The death-rate

for the population as a whole has dropped 36 per cent since the War, the annual increase of population is three million a year, and between 1926 and 1932 the population of the Soviet Union increased from 147,000,000 to 164,000,000. Two years ago, Dr. R. Kuczynski, writing on 'World Population Trends,' said: 'Reproduction [in European Russia] is extraordinarily high and gives no evidence of dropping, because the death-rate has fallen at least as much as the birth-rate.' He attaches primary importance to the number of future mothers being born and says: 'In European Russia 170 future mothers are now being born to every hundred existing mothers. . . . In the United States it was 113 for the white population in 1919-20, but today it is less than a hundred, and it is less than a hundred in most of the west and north European countries. In Germany, England, Austria, Esthonia, and Latvia it has fallen to less than eighty.' Mr. Kuczynski therefore arrives at this conclusion: 'The Soviet Union, which includes more than a sixth of the inhabited surface of the earth, has room for at least twice its present population and probably more. The capitalistic countries of the West can no longer count on any great increase in their total population. South America and Africa will perhaps never have to seek an outlet for their excess population, certainly not in this century. Japan is very thickly populated, but up to now it has succeeded in spite of its growth in steadily raising the standard of living of its inhabitants. The danger of overpopulation therefore seems confined to China and India. But overcrowding is not so great as it was thirty years ago and it is not likely to grow more serious dur-

ing the next generation. The idea that the population of China will double in the next forty or fifty years if there are no civil wars or infanticide is just as absurd as the idea that the population of the United States would double in the next forty or fifty years if birth control were abolished.'

Japanese statesmen, who prophesy a population of one hundred million by the end of the century, would probably disagree with part of this analysis. They would point out that the population of their country increased eight per cent between 1925 and 1930 and would argue that Japan was still going through the same process of industrial expansion that quadrupled the population of England during the nineteenth century. For even in the face of declining world trade Japan's exports increased during 1932 simply because she was still able to undersell the rest of the world. Only last month in 'The World Over' we quoted the president of a large Japanese spinning company, who made the point that England's dominance in the textile industry has now been shattered by Japan. 'It is no exaggeration to say that the English cotton industry is now bankrupt of initiative. An industry that cannot maintain itself unless a handicap of as much as 70-80 per cent is imposed on its rivals is a national handicap rather than an asset.' Although he is attacking the attempt of the British to keep Japanese textiles out of India by raising the tariff, he brings out the fact that Japanese industry has not yet reached that condition of stagnation which automatically brings down the birth-rate. The outlook for Japan would therefore seem to be roughly analogous to that of Italy—perhaps a generation of con-

tinuing population growth followed by stabilization.

Now what do all these figures prove? That the populations of Germany, France, and England are about to decline. That the population of the United States will begin to decline in thirty or forty years. That the populations of Japan and Italy will continue to increase, but with diminishing rapidity. That the population of Russia will continue to grow rapidly for an indefinite period. But most of the nations with declining populations are precisely those which grew most rapidly in numbers and power during the nineteenth century, whereas the ones with rising populations have only recently adopted those industrial methods of production that caused the population of Europe to increase at such unprecedented speed during the past hundred years.

IV

So much for the facts that confront us—let us now try to discover what brought them into existence and what results they, in their turn, may bring. It has already been assumed that the Industrial Revolution was what caused such rapid increases of population during the nineteenth century. But if the population of the chief industrial countries increased because their people could produce more and more goods with less and less labor while medical progress was cutting down the death-rate, why has the birth-rate declined in these very nations during the last thirty years—a period in which their productive capacity multiplied even more rapidly than it did during the nineteenth century? And why, now that the best

engineering brains in the world assure us that we have reached the threshold of an age of potential plenty for all, do the nations with the best technical equipment face a period of declining population? I believe there are two answers—birth-control and depression.

Professor Julian Huxley, one of the foremost living British scientists, has referred to birth-control as 'one of the major events of world history' and the facts we have surveyed seem to bear him out. Furthermore, there is one outstanding fact that proves beyond doubt how widespread the use of contraceptives has become—the new status of the middle-class woman. For now that love is no longer synonymous with the bearing of children, women of the middle class no longer have to deny the strongest impulse in life in order to compete on a footing of equality with men in many occupations.

The columns of a serious review are hardly the place to discuss the havoc that birth-control has wrought in the American middle class. Moreover, the subject has already been covered exhaustively, notably in the October issue of *Harper's*, which contained a most encouraging, though anonymous, report on the emotional opportunities now open to the enterprising middle-class spinster, entitled 'The Single Woman's Dilemma.' The only dilemma our failing eyesight could discern was which husband the single woman should set her cap for next, but it was also clear that the American middle class is working out a new morality as a result of the very conditions that the article itself describes. Judge Ben Lindsey's doctrine of companionate marriage is another mani-

festation of this new morality and offers further proof of the extent to which birth-control is practised by our better citizens. Back in 1927 Havelock Ellis was writing of 'the growingly acute realization of a new attitude on the part of the young' and giving Judge Lindsey much more serious attention than he has ever received from the bigwigs on this side of the Atlantic.

Here, then, is one portent of the present decline in population, a portent that is not confined to the United States, though our enormous middle class makes it more conspicuous here than elsewhere. The practice of birth-control, which has helped to reduce the population, has also helped to create a new morality. Not only does a declining birth-rate mean that more and more women of the middle class are competing with men for middle-class jobs; it means that new codes of sex and marriage are developing in that class, codes peculiarly disruptive to the unit of the family. It is a commonplace that rich families have fewer children than poor ones; it is less widely recognized that the practice of birth-control makes rich families less cohesive than poor ones. One can only speculate as to what the consequences of this tendency may be, but Christians and Communists will have no difficulty in arriving at precise and somewhat similar conclusions.

Whereas birth-control has accelerated the decline of the birth-rate in England and America by reducing the middle classes, the economic depression has played the chief rôle among all classes in Germany. Proof of this is to be found in the appalling number of abortions that have been performed in that country in recent years. In

1932 Dr. Else Kienle, who had been sent to jail for performing abortions, wrote a book called *Frauen. Aus dem Tagebuch einer Ärztin* (*Women. From the Diary of a Woman Doctor*). In it she told about a doctor who lived in a German city of less than twenty-five thousand and who received 556 requests for abortions in 1927. He operated 426 times, and only 74 of those operations were performed on unmarried women. Another book, entitled *Criminal Abortion*, by L. A. Parry, published in London in 1932, stated that between a half million and a million abortions are performed in Germany every year. Since less than a million children were born in Germany last year, this means that there may be as many as one abortion for every birth in the country and that there is at least one abortion for every two births.

Nor is this condition peculiar to Germany. In spite of the prevalence of birth-control among the well-to-do classes in England and the United States, abortion is by no means uncommon in either country. Exact figures are not available, but a leading review of Mr. Parry's book in the *New Statesman and Nation* by Harry Roberts contained this passage: 'Precise figures showing the prevalence of abortion in modern countries are not easy to come by, but the lowest estimate is about 10 per cent of all pregnancies. Mrs. Chance in her recent book on *The Cost of English Morals*, says that "it would probably be difficult to find a single uninstructed, poor, and fertile mother who has not made some crude and furtive attempt to get rid of an unborn child." From my own fairly large experience, I have come to the conclusion that not less than 25

per cent of all women in this country, married and unmarried, have, at some time in their lives, procured or attempted to procure abortion.' Figures for the United States are even more startling. Dr. A. J. Rongy in *Abortion: Legal or Illegal?*, published last spring by the Vanguard Press of New York, estimates the number of abortions in the United States at two millions. Since a birth-rate of 17.8 per thousand in a nation with 120 million inhabitants means that 2,136,000 births occur each year, these figures suggest that the United States may be quite as badly off as Germany.

V

Some of our leading engineers maintain that the year 1900 marked the beginning of a new era in human history. Walter N. Polakov, in his new book, *The Power Age*, explains that the Industrial Revolution of the nineteenth century merely made human labor more efficient, but that since that time the substitution of nonhuman for human power has wrought an even greater revolution. What has happened to the birth-rate in the past thirty years certainly confirms this analysis. Within the past generation the new age of power has brought to the upper and middle classes unprecedented leisure and security which, in turn, have encouraged the practice of birth-control. More recently still, the world depression, itself a product of the Power Age, has brought to the lower classes forced leisure and lessened security, which, in turn, have encouraged the practice of abortion. And whereas birth-control encourages a new morality in the middle class and breaks down middle-class family life,

the widespread practice of abortion among the working class indicates that present conditions deny millions of people the opportunity to perpetuate their kind. Here is a population portent of truly revolutionary significance. Hitler's efforts to get women out of the professions and industry and back to children, church, and cooking and Mussolini's glorification of motherhood show that two defenders of the *status quo* understand that a connection exists between a high birth-rate and social stability.

But while population is about to decline in Western Europe, no such tendency has yet appeared to the eastward. With the population of Italy, Poland, and the Balkans still certain to increase for at least a generation, while the man power of France, Germany, and England goes into a decline, it seems probable that the European balance of power will move to the eastward and that Italy will be the logical beneficiary of that shift. Already the Italians have been shipping arms illegally to Hungary, and both Mussolini and the Vatican have been supporting the Dollfuss Government in Austria. Ever since the War, Italian diplomacy has been trying to control the Adriatic Sea and the Danube basin, and now the belligerence of Nazi Germany seems to be playing into Mussolini's hands, since it is becoming increasingly necessary for France to allow the Italian sphere of influence to spread northward and eastward in order to block German ambitions in those directions.

Sheer man power thus plays a considerable part in Italian expansion and in the growing importance of the Balkans. France, with her vastly enlarged colonial empire and her de-

clining population, has no choice but to delegate authority to Italy, with her meagre colonial possessions and her increasing population. But, most important of all, the population of Eastern Europe is still growing and therefore intensifying the present disturbances. If the Balkans could look forward to a period of declining population in the near future, as France, Germany, and England can, there might be some hope for the *status quo*, but as things are the prospects of stabilization grow more remote every day.

The Polish-German conflict is also intensified by the divergent population trends in the two countries. Because the Polish birth-rate, although declining, is still large enough to guarantee an increasing population for at least twenty years the Germans are making frantic efforts to persuade peasants to settle in East Prussia and along the Polish frontier. Polish statisticians have even estimated that by 1945 their country will have as many men of military age as Germany, and though they have probably erred to their own advantage there can be no doubt that as far as man power is concerned Poland is steadily gaining on Germany. Hence Germany's increasing belligerence.

Thus we arrive at two more population portents, both of them confined to Europe. The first is that the inhabitants of Eastern Europe are increasing while the inhabitants of Western Europe are declining—the Scandinavian countries, Switzerland, Holland, and Belgium are all about to lose ground—and that Italy, the one major power with an increasing population, is gaining influence in precisely those parts of Europe which are also adding

to their man power. In the second place, the Germans' desire to regain the Polish Corridor is stimulated by their fear that Poland may be able to put an army as large as their own into the field within the space of ten years. Now I do not maintain that man power is the only factor in modern warfare or that countries with increasing populations automatically fight countries with declining populations. I am simply drawing attention to two regions that no one who is attempting to foresee the future of Europe should ignore.

Japan's recent activities on the Asiatic continent reveal a third region in which increasing population is a portent of war. Whereas Europe's imperial and industrial expansion during the nineteenth century opened up new territories for settlement and exploitation, Japanese expansion is occurring at a time when there are no new territories left. Although Japan's inhabitants have been multiplying as rapidly during the twentieth century as the people of Western Europe did during the nineteenth, few outlets are open to them. Already this pressure of population has forced Japan to attack Manchuria, and now a clash with Russia seems imminent. And reports of domestic conditions reveal many of the same symptoms of impending revolution that can be found in Europe.

Already Japanese Fascism is on its way under the guidance of General Araki, but since our only concern here is with population I shall confine myself to pointing out that in Japan, as in the industrial nations of Europe, women have begun to play an increasingly important rôle. Writing in the December 1932 issue of *Current History* on 'The New Woman in Japan,'

Diane O'Connell mentions several popular Japanese women novelists who are avowed Communists and states that 'out of an estimated total number of factory workers 1,135,199 were male and 1,058,369 were female.' But, most significant of all, 'two birth-control clinics have recently been established in Osaka, and there is a Japan Birth-Control Association.' Thus we find in Japan two of the same population portents that also exist in Europe. As in the Balkans and Poland, population and the war danger are growing side by side. As in England, modern industrial methods are transforming the status of women. But the special situation of Japan makes the danger of war even more imminent than it is in Europe and the prospect of revolution not far distant.

VI

Racial mystics may be tempted by the population portents of Japan to prophesy a struggle for world dominance between the white and yellow peoples. Such a view, however, quite ignores the most formidable population portent in the world—the Soviet Union. I have already referred to the fact that Russian territory is capable of supporting twice its present population, and, if the growth continues at the present rate of three million a year, Russia will have three hundred million inhabitants by 1985. Nor does this estimate seem completely fantastic in the light of Hans Thierbach's article, 'The Continental Epoch,' which appears elsewhere in this issue of *THE LIVING AGE*. As a Nazi, the author would have no natural sympathy for the political or economic policies of the present Russian régime, yet his de-

scription of what the farm tractor has done to Siberia suggests that Russia may be going through the same phase of expansion that the United States did a century ago. There are the same empty spaces, the same high hopes, the same break with precedent, the same skepticism in conservative Europe. The increasing population of Russia portends, therefore, not merely the emergence of another major power with more territory and more inhabitants than any other autonomous state; it also means that an entirely new social order is making rapid headway in the world at a time when capitalism has entered a period of decline.

Russia also possesses special significance to the believer in birth-control. Although both birth-control and abortion are legalized in the Soviet Union, although the standard of living is still

far below that of Western Europe or the United States, neither of these two factors has retarded population growth. I have already intimated that the revolutionary implications which Julian Huxley believes are inherent in the practice of birth-control chiefly affect the upper and middle classes, and we have seen that abortion is most widespread in those countries which have been most affected by the world depression—Germany and the United States. Russian experience confirms both these contentions. The Soviet Union has no middle-class women whom birth-control would enable to combine love and a career, and its working people have enough hope in the future to dare to reproduce their own kind. As the symbol of this hope, Russia's birth-rate overshadows all other population portents of our time.

The baker's wife in a French provincial town quits her husband's bed, board, and shop for the arms of another man. A charming tale of adulterated love.

The Baker's WIFE

By JEAN GIONO

Translated by GLADYS BILLINGS

From the *Nouvelle Revue Française*
Paris Literary Monthly

THE baker's wife went off with a shepherd from the Conches farm. The baker had come from a city in the valley to take the place of the man who'd been hung. He was red-headed, short, and emaciated, and his body had become twisted like green wood under the steady heat that issued breast-high from his oven door. He always wore a sailor's blue-and-white-striped jersey intended for a stalwart man with a well rounded chest. He was hollow-chested, however, and the jersey hung from his neck like flabby skin. This had given him the habit of constantly pulling at it from the bottom, so that it kept getting longer and longer till finally it reached his knees.

'You're a sight,' his wife used to tell him.

She herself was shapely and trim with hair so black that it made a hole in the sky behind her head. She slicked

it down with oil in the palm of her hand and wore it in a knot at the back of her neck—a knot without pins that stayed in place no matter how much she shook her head, and, whenever the sun touched it, it brought out violet lights like a plum. Every morning she dipped her fingers in flour and rubbed her cheeks with it, and she perfumed herself with violet or with lavender. She used to sit bending over the lace she was making in a chair outside her door and all the time she would bite her lips. Whenever she heard a man's footsteps coming near, she moistened her lips with her tongue and then let them be for a while so that they would look full and red and glistening. After the man had gone by, she would raise her eyes.

It did n't take long. Eyes like that could n't go unchallenged for any length of time.

'Hello, Cæsar.'

'Hello, Aurelia.'

Her voice played along the surfaces of men's bodies from their heads to their feet.

The shepherd was a nice fellow, as frank and open as the day, more like a child than anything else. I knew him well. He could make whistles out of the pits of all the different fruits.

Every Sunday morning he came to get the bread for the farm. He tied his horse to the door of the church, slipping the reins around the door knob and with one turn of the wrist making a knot that was almost impossible to undo. After that he looked his saddle over and patted his horse on the flank.

'If he's in the way, just give him a push,' he said to the women who were waiting to go inside the church. Then he hitched up his trousers and went off to the bakery.

The bread for the Conches farm filled a sack weighing eighty pounds. At first it had always been prepared in advance, ready to sling over the horse's back. But Aurelia had the whole week in which to count off the days, to bite her lips, to nourish her desire, and now when the shepherd arrived the sack had still to be filled.

'Hold on to one corner,' she would say.

He pulled one of the edges of the bag out while Aurelia held the other with one hand and put the bread in with the other hand. She did n't toss it in but placed it carefully, loaf by loaf, in the bottom of the sack, bending over and straightening up a hundred times or more and with each motion showing her breasts and bringing an eager cheek close to the shepherd's. He stood there dazzled by it all, stirred by the pungent odor of woman

swaying beside him in the bright light of a Sunday morning. . . .

'I'll help you.'

Their words were few and spoken brusquely.

'I can shoulder it alone.'

Then it was his turn to show himself off. For the ride down on horseback he always wore a pair of thin white canvas trousers belted in tight at the waist and a white shirt of such heavy linen that it stood stiffly out from his body as though it were full of starch. He did n't button it, either at the neck or at the bottom; it lay open like the shell of a ripe walnut and inside you could see his entire torso, small of waist, broad of shoulder, brown as one of the loaves of bread and covered with a fine coat of black hair as dense and curly as that on a young plantain.

He bent down over the sack, facing it, and seized it with two strong hands while the muscles in his arms stood out. With a single motion he lifted the weight without hurrying, smoothly and carefully twisted his chest and shoulders, and there it was, in place on his back. A feat that spoke for him, proclaiming, 'What I do, I do slowly and well.'

Then he walked over to his horse. He squeezed the bread sack in the centre as though to give it a waist, set it astride the beast's withers, unfastened the reins, and, as the horse turned, gave a precise little leap from the ground and landed in the saddle. That was all!

II

'She did n't take a thing along with her,' said the baker. 'Nothing to cover herself with.'

It was a great calamity. People

flocked in through the bakery door, which stood wide open. He showed them everything, even the bedroom in back, behind the oven. The closet was neatly arranged, the bureau drawers closed, and she had left her small bunch of keys, shining bright like silver, on the marble mantel.

'See here—'

He unlocked the drawers.

'She did n't take a stitch of underclothes, not even a shirt or a pair of pants.'

He fumbled around among his wife's things, his hands covered with flour. He even hunted in the soiled-clothes bag and drew out a knitted union suit that smelled like the skin of a polecat.

'Well, we saw it coming,' said the women.

'What did you see it by?' And he looked at them with his gray little red-rimmed eyes.

It was n't long before they found out that Aurelia and the shepherd had gone down to the marsh lands.

On the first afternoon four boys mounted their horses. One went, without any great amount of hope, to the Conches farm to ask them to search the lofts there; another went to the station to see if anyone had bought tickets; and the other two galloped, one north and one south, along the railroad line to the stations on either side. But there had n't been a single ticket sold that day.

The fellow who had been to the Conches came home very late as drunk as a lord. He'd told the story to Mr. Arboise, owner of the farm, and then to the ladies. They'd been out in droves and had hunted through all the lofts. They'd done a lot of laughing and Mr. Arboise had told stories about

when he was captain of dragoons. They'd opened a good many bottles of wine.

Gallop across country after a woman and rubbing noses all afternoon with the grand ladies of the Conches had gone to the boy's head even more than the wine. He patted the baker on the back.

'I'll find her for you,' he said. 'I'll bring her back, but I'm going to kiss her on the way home!'

The baker was there under the hanging oil lamp. His was the only face you could see clearly because he was shorter than the others and because the other faces were in the shade. There he stood with his earth-colored cheeks and his reddened eyes, gazing out beyond everything and tapping with his fingers on the chill surface of the bread counter.

'Yes, yes,' he kept repeating.

'With all these goings on,' said Cæsar, as he went out, 'we'll be losing the baker next. Love's a fine thing and all that but we've got to eat, have n't we? Pretty soon we'll be having to go clear to Sainte-Tulle to get a loaf of bread. I'm not one to put blame where it does n't belong but if she'd used her head a little she'd have thought of that.'

'Good night folks and I thank you,' the baker was saying in his doorway.

Next morning Cæsar and Massot went down to the marshes. They stayed the whole day, splashing about as noiselessly as possible and ferreting in and about like rats. As evening was approaching they climbed up on to the dyke and shouted in every direction: 'Aurelia! Aurelia!'

A flock of duck rose in the east and, turning toward the setting sun, flew off into the light.

Cæsar's chief concern was with the bread. What became of a village without a bakery? Wasting your time and tiring your animals going to the next village was bad enough, but there was more to it than that. They'd be getting flour from this harvest and whom could they take it to? Where else could they get their bread allowance paid for in weight of flour checked off on a stick just by a cut of the knife? If the baker did n't work out of his trouble pretty soon, they'd have to sell their flour to a broker and then go after their bread with their money in the palm of their hands.

'When a female's eye gets to roving, you see what comes of it, what it leads us all into.'

For three days the baker did n't leave his oven, which continued to yield its accustomed provender. Cæsar had loaned his wife to serve behind the counter. There was no dillydallying where she was concerned. She was interested neither in shepherds nor in marshy retreats. She sat chewing the ends of a thick moustache, glowering at her customers, and, when it came to weight, a pound was a pound and not an ounce more or less.

On the fourth day there was no longer any odor of warm bread in the village. Massot stuck his head in the door.

'Everything all right?'

'All right,' said the baker.

'Is the oven going?'

'No.'

'Why not?'

'Taking a rest,' said the baker. 'There's bread left over from yesterday.'

Then he went outdoors in his flour-covered trousers, twisted crooked at the waist, with the jersey hanging out

behind. He went to the café and took a seat at a zinc-covered table behind a lilac bush on the terrace. He tapped on the window pane of the bar inside:—

'Bring me an absinth.'

Without that odor of warm bread and under the hot noon sun, the village seemed to have died. The baker began to drink, then he rolled a cigarette. He let the tobacco and cigarette papers lie there on the table in front of him close to the bottle of absinth.

III

Maillefer was arranging the watches in rows behind his shop window. He had had 'Maillefer Watchmaker' painted on his sign, but he should also have added 'Fisherman.' A vast patience (which is necessary for detecting the ills of a tiny wheel through a magnifying glass) had gradually piled up in him. They called him 'Patient Maillefer.' He would wait an hour, two hours, a day, two days, a month, two months, but the thing he waited for finally became his.

'Wait, I have it,' he used to say. They sometimes called him 'Wait-I-have-it' to distinguish him from his brother, who was patient too.

'Which Maillefer?'

'The wait-I-have-it one.' Then they knew.

He was by nature a fisherman. Often, crossing the marshes, they saw him standing upright like a tree trunk, entirely motionless. Even in March, when showers of hail pounded the water's surface, he stood motionless. He came in with whole basketsful of fish. Once he had had a long struggle with a pike. Whenever they talked to him about it nowadays, he tapped his stomach meditatively.

'It's in here,' he said.

He had thick lips, scarlet and bulging like snow apples, and a large tongue that wasted no time in conversation. He used it only in eating, but then it worked hard, especially when he ate fish, and now and then you saw it emerging from his mouth to lick the sauce that gathered like dew on his moustache. His hands moved slowly and his feet moved slowly. He had tenacious eyes capable of holding to his magnifying glass as a fly does to a window pane, and a large head covered with thick hair the color of boxwood.

One evening he walked into the village.

'I've seen them,' he said.

'Come here quick!' said Cæsar, dragging him into the bakery.

'I've seen them,' said Maillefer again.

'Where? What was she doing? How'd she look? She lost any weight? What did she say?'

'Hold on a minute,' said Maillefer.

He left the bakery, walked across the street to his house, and emptied the contents of his basket on to the kitchen table. The baker, Cæsar, Massot, Benoît, and Tauler followed him. No one asked any more questions. They knew it was of no use.

Laid out on the table were a bunch of eelgrass and fourteen large fish. He counted them, turned them over, gazed at them, separated the eelgrass bit by bit, searched the basket, and finally brought forth a small bluish fish with a yellow mouth and a rust-colored back.

'A rare trout,' he said to his wife. 'Cook it on the grill and don't clean it. It's a special tidbit.'

He turned back to the men.

'Well?' he asked.

'Well, we're waiting,' they answered.

He told them that while he was standing in the marshes, as was his habit, and just as he was angling for that trout—no common fish—it makes channels through the reeds to get to abandoned sluiceways, and jumps on the grass like a grasshopper and uses regular highways like men do to reach fresh waters—well, to repeat, just as he was angling after this trout, he'd heard, like it was coming out of the air, a scattering of funny little sounds.

'Ducks? I said to myself. No, not ducks. Rail? They did n't twitter or chirp like rail. Dogfish? . . .'

'Was she singing?' the baker asked.

'Have a little patience,' answered Maillefer. 'What's the hurry? Yes, she was singing. In the long run you'd call it singing. There was n't another sound across the marshes. Could n't have been anything stirring down there at that hour except for the fish and the light summer breeze ruffling the water.' Aurelia was singing. He, Maillefer, was casting for the trout with a special kind of wrist movement like this . . . he went through the motions two or three times for the benefit of the poor baker.

After that, he said, he'd started to move. The air was vibrating a little under Aurelia's voice and he began to follow after those vibrations the same as he would have followed the ripples made on the water's surface by a sleeping trout when the water cress tickles its belly. One step, then another—no splashing, mind you. He knew the trick of pulling out his leg and putting it in again, big toe first, so that the water would open up without a sound the way grease does. 'It's slow but it's sure.'

First he'd come on a plover's nest with the mother sitting on the eggs. She did n't get up, did n't even stir a feather. She just looked at Maillefer and clucked softly. Then he'd found a bed of herring. There'd been a lot of females lying at the bottom of a dark pool and their bellies were so swollen with eggs and so white that the water was lit up like it is when the moon's shining. He circled round the bed without waking a single herring.

He could hear Aurelia distinctly now and every now and then the shepherd would call out "Relia!"

Then there'd been no sound for a while and Maillefer had stopped moving, but after a few minutes the singing began again and he'd gone ahead through the marshes.

'It's an island,' he said.

'An island?' Cæsar asked.

'Yes, an island.'

'Where?' asked Massot.

'In the widest part of the water, near Vinon.'

The shepherd had built a hut out of willow shoots. Aurelia was lying out naked on the grass in the full sun.

'Naked?' asked the baker.

'She was waiting for her clothes to dry,' said Maillefer as though to apologize.

IV

The baker was all for setting out immediately. Cæsar, Massot, and the others tried to restrain him but he would hear nothing of it; he feared neither water, darkness, nor mud holes.

'If you go now, you'll stay.'

'No matter.'

'What good will it do?'

'No matter, I'm going.'

'It'll be a miracle if you get out alive.'

'Makes no difference.'

'You don't know where it is.'

Finally Cæsar said:—

'Anyway, you're not the right man for the job.'

This was a real reason and the baker gradually quieted down till finally they'd evolved a plan. They would send the parson and the schoolmaster together. The parson was old but the schoolmaster was young and owned a pair of high rubber boots. He could carry the parson on his shoulders as far as a piece of dry land that lay not far from the dyke. A voice would carry over from there, especially the parson's. He was used to talking. The schoolmaster could go all the way to the hut. Not to make things disagreeable in any way—just to say that of course love was a fine thing . . .

'That love's a fine thing,' said Cæsar, 'but we've got to eat.'

. . . that it may be a very fine thing but what about the counter over there in the bakery and the bread to be weighed and flour to be bought, to say nothing of a man . . .

'If it came to a last resort,' added Cæsar, looking at the baker, 'and the schoolmaster was n't able to pull the trick alone, he could whistle to the parson back there on the piece of dry land, who could add his say from there. By raising his voice a little he could manage the business without getting his feet wet.'

Next morning the parson and the schoolmaster set out on the same horse.

V

That evening the schoolmaster came into the village alone. Everyone was out taking the air in front of their houses.

'It must be ten o'clock and you've cooled off enough, I guess. Anyway, the parson's down there at the foot of the hill near the church with Aurelia. She won't come any farther as long as there's anyone out in the street. The parson has n't got his overcoat and it's beginning to turn cold. He's wet too. I'm going in to change my clothes. You folks get inside and close everything up.'

About midnight the baker knocked on Mrs. Massot's door.

'You have n't got the makings of some herb tea, have you?'

'Why certainly. I'll be down right away.'

She gave him a mixture off her kitchen shelf and added a touch of camomile.

'We'll put this in too,' she said. 'It'll help to make her sleep.'

The rest of it was planned behind closed shutters in each of the village houses.

Catherine went first, early in the morning. She shuffled along the ground as she walked because of her varicose veins. She must try to forget that Aurelia did n't have any. Just before she went into the bakery, she turned and looked at her husband, who was standing watching her from his doorway.

'Good morning, Aurelia.'

'Good morning, Catherine.'

'Give me three pounds, please.'

Aurelia weighed the bread without speaking.

'I guess I'll sit down a minute,' said Catherine. 'My varicose veins are paining me again. You're pretty lucky not to have any.'

Then Mrs. Massot came in.

'Did you sleep well, Aurelia?'

'Yes.'

'Anybody could see that. Your eyes are bright as two peas.'

Next it was Alphonsine and Mariette:—

'Show us how you make your knot, Aurelia.'

'Oh! But you'd have to have hair like hers!'

'Just feel, Alphonsine, the weight of it!'

'I know. It's only that kind you can keep up without pins.'

It was ten o'clock and Aurelia had not yet set foot outside the door. She was still inside in the semiobscurity of the shop, when Cæsar passed by in front of the bakery. He had thought he was all ready to go in but he found he was n't. So he did n't stop but instead went on down to the church, made a tour around it and came back again. This time he stopped.

'Hey, Aurelia!'

'Hey, Cæsar!'

'What are you doing in there? Come on out!'

She came as far as the doorstep. She'd let her hair down to show it to Alphonsine and Mariette, there were dark circles around her eyes, and her beautiful mouth had a slight expression of disgust, as though she'd eaten too many sweets.

'It's a fine day,' said Cæsar.

They looked at the sky.

'There's a touch of sea in the air . . . You must come over to the house. The wife wants to give you a slice of venison.'

At noon the baker stoked his oven fire high with well-seasoned chestnut faggots. There was no wind, the air was flat as a stone, and the heavy black smoke from the bakery chimney fell over the village, rich in its odor of earth, of peace, and of victory.

BOOKS ABROAD

THE CRITICISM OF POETRY. By F. L. Lucas. *Being the Warton Lecture on English Poetry delivered before the British Academy.* London: Humphrey Milford. 1933. 1s.

(Basil de Selincourt in *The Observer*, London)

‘WHAT is it that has happened to our poetry and our judges of poetry,’ asks Mr. Lucas, ‘in the twenty years since Rupert Brooke?’ taking Rupert Brooke as his landmark because he died in Skyros and so seemed, in his death, to lay his poetry as a wreath where the breath and spirit of all poetry, and in a peculiar sense of Rupert Brooke’s, seem to belong—in its cradle, the isles of Greece. But what, he asks again, was this spirit of Greek poetry, and in what estimation was poetry held among the Greeks, who surely of all people knew best what it was? And he answers: ‘To the Greek in his best days good poetry meant, above all, poetry that bred good men.’ And again: ‘For antiquity, good poetry meant noble poetry.’ His whole lecture, which is studded with fine sayings and equipped at every turn to meet and defeat the disillusioned modernist, is a plea to us to return to that serene antique judgment and to recognize securely with Longinus that great poetry ‘is the echo of a great soul.’ Anatole France, prince of skeptics, ‘admitted that there was one quality common to the great masters, “ils n’ont pas l’âme basse.”’ Sidney, who had already begun to see the devastations of the wits, long ago uttered his warning:—

Oh, let them hear these sacred tunes and
learn in Wonder’s schools
To be, in things past bounds of wit, fools—
if they be not fools.

Poetry, Mr. Lucas reminds us, ‘is not a jewel found in the heads of toads,’ nor can any cleverness ever produce anything better than verse while ‘its spirit is that of a rabbit imprisoned in a dust-bin.’

Admirably salutary, yet deeply sophisticated,—so deeply that one may say sophistication here has turned the leaf and seen its own inconclusiveness,—the lecture is everywhere delicately worded, sometimes quite deliciously so; and how difficult it is to be both salutary and delicious! Is that not a part at least of our present trouble? Most things in life are easier than they used to be; it therefore escapes our notice that life itself and art, the mirror of life, are not among these easier things. Both are becoming continually more difficult. Obviously, the more we know, the more difficult it must be to be adequate to our knowledge. By grasping the easy parts of it, the inventions and the gadgets, and letting the rest go in vague regret, we have turned the world into a dust-bin; and how, in our dust-bin, shall we grow to our full stature and be men and poets? Rabbits, Mr. Lucas calls us, for our want of initiative and grit; and if we cannot be true men, better perhaps to be rabbits than rats. However, it is especially the poets of the day that he calls rabbits. I dare say he would call the critics rats; but as he is of the fraternity, his politeness prevents him. Hinting at the waste

and desolation made by machinery and our foolish worship of new toys, he has a quite enchanting passage, in which again he takes a lesson from the Greeks:—

Socrates had no electric bells to listen to. Instead he had a demon. In some respects it worked better. And we have poetry. The gods of Hellas had a very able scientist among them, called Hephæstus. They did not tremble before him; they found him useful, but something of a joke; he was lame, for one thing, and sooty; yet they married him, some say, to Charis, who is Grace; or, as others tell, to Aphrodite, who is Loveliness. Might we not try to bring them together again?

It is certainly better to be a Greek than to be a rat or rabbit; but I am not sure that criticism has really done its job when it reminds us how puny and pusillanimous we are and how noble and glorious other men have been before us. We need all our available vitality for present use, and to be confronted with the perfection of the ancient Greeks is always depressing. Why are we not, why cannot we be as they? Dare I say that, if they had a defect, their defect was their perfection? That will not do; for after all they only seem perfect because they are so far away; while they lived, heroically complete, they were still outgrowing and breaking away from what now seems their perfection. Still they have left us a legacy of flower-like loveliness, they have shown us human dignity in joyous exercise of disciplined power, they had the grace of animals and the minds of men. What is wrong with us then, that it should be a check on our spirits when we are exhorted to resemble them? Is it not just that we know more than they did, and especially that our new knowledge touches vital regions, the deep springs of existence; is it not that

we know better than they did what it means to be a man, what is required of manhood? Mr. Lucas comments on this new knowledge and puts it aside:—

Greek art at its best seems to me, above all and beyond all others, sane. . . . But the end came—Plato, Christianity, asceticism, Puritanism. . . . The great flaw in the Greek view of poetry had been that it was often too crudely didactic. . . . And now new moralities arose that considered not health, but holiness; not sanity, but sin.

And again he says:—

What matters in the end, I would repeat, is health, not holiness; sanity, not sin.

Is not that again taking, or trying to take, the easier way? It looks like a plea for beauty, but, because of our better knowledge, what led to beauty in the past leads only to the dust-bin now. If you could choose whether to be insane or sinful, whether to be healthy or holy, life would be easier than it is. The trouble with Christianity (from the point of view which Mr. Lucas so ably and to me so convincingly expounds) is that it is true. Since Christianity came into the world ('the end came,' says Mr. Lucas) there is no more use in a man's trying to emulate the wholeness of a Greek than in his trying to emulate the wholeness of an animal. A great cleft has been driven in that old animal manhood, a new unity has been achieved and shown. The power of love, which is the very core of life, is endowed with a new meaning; and life, so far as this new meaning is not realized in it, is now divided, judged. That is inescapable fact; and poetry, which, as Mr. Lucas so truly says, lives on fact, cannot any longer live in the world, cannot, I mean, possess

wholeness and sanity and health, except with open eyes, recognizing the fact, assimilating it. You cannot be sane and whole in a Christian world unless you are a Christian; you cannot pretend you are not judged, when you are. Christianity has many facets; so let me insist that the vital thing in it for art is not its judgment, but its vision. The judgment arises out of the vision, and the vision embraces, what the judgment often seems to soil, the love of human passion. 'With my body I thee worship.' That single sentence relegates the whole Greek world and dictates to Christian poetry a new standard, new conditions, to what is sane and whole.

Of course, these new conditions are hardly ever fulfilled; but they have been fulfilled often enough to leave us in no doubt that they are worth fulfilling, and that we can never surrender and dedicate ourselves to any life if it does not aim at fulfilling them. Horror of unfulfillment has encumbered our poetry, inevitably, but even that is better than pagan hopes of a revived animality. Think of

Wilt Thou forgive that sin where I begun
Which was my sin, though it were done
before. . . .

and

Wilt Thou forgive that sin which I did shun
A year or two, but wallow'd in a score?

The pity, the abasement of those words, is that they are the cry of an excluded Christian, of one who knows there is a judgment, but has not learned what it is that is judged: as if a lover should defame love. But another strain, deeper and sweeter, runs through all our poetry. The new testament of love, however seldom

realized, is heralded, regretted, promised, surmised; and passion is shot through with such a tincture of pity, hope, forgiveness, tenderness, and adoration that the vision is grounded in our hearts forever. We hear the echo of it in the unlikely places:—

Western wind, when wilt thou blow
That the small rain down can rain?
Christ, if my love were in my arms,
And I in my bed again!

No Greek could have said that; it implies the larger pity. Nor could any Greek have imagined the despair of

As ye came from the holy land
Of Walsingham,
Met ye not with my true love
By the way as ye came?

One cannot go on quoting. These things are now ours; they are our difficult inheritance. Having them, we cannot lead other lives or write other poetry than they demand.

DIE GESCHICHTEN JAAKOB. By *Thomas Mann*. Berlin: S. Fischer Verlag. 1933.

(From the *Pester Lloyd*, Budapest)

FROM the smoke of the burning books rises a new work by the master of German narrative art. Its title is *The Tales of Jacob*, and its four hundred pages form the first volume of a trilogy that has the Biblical character of Joseph as its hero. Thomas Mann has taken Biblical material and created a new Biblical language of a surprising kind. It is said that Mann has been planning his new book for almost ten years, and careful readers of these *Tales of Jacob* will recognize that Germany's foremost writer has taken the most minute pains in composition and has polished his style to the highest degree. Here is an artistic

achievement of the first order, a literary work of world significance that one can read and discuss only with reverence.

Those who have honored Thomas Mann as the author of *Buddenbrooks*, *The Magic Mountain*, *Death in Venice*, and other epic creations will now make the acquaintance of a new Mann. The sureness of his touch, the care he has taken to deal with an old-new theme in an old-new style remind one of Flaubert, whose *Madame Bovary* on the one hand and *Salammbô* on the other are as different as Thomas Mann's *Royal Highness* and his *Jacob*. On the one hand, the modern world and the modern style; on the other, the classic world and classic style. Anyone who knows how self-critically Flaubert modeled every sentence and how often he changed his phrases can appreciate how Mann must have perspired courting the gods of fame and how likely it is that he really did spend almost ten years on this book. Look at the Bible and you will see that the *Tales of Jacob*, which Mann tells in his first volume of nearly four hundred pages, fill hardly a page in the original. The artist has grasped the profoundest meaning of the Holy Script, and with words worthy of Luther's vocabulary, but covering a wider range, he relates to us the life of Jacob, of his wives and women slaves, reveals to us the secret

of his life, and, in spite of the great length of the book, leaves us when we have finished the first volume awaiting with the greatest expectancy the continuation and conclusion of this vast, epic masterpiece.

Even the most severe critic who dislikes Mann's prolixity and does not relish the archaic note when it is maintained for so long a time cannot deny that Thomas Mann never brought such profound study to any of his other works, never wrote a novel with so much imagination, and that none of his contemporaries has ever set down in any book more profound ideas in more amazingly artistic language. Of course, the story is not a new one and can be found in the Old Testament, the First Book of Moses, Chapter 35. But what poetic intuition Mann possesses! He carries the reader away with his unique powers of description, his superb narrative art, his striking pictures of family life, and, above all, with his powerful poetry.

Yet a final judgment on his new trilogy of novels is not yet possible, because we have only the first volume. One can only say on closing this book that representatives of the new literature, who have presumed to cast aspersions on Thomas Mann's name, will some day make rueful apologies, and that the blaze of the burning books will turn into a blaze of glory.

THE SCIENCES AND SOCIETY

INDUSTRIAL WASTE is by no means confined to the intentional destruction of raw materials (chiefly agricultural products) or to excess supplies of finished goods resulting from unintelligent competition. Few industries are so highly rationalized as those centring around the production of automobiles: technical difficulties in this field would, therefore, be worth noting. In his presidential address before the Institution of Automobile Engineers, which met recently in England, Mr. C. R. F. Engelbach brought out some startling facts based on the experience of one prominent English automobile works. To quote from an editorial in *Engineering* (London):—

Dealing with the actual conditions ruling in the Austin works at the present time, he pointed out that, in order to produce finished products of a total weight of 33,762 tons, no less than 146,064 tons of material were required, made up of 68,777 tons of productive material, 14,112 tons of consumable stores, and 63,157 tons of coal and other fuel. In other words, 26 per cent of the total materials received in the works was delivered to customers, and 74 per cent was consumed or wasted in various processes.

From the strictly economic point of view the Austin Company is faced with this problem:—

Some 16,000 tons of sheet metal are used annually, the average price being about £20 per ton, so that the yearly bill is approximately £320,000. Of this total material some 35 per cent is scrap, representing £112,000, with a recovery value of £7,000. The total dead loss on this material is, therefore, £105,000 per annum.

MORE AUTOMOBILES for the Orient is one of the recommendations offered by Mr. Engelbach, who is reported by *Engineering* as saying 'that the laborer in the paddy fields in China or the road scavenger in an Indian village would rather drive a car from his hut to his work, if he could afford to purchase one, and if the roads were good enough to drive a car on.' These are rather big 'ifs,' and there

are several more of them. In the whole of China there are barely more than 35,000 miles of highway, most of them in abominable condition. Even in the United States, with well over three million miles of highway, the construction of an ordinary dirt road will cost in the neighborhood of \$10,000 a mile, and Chinese coolie labor is notoriously inefficient and irregular. Furthermore, the proper servicing of a car requires shops, garages, pipe lines, gas, oil stations, and an army of trained mechanics, none of which are in large evidence beyond the congested urban centres. Just how a Chinese rice farmer, whose holding averages about two acres, can support a large family yet manage to buy, operate, and care for a car costing from two to five times his yearly income remains a mystery. And even if we are to suppose that in time China will be able to exploit her own natural resources adequately, the fact remains (as stated by H. Foster Bain in *Ores and Industry in the Far East*) that the present known iron ore reserves of China amount to about two tons per capita, as contrasted with nearly seven hundred tons per capita for the United States. Assuming an American consumption rate, Chinese iron ores would be exhausted in two years; or in three, if we include the potential reserves. As for coal, so lavishly required even by the efficient Austin works, Chinese reserves would last about seventy years on the basis of the present annual consumption rate of the United States, where the coal reserves will hold out, at the present consumption rate, for nearly 6,000 years.

FOOD AND NUTRITION problems are seldom given proper attention in discussions of the economic development of other countries, particularly those in the Orient. Thus, writing of mineral development in the Far East in the book above referred to, Mr. Bain comments on the

almost exclusively vegetable diet of the average Chinese coolie. This results in physiological peculiarities that go far to explain why it is that 'in good Chinese coal mining it requires eight men to do the work of one American miner, while in ordinary mines it takes half again as many.' And Mr. Bain adds, with an emphasis deserving careful thought: 'It would be necessary to recruit for mining alone many times the number of men now in all the Chinese armies to permit any such wholesale change in consumption of fuel as will be necessary to modernize the Far East.'

To bring this point home it is stated that Shantung coolies, working at the Fushun mines near Mukden in Manchuria, maintain themselves on from three to four cents gold per day, eating mostly millet, pork, onions, and other low-priced foods. The company hotel charges five cents gold a day per miner for board. In South Africa it is usually not possible to employ Kaffirs in the mines until they have been given nearly a month of systematic feeding on rations supplying about 4,000 kilogramme calories per day. A similar experiment conducted on certain large ranches in California succeeded in raising the work capacity of the Hindus to something like the native standard.

THE ENERGY CONCEPT as applied to living organisms receives full support from no less an authority than Sir Frederick Gowland Hopkins, one of the greatest of English biochemists. In his presidential address before the Leicester meeting of the British Association for the Advancement of Science, Sir Frederick tries to make it clear that 'every living unit is a transformer of energy however acquired,' and for him the 'essential or ultimate aim' of biochemistry is 'an adequate and acceptable description of molecular dynamics in living cells and tissues.' To the superficial reader this is mechanism with a vengeance, and suggests comparison with the recent life-rays hypothesis of the

American surgeon, Dr. George W. Crile. It should be understood, however, that the term, mechanism, as used by responsible scientists, refers less to a collection of dogmas than to a method for obtaining dependable results in some domain of nature. Where this method is still incapable of yielding data of the kind and precision demanded by scientific standards,—as, for example, in regard to consciousness and values,—it must mark time until more of the right kind of facts are available. This does not mean, as Sir Frederick well recognizes, that mechanism must give place to vitalism or some other variant of idealist interpretation, but simply that certain details have yet to be filled in at the cost of still greater labors and more patient research. It is for this reason that he criticizes, as 'scientifically faulty,' the *holistic* conception of the organism which J. S. Haldane (father of J. B. S. Haldane) shares, in a qualified form, with General Jan Christiaan Smuts. Sir Frederick's main position is well summed up in a passage that deserves quotation here:—

We must recognize . . . that life has one attribute that is fundamental. Whenever and wherever it appears, the steady increase of entropy displayed by all the rest of the universe is then and there arrested. There is no good evidence that in any of its manifestations life evades the second law of thermodynamics, but in the downward course of the energy flow it interposes a barrier and dams up a reservoir that provides potential for its own remarkable activities. The arrest of energy degradation in living nature is indeed a primary biological concept. Related to it, and of equal importance, is the concept of organization.

COMPARE WITH the above statement by a distinguished British representative of 'bourgeois' science the following passage written by B. Zavadovski, an orthodox Communist scientist. It is extracted from his article on 'The "Physical" and "Biological" in the Process of Organic Evolution,' printed as one of the contributions in *Science at the Crossroads*, published by the Soviet Government two years ago. Mr. Zavadovski is trying to

show that the Darwinian theory is 'the concrete expression of the dialectical process applied to the biological form of motion of matter.' Failure to understand this idea has resulted in 'a number of methodological errors and contradictions on these questions accumulated within the limits of bourgeois natural science.' Mr. Zavadovski continues:—

Precisely from this point of view biological phenomena, historically connected with physical phenomena in inorganic nature, are none the less not only reducible to physico-chemical or mechanical laws, but within their own limits as biological processes display varied and qualitatively distinct laws. Thereby biological laws do not in the least lose their material quality and cognizability, requiring only in each case methods of research appropriate to the phenomena studied.

Sir Frederick says that life has one fundamental attribute: the power to arrest (*not* to modify or to change) the simple mechanical laws of energy degradation; Mr. Zavadovski concedes to life 'qualitatively distinct laws.' The English 'bourgeois' scientist holds biological processes strictly accountable to thermodynamics; the Russian Marxist physicist merely changes the wording to 'physico-chemical or mechanical laws.' Each, in respect to social objectives and attitudes, sharply disagrees with the other; yet, on the common ground of scientific methodology, they achieve a surprising unanimity. But this unanimity tends to break down in practice; and it is here that a broadly based social ideology, such as the Communists at least approximate, has the advantage.

THE REVOLUTION in agriculture, which was discussed editorially at some length in last month's *LIVING AGE*, offers a striking example of the effects of science when systematically applied to basic human needs. Further proof of this is given by Julian Huxley in a recent British Broadcasting Corporation radio talk, published in *The Listener*. Professor Huxley is making an extensive survey of scientific research in Great Britain, at

the request of the British Broadcasting Corporation, and his first talk has to do with 'Science and Food.' On a visit to the School of Agriculture in Cambridge, directed by Sir Rowland Biffen, he learned of recent experiments in the development of special varieties of wheat that would combine the best qualities of already existing strains. Sir Rowland was responsible for the Little Joss and Yeoman varieties, yielding the hard grains so desired by millers: within fifteen years of their introduction a third of the world's wheat fields were planted with them. Professor Crew, at Edinburgh, through extensive studies of the inheritance factor in milk production, has made it possible to increase the milk yield of English cows by from 20 to 40 per cent merely by following the Mendelian laws of sex-linked inheritance traits. At Aberdeen the Rowett Institute for the study of animal nutrition, under the direction of Dr. John Orr, has so improved the nutritive factors of pasture lands (especially as regards minerals) that a cow is able to raise eleven calves in one milk period, instead of the customary two or four. Professor Stapledon, at Aberystwyth, by manipulating and cross-breeding innumerable types of clover and pasture grasses, developed strains that would grow at altitudes of 2,000 feet over a much longer period than before. This promptly improved the quality of lambs and sheep and helped to eliminate the cost of winter boarding in the lowlands.

Such facts as these, duplicated in scores of institutes and laboratories throughout England, lead Professor Huxley to wonder just how society is going to assimilate the incredibly fertile work of science. Confronted by the sabotage so shrewdly analyzed by Thorstein Veblen, and more recently emphasized by Major Douglas, Huxley concludes:—

That, however, is not the fault of science . . . If the barrier of the system seems strong, the basis of the hope is strong too! And that basis is the certitude that science, if its existing knowledge were properly

applied, could at least double the amount of food we produce in these little islands, and could put up world production to a level at which there would be enough and to spare for the 2,000 million human beings in existence.

Altogether, it seems probable that the agricultural problem will be for the world at large what it has been, and still is, in Soviet Russia: the decisive factor in a revolution far deeper and more significant than any staged on the puppet theatres of political forces or financial interests.

ARMAMENT ACTIVITIES throughout the world, as described so realistically in extracts from the pamphlet, *Patriotism Ltd.*, in last month's LIVING AGE, find sanguinary confirmation in a leading article on 'Bombing the Battleship' in a recent issue of the *London Times Trade and Engineering Supplement*. Reporting on the fleet and air exercises held off the Firth of Forth in Scotland, the special correspondent has much to say on the great improvement in aerial warfare, particularly as it affects the naval arm of the enemy's forces. Regarding the exercises as a whole, the writer cheerfully reports:—

One outcome of this Scottish exercise has been to reveal the extent to which the technique of aircraft attack against ships has been developed. . . . Every ship of the fleet was found by the flying boats. Everyone of the nineteen raids that went out [on the strength of the land-based aircraft] found its mark, and the early ones had to make sixty miles over the open sea before they reached their targets. The work of the boats was so good that their identification of position out at sea could be trusted implicitly. The work of the bombers was so sound that no squadron failed to find what it was sent out to seek.

These results, which 'seemed almost too good,' justify the conclusion 'that a hostile fleet can almost infallibly be found by reconnaissance flying boats, and, once found, can be attacked by high-performance bombing aircraft.' To illustrate the extraordinary technical advance of military aviation the correspondent gives a few details on certain types of bombing, their limitations and advantages. The 'torpedo bomber,' carrying a 1,750-pound

missile, cannot go into action until it is within five hundred yards of the ship and about fifty feet above the water; despite an average of thirty hits out of one hundred (considered a good percentage by anti-aircraft gunners also) this method is extremely hazardous for the bomber and casualties are heavy. Many of these disadvantages are overcome by the 'diving bombers' which, traveling at a rate of 300 miles an hour, release 250-pound bombs at a height of 2,000 feet, wind direction and velocity being nicely allowed for. The impact gives a penetrative power at least equal to that of the torpedo, and the possibilities of much heavier missiles must be considered: 'A diving bomber that could carry a 1,000-pound bomb would probably represent the greatest menace yet produced against naval craft. It could be fairly sure of hitting its mark and, after releasing its bomb, it would have enormous power at its disposal for the fast climb away to safety.'

Small wonder that Germany's Third Reich is so eager to purchase air bombs and bombers from England; or that, for the moment at least, Great Britain has enjoined her powerful armament-makers from contracting for any sales in that quarter.

SALES, HOWEVER, there must be, and in large quantity. In an earlier issue of the *Trade and Engineering Supplement* a quarter-page advertisement of Vickers (Aviation), Ltd., showed a photograph of a huge bomber traveling at high speed, a 1,750-pound torpedo slung neatly beneath the wheels. Above was the terse legend, 'Vickers "Vildebeest"—Pegasus engine.' Readers of the pamphlet, *The Secret International* (parts of which were reprinted in THE LIVING AGE for November 1932), may recall a reference to this aptly named aircraft in a section dealing with some of the more important technical developments in the art of war.

—HAROLD WARD

AS OTHERS SEE US

THE KOSHER DEAL

THE New Deal has been interpreted in many different ways but it has remained for Mr. F. Britten Austin, super-Tory contributor to the *Nineteenth Century and After*, to discover in Roosevelt a humble disciple of Lenin and in the New Deal a Jewish conspiracy to control and ruin America the Beautiful:—

It is safe to say that the average American does not yet consider Franklin Roosevelt a great man. He suspects him to be rather a very capable histrion, effectively performing a part written for him by someone else. (When isolated and speaking for himself, as in the case of the bombshell hurled into the Economic Conference from the presidential yacht, Mr. Roosevelt is liable to lose his balance and be a trifle crude.) The ordinary American, also, has a half-amused contempt for the 'professors' of the Brain Trust mobilized to do the President's thinking for him. Very few Americans—and almost no British—are aware of the surprising affiliations of those supermen, Professor Rexford Guy Tugwell, Professor Raymond Moley, Professor Mordecai Ezekiel, and Mr. William C. Bullitt.

The leader of the team, Professor Tugwell, is not only Professor of Economics at Columbia University; he is a left-wing Socialist, contributing editor of the Socialist *New Republic*, member of the advisory board of the Socialist 'People's Lobby' movement, committee member of the American Civil Liberties Union—specializing in the defense of Communists and radicals, and whereof Morris Hillquit was one of the founders in 1920—and co-author with Stuart Chase (Socialist) and Robert Dunn (Communist) of *Soviet*

Russia in the Second Decade. His 'right arm,' Professor Raymond Moley—who raced across the Atlantic authoritatively to express the President's exact mind at a crisis of the Economic Conference—was formerly lecturer at the Rand School, a Socialist-pacifist institution, and is also a prominent member of the American Civil Liberties Union and a director of the Foreign Language Information Service, which is its offshoot. The less conspicuous Professor Mordecai Ezekiel, adviser to the Department of Agriculture, apparently is chiefly a specialist in the Soviet five-year farm plan, which he studied in Russia.

Mr. Bullitt, the fourth member of the 'Trust,' seems to be most important as a close friend of the Communist writer, Lincoln Steffens, who, with an American-Jewish banker, was instrumental in the release of Trotsky from British custody at the beginning of the Russian Revolution, and who accompanied Trotsky and his party to Russia. In 1919, after the abortive 'Prinkipo' negotiations, Mr. Lansing sent Mr. Bullitt and Mr. Steffens to Russia to ascertain on what terms the Soviet Government would cease fighting. Mr. Bullitt brought back to Mr. Lloyd George in Paris those official Soviet proposals which Mr. Lloyd George subsequently denied receiving, and the resultant minor diplomatic scandal made Mr. Bullitt's name briefly familiar to the world.

Doubtless all these gentlemen possess exceptionally brilliant intellects, but they are hardly the persons one would have expected to find in control of the destinies of the ultra-capitalist United States. It is exactly as if the British Empire should surrender itself into the hands of Professor Laski, Mr. G. D. H. Cole, and Mr. E. F. Wise. And behind the Brain Trust looms the enigmatic figure of Mr. Bernard

Baruch, the aforetime autocrat of the American War Industries Board, possessing (as he himself modestly admitted to a congressional committee) 'more power than any other man had during the War,' and creating some contemporary scandal by the alleged predominance of Jewish personnel in that organization to which the whole of American industry and commerce was inquisitorially subject. General Johnson, the present 'boss' in the complete regimentation of industry under the 'New Deal,' is confessedly a nominee of Mr. Baruch, and 'a partner in his private business office. It would be interesting to know exactly who does indeed 'recommend' the presidential policy to Mr. Roosevelt, and to what ultimate purpose.

For an indefinite period the American Republic is firmly gripped in a dictatorship deliberately elaborating a gigantic state socialism. The entire mechanism of production and distribution, industrial and agricultural, is now subjected to the control of the state, which will plan ahead in the approved Gosplan manner. What was sanguinarily initiated in Russia by Lenin's band of fanatics and criminals has in America been unobtrusively achieved by a group of socialistically minded professors working through a constitutionally elected President. It is an amazing illustration of the docility of modern democracies. Once get your hands on the levers, and you can do what you like. It is the Leninist thesis.

In barbaric Russia the dream of the Socialist theorists has eventuated in the most appalling accumulation of human misery known to history, and the experiment is now in the penultimate stage of colossal failure. It would seem that the same experiment is now again to be tried, with appropriate difference of method, in the utterly different environment of the United States. It may, or may not, prove to be the salvation of the world. Certainly we have not yet seen the end of it. Some more surprising things are going to happen.

LAMENT FOR LARDNER

THE *Week-end Review* of London lived up to its reputation as the leading English weekly by printing a short essay of Elizabeth Bibesco's on the death of Ring Lardner. Even in his own country Lardner did not enjoy during his lifetime the reputation he deserved as the greatest American writer since Mark Twain, and we are grateful to the *Week-end Review* for having understood his importance and thus given us the opportunity to remind our readers of the loss their national literature has just suffered. Here is the entire essay:—

I was driving down the street in a taxi, depressed by the somewhat half-hearted sensationalism of the posters, a woman novelist's death mystery, an air crash or two, a hurricane, an unswum Channel, an unbroken record, an adjourned inquest, nothing for a jaded late afternoon palate, but I bought an evening paper to see if there was any news of the Leipzig trial. Turning over the pages casually, I came across a small paragraph tucked away on some indeterminate page. For a moment my breath seemed to have collided with some obstacle. Then I said to my daughter: 'Something dreadful has happened.' She looked up in alarm. 'What?' 'Ring Lardner is dead.' I did not know Mr. Lardner personally, and I am still surprised to think that an impersonal loss should be able to give one a sense of physical shock. But for a moment or two I felt weak and shaken, the feeling that one has after narrowly avoiding a bad accident.

In the United States Ring Lardner was a best seller and labeled a humorist. These two facts must have provided his voracious irony with a daily meal. The general public adored him because he made them laugh, and the tiny core of the intelligentsia—in the sense in which that word can occasionally be used as a term of praise—

admired him profoundly because he made them shiver—for this and other reasons. (That superb critic, Mr. Edmund Wilson, has written most brilliantly about him.) But to the large, painstaking, and melancholy public that wants to read books that are 'worth while,' that listens to lectures and joins book societies, that believes in literary juries and confuses complication with profundity, to those earnest, toiling readers who hold their inclinations under in order to train their taste to higher things, Ring Lardner meant nothing. He was, indeed, that heinous crime; 'light reading.' Many a time I have said to some intellectual American lady: 'To me Ring Lardner is your greatest American writer—with the exception of Hemingway,' only to realize that she either thought I was being deliberately offensive or that I was pulling her leg in a rather crude way. If the great public had understood their darling they would have lynched him. His indictment of American civilization is devastating in its flat, unemphatic finality.

Compared to Ring Lardner Dostoevski is as jovial as a Rotarian. He gives us no hate, no love, no black abysses or shining heights. In Mr. Lardner's world there is no redemption, for there are no souls. With barely an accent and never a comment, story after story reveals to us the invulnerable barrenness of lives unlit by any vision. On September 9 I wrote in the *Week-end Review*: 'She [Miss Ferber] accumulates where he lays bare. I know nothing more devastating than the icy drip of Mr. Lardner's writing. Never an emphasis, never the suggestion that he knows what he is doing. He uses life as a comment on life.' His gift of dialogue is as great as Chekhov's. His written word is always the spoken word. The rhythm of speech lurks in every sentence. He started life as a sporting reporter, and a great many of his stories are about baseball. Also, he writes in American, which may account for the, to me incomprehensible, fact that he is almost unknown in this country. Stories like 'Who Deals?' and 'Some Like Them

Cold' belong to the universal masterpieces that know no frontiers.

It is very interesting to compare Ring Lardner with Sinclair Lewis. The one is a great artist and the other a great photographer, the one is labeled a humorist (he is that, too) and the other a satirist—which always seems to me a little doubtful. Mr. Lewis is so essentially one of his own characters—perhaps I should say all of his own characters. He is near enough to them to know them very well, but not far enough away from them to get any real perspective. He is always boosting what he is ostensibly attacking. The very qualities that enable him to give us such brilliant snapshots inevitably deprive him of the quality of irony that is the refining spirit of the satirist. *Babbitt* is a new and original way of advertising—not destroying—Babbitts. Ring Lardner is more dispassionate than a god or a critic. He is an entomologist observing, collecting, annotating, and showing his insects. With his carefully trained eye and his delicately attuned ear he draws our attention to sights and sounds that we should not have seen or heard for ourselves. If the sights and sounds are ugly, what matter? He is not there to condemn or criticize. A naturalist watches and observes; he does not indulge in absurd likes and dislikes. The æsthetic or moral differences between a butterfly and an earwig are no concern of those who are studying their habits. Nothing could be further apart than Mr. Sinclair Lewis, always in the same scrum as his characters, and Mr. Ring Lardner, carefully arranging his specimens under glass. And yet both with a little stretching of the word *could* be called satirists.

You cannot describe a truly individual flavor any more than you can convey the taste of peppermint or cinnamon. To those who are ignorant of the work of Ring Lardner I am afraid I have been able to give only a very faint idea of his genius. But if I have succeeded in tempting any readers of this paper to buy his books I think I shall receive many anonymous

blessings. Ring Lardner has died at the age of forty-six, and the world has lost a great artist whose unique quality will perhaps forever elude criticism and defeat imitation.

RECOGNIZING RUSSIA

PRESS comments in England, France, and Germany on American recognition of the Soviet Union all emphasize the political rather than the economic factors. The *Manchester Guardian* chides the British Government for having muffed a great opportunity to increase trade, but it attaches more importance to what American recognition will mean to Russia's Far Eastern policy:—

Mr. Roosevelt has seized an obvious chance; the British Government has missed it. That is one moral which this country may deduce from Mr. Roosevelt's action. The British Government has no one but itself to thank if by far the largest share in Soviet Russia's import trade is now diverted to the United States from this country and Germany. But this is not the only interesting aspect of the Roosevelt Government's action. The situation in the Far East has certainly helped Mr. Roosevelt to make up his mind.

He has to face the facts created by Japan's aggressive policy. China is weak and isolated and may soon be forced against her will to reach a temporary understanding with the Japanese. The United States has done what it could do—through a commodity loan and technical assistance—to strengthen the unfortunate Chinese Government's hands. But China cannot by herself resist Japan's attentions. There remains Russia, another great power with a major interest in the Far East. Common hostility to Japanese policy was bound to bring the Soviet Government nearer to the United States. But the Manchurian experience has shown

that the initiative must not be left to the Japanese. If the Soviet's position is to be reinforced it must be reinforced quickly. *De jure* recognition now may make a difference to the fate of Vladivostok and the Maritime Province. At any rate, its offer at this moment greatly strengthens Soviet Russia in her dealings with the Japanese. Mr. Litvinov has good reason to be pleased with the success of his foreign policy. The fear of Germany has helped him to conclude a chain of comprehensive nonaggression pacts covering Soviet Russia's western frontiers. Now he has the probability of valuable moral backing in the Far East.

Le Temps, semiofficial organ of the French Foreign Office, interprets American recognition as a victory for the Kremlin and a defeat for Tokyo and Berlin:—

The resumption of official relations with the United States will be valuable to Russia as a brilliant confirmation of its return to the circle of great powers. It is quite clear what the Kremlin stands to gain at home in consolidating its régime, and abroad in continuing its policy of seeking security for the U. S. S. R., which is menaced by Hitler's Germany in the West and by Japan in the Far East. The commercial and economic advantages that Russia may hope to gain as a result of American recognition are unquestionably of secondary importance in the minds of the country's leaders, for they have never been bothered on this score by the lack of *de jure* recognition. Everyone knows that American goods and private American credits were chiefly responsible for the attempt to execute the famous Five-Year Plan. What should be of outstanding interest now is the political results that Mr. Roosevelt's gesture cannot fail to produce. Under present circumstances this gesture represents a warning to Japan and also a warning to National Socialist Germany, whose attitude toward Soviet Russia is well known.

Le Temps concludes with a note of warning:—

In the face of the crisis with which the Americans are now contending, in the face of the confusion of mind that prevails on the other side of the Atlantic, and because of the change of opinion now under way in that great country, where financial and economic collapse menaces the entire social order with destruction, the United States in resuming relations with Soviet Russia should above all else be on guard to close the door to all revolutionary and Communist propaganda.

The *Vossische Zeitung* of Berlin, reflecting, as all German papers do, the point of view of the Government, dwells on Russia's fear of an armed attack by the European powers:—

The League of Nations, from which Moscow considered itself excluded, seemed to be primarily a witches' caldron in which the next war was being brewed. But America, which had kept aloof from Geneva as it had from all European entanglements, seemed to the Kremlin a much more natural ally than an enemy. The Soviet Government had inherited almost no oppressive debts to the United States. American capital had played almost no rôle at all in Tsarist Russia. Hardly any American held Russian obligations. During the recent diplomatic manoeuvres, when attempts were made to form a united European front against America in regard to the war debts, Moscow urgently offered Washington its support against Europe. And just as there is no conflict between Russian and American foreign policy, so there is a great common interest—the problem of the Pacific.

Japan's extensive expansion in China and Manchuria has threatened important

advance posts of American capital and also has reached as far as the Soviet frontier. In this connection there can be no doubt that American recognition of the Soviet Union is a strongly anti-Japanese move. That Japan will not let herself be hindered by Europe or by the League of Nations in carrying through plans that seem essential for the preservation of her historic rights of way is perfectly evident. Only the United States, as the most powerful nation on the Pacific Ocean, is now able to control the situation in the Far East by purely political means. A Russian-American *rapprochement* must, therefore, be regarded, not only in Moscow but throughout the world, as a move in the direction of peace.

Germany cannot fail to be interested, because the Soviet Union plays such an important part in relation to ourselves on geopolitical and historical grounds. The situation in which we are now placed as a result of our withdrawal from the League of Nations makes us particularly sympathetic to the fact that two powerful states that do not belong to the Geneva circle have at last established normal relations. While the Soviet Union was engaged in industrial construction it used to be said that American and German interests were competing against each other economically. But Germany never claimed an economic monopoly of the Russian market. German and American machines stand peacefully next each other in the Russian factories. There is no reason to deny that German-Russian trade, which was built up by state-guaranteed German financing, profited indirectly from the American credits that were extended to Germany. As for the future, we may anticipate that the economic relations of these two countries with the Soviet Union will continue to pursue parallel courses.

OUR OWN BOOKSHELF

PERSIA. By Sir Arnold T. Wilson. New York: Scribner's. 1933. \$5.00.

PROBABLY no man in England or America is more keenly alive to conditions in the Near East and Middle East than Sir Arnold Wilson. We have long admired his writings, his translations of Sanskrit poetry, his political and economic acumen, and the generosity of his outlook. This may smack of bias, but we defy anyone to find much fault with his latest book, *Persia*. The hardest criticism which we could make is that he does not go out of his way to indicate to what extent Persia has come, in recent years, under the thumb of the British foreign office. Page after page in the present work 'reads itself,' for, if Sir Arnold is a master of anything, he is a master of clear, graceful style. Among other things he does a good deed in calling attention to Sir Denison Ross's pamphlet on *Eastern Art and Literature*. His treatment of educational theories in Persia is praiseworthy; this book might be added to the required reading lists at Teachers College. High-school principals might paste a copy of Sa'di's 'ode' on the effects of education on their bulletin boards: 'Where the innate capacity is good, education may make an impression upon it, but no furbisher knows how to give a polish to badly tempered iron. Were they to take the ass of Jesus to Mecca, on his return from that pilgrimage he would still be an ass.' Business schools will appreciate the clear analysis of Persia's foreign-trade prospects. The author closes with the almost startling statement: 'The Persians bid fair to show themselves able, in a measure equaled by no other nation, to imbibe, without intoxication, the strong wine of the West.'

L. W. E.

POLAND. By Roman Dyboski. New York: Scribner's. 1933. \$5.00.

ALTHOUGH Dyboski makes Treitschke take a back seat, you who are not yet tired of reading anti-German tracts in the metropolitan press may turn to *Poland* with a sigh of content. For this is not so much a history of why Poland has her modern problems with the Russians, the Ukrainians, the Liths, and the Germans, as it is a history of why

Poles have always been superior to Austrians, Balts, Germans, Hungarians, and Russians. Thus, even Leibnitz becomes a Pole, by virtue of West Slavic ancestry; though no claims are filed for such Slavic names as Clausewitz, Treitschke, Nietzsche, or even Hitler. Thus, also, Sobieski, who 'saved Vienna,' proved that Poland was never imperialistic—and not, strangely enough, that the Sobieski family had friends and relatives at the courts of Austria and Hungary. Even that generous-hearted and hard-swearing Lithuanian soldier of fortune, Kosciuszko, is claimed for Poland's hall of fame—because, perhaps, his birthplace is included in those 35,000 square miles of Lith territory that Poland stole soon after the Armistice! Yes, Professor Dyboski, Poland deserves her 150,000 square miles and her 30,000,000 people: 10,000,000 Poles, 10,000,000 Jews, and 10,000,000 other minorities. The next generation will probably tell us how much better she has treated them than they could have treated themselves!

L. W. E.

THE END OF OUR TIME. By Nicholas Berdyaev. New York: Sheed and Ward. 1933. \$2.25.

THE first part of the *Novoe Srednevekovie*, published in 1919, probably suffered from the author's anti-Bolshevist melancholia and therefore does not seem startling in 1933. We do not believe that we are witnessing the end of the Renaissance, the subversion of Humanism, or that the last five centuries have stood for a 'complete *Weltanschauung*' rather than for a remarkably fine set of modern creations. If anything, we should be tempted to say that the worst difficulty of 'modern historical man' has been due to his failure to produce a 'complete *Weltanschauung*,' and that the omission has been rather *in spite of* than *because of* the humanists.

The fine words of the remainder of the volume we accept, gritting our teeth at the ability of some people to get sophomoric wisdom, such as this, into print. Everyone understands it, and everyone pretends to respect it, but one is not enraptured with the grandiloquence used to cloak such ordinary ideas about virtue and religion and economics. For this, however, we do not blame the author. The

present edition was anonymously translated from an anonymous French translation.

L. W. E.

HISTORY OF EUROPE IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY. By Benedetto Croce. New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company. 1933. \$3.50.

THE ideas of Benedetto Croce read to-day like something of a compromise between those of Oswald Spengler and Ortega y Gasset. All three men have presented interpretations of our age that will be of value to historians; and yet how strikingly they depict the groping tendency that has seized mankind as it struggles haphazardly through a serious transition in world civilization. It has been said that Croce is the founder of a new school of historical ideology, but he seems more like a follower of the William Morris tradition. The apparent divergence is that Morris called himself a Marxian Socialist, though he was not one, whereas Croce is one of Marx's most vigorous denouncers. Both Morris and Croce despaired of achieving a common denominator of 'communal intelligence' and reverted to 'art effects' in pointing toward a new Utopia for the masses. Of course Croce is a liberal. His historical interpretations are colored bone deep with the hope of a liberal resurgence and with his apotheosis of the great liberals—witness his treatment of Mazzini and Cavour. His epilogue is one of the most illuminating essays on liberalism that has been written in this age and is alone worth the price of the book.

L. W. E.

WORLD RESOURCES AND INDUSTRIES, an Appraisal of Agricultural and Industrial Resources. By Erich W. Zimmermann. New York: Harper and Bros. \$5.00.

'FACT-GROUNDS in Economics' might well have been the subtitle of this impressive survey of the world's natural resources and energy potentialities. The result of five years' patient research, it is for quantity, range, and variety of information on the physical 'wealth of nations' one of the most instructive books published in recent years. The author—who is Professor of Economics at the University of North Carolina—is convinced that, with regard to all social processes, energy, as the capacity for doing work, 'domi-

nates the scene, determining the manner of land utilization, the size, shape, and architecture of the cultural superstructure which man raises on the foundations of his natural environment.' Accordingly, with a realism and thoroughness far from universal among his colleagues, Professor Zimmermann draws up a resource balance-sheet of the modern world, including the Orient. Graphs, tables, maps, diagrams, and illustrations are scattered liberally through the 800 closely packed pages that deal with raw materials, production, and consumption; with technology and world trade; with mechanization and labor in the fields of agriculture and industry. Although his book nowhere discusses the 'new economics,' whether of the Social Credit or technocratic variety, it demonstrates by unintended implication that the financial system now so insistently under fire is hopelessly antiquated. With still greater, and equally unconscious, irony, this heroic effort to get down to brass tacks strengthens a growing suspicion that those whom we once revered as economists—from Aristotle to J. M. Keynes—will soon be merely tolerated as *econo-mystics*.

The first part, 'Background and Perspective,' lays down the concept of resources as a functional reciprocity between man and utilizable aspects of his environment. The two chapters dealing specifically with energy and its social implications are technically unsatisfactory, but the point is well made that 'an economy using animate energy is basically static; an economy using inanimate energy is essentially dynamic.' The second part, on agriculture, gives an exceptionally full account of the slow, but inevitable, industrialization of this old stand-by of rugged individualism and in Part Three we have a similar appraisal of the world's industrial resources. The discussion of technical and manufacturing methods throws much light on the confused problems of world trade—more light, possibly, than the author himself sees. Yet one may agree with the spirit, if not the letter, of the author's final conviction: 'The machine, as the means to dedicate natural energies to the service of man, is the greatest instrument of progress yet devised. These energies can fulfill their noble mission only if man, by the loftiness of his aspirations, becomes worthy of their aid.'

H. W.

WITH THE ADVISORY COUNCIL

ADMIRAL WILLIAM H. STANDLEY, Chief of Naval Operations and a member of our Advisory Council, not only advocates an American navy second to none but also emphasizes the necessity of a large merchant marine. Speaking in Washington on Navy Day, he said:—

'Sea power comprises not only powerful ships of war, but merchant vessels quickly convertible, when war threatens, into fast auxiliary cruisers, airplane carriers, and scouts, manned by trained navigators and seamen available for quickly expanding navy personnel.'

ANOTHER of our Advisory Council members, **N. M. Hubbard, Jr.**, president of the Navy League, has also been advocating an American navy of full treaty strength and attacking Sir John Simon, British Foreign Secretary, for intimating that the construction of such a navy by the United States would lead to a building race with England and Japan.

'The fact is unquestioned by American naval authorities that Great Britain and Japan are entirely within their treaty rights in building up to and maintaining the quotas which at the London Conference they asserted, and we consented, were reasonably necessary to their national security. No such construction can, within reason, be characterized as a naval race.'

Mr. Hubbard also rejects Sir John's suggestion that the United States consider building smaller vessels. Not only do these vessels cost more to build per ton; they would also put us at a disadvantage in relation to Great Britain.

'Such a reduction would render us a negligible enemy, but, with access to British navy bases, an efficient ally, an inducement to conditional vassalage that is far from palatable. In brief, our people are being forced reluctantly to a conclusion that, while your statesmen continue to say that war between us is unthinkable,

they apparently keep in mind always such a contingency and that, in the event of our engagement in a war in which the British remain neutral, Great Britain will be indifferent to the outcome.'

JOHN T. MADDEN, Dean of the New York University School of Commerce, Accounts, and Finance and a member of our Advisory Council, asserts that there was some inflation, 'as inflation is usually defined,' even before President Roosevelt embarked on his scheme of buying gold above the world price. Here is the way Mr. Madden sums the matter up:—

'The answer to the question whether there has been any inflation may therefore be summed up as follows: (a) there has been little increase in the volume of purchasing power in the hands of the people; (b) the increase in business activity has been financed to a large extent by the increased velocity of circulation of bank deposits; (c) the increased velocity of circulation has also made possible competitive bidding for and speculation in securities and commodities, and to this extent there has been inflation as inflation is usually defined.'

Mr. Madden goes on to say that the N. R. A. has also helped to raise prices, and Mr. Robert L. Lund, president of the National Association of Manufacturers of the United States and a member of our Advisory Council, has declared that imports have begun to increase in consequence. Writing to President Roosevelt, Mr. Lund says:—

'The N. R. A. can never succeed unless imports produced on long hours and low rates of pay are controlled. Each importation of one day's labor contained in articles that can be produced here takes one day's labor from American workmen . . . We seek the good will of all nations and desire to trade with them. However, in the present emergency it is fatal to

increase imports at the expense of American employment.'

TWO MEMBERS of our Advisory Council belong to the Committee on Russian-American Relations of the American Foundation. They are the Right Reverend William Scarlett, Protestant Episcopal Bishop Coadjutor of Missouri, and Esther Everett Lape, member in charge. Two statements in their 270-page report, which was issued shortly before Litvinov sailed for the United States, are worth quoting:—

'We believe that the Comintern and hence its members, which include the Communist Party of Russia, which now controls the Soviet Government, is as much committed to-day as it ever was to the doctrine of world revolution.'

But the report goes on to say that the philosophy of Communism and the practical policy of the Soviet Government are separate and distinct:—

'While there is no evidence of a change in the fundamental ideas of the Communist Party, there is increasing evidence of a change of emphasis on the part of Soviet leaders.'

WE RECORD with regret the recent deaths of three distinguished members of our Advisory Council—Wallace Rider Farrington, former Governor of Hawaii; William N. Doak, Secretary of Labor in the Hoover Cabinet; and Dr. Lewis Heisler Ball, former United States Senator from Delaware.

DURING the past month the following names have been added to our Advisory Council:—

Edward Albright, Minister to Finland; Senator Bennett Champ Clark of Missouri; Senator Royal S. Copeland of New York; Edward C. Delafield, vice president of the City Bank Farmers Trust Company of New

York; William E. Fitch, physician and author, Burlington, N. C.; J. Andre Fouilhoux, New York architect and engineer; Flint Garrison, director general of the Wholesale Dry Goods Institute of New York; Governor Robert H. Gore of Puerto Rico; Professor Ian C. Hannah, of Pebbleshire, Scotland; Walter L. Hervey, New York lawyer and banker; William D. Jamieson, lawyer, author, and editor, Washington, D. C.; William M. Jardine, former Secretary of Agriculture; General Hugh S. Johnson, N.R.A. administrator; Otto H. Kahn, New York banker; Dean Carl A. Kallgren of Colgate University; Joseph B. Keenan, special assistant to the Attorney General, Washington, D. C.; Philip Ketchum, head master Trinity College School, Ontario, Canada; Julius Klein, former Assistant Secretary of Commerce; Robert L. Lund, President of the National Association of Manufacturers; Professor R. A. MacKay of Dalhousie University, Halifax; Professor M. A. MacKenzie of the University of Toronto; Professor Norman MacKenzie of the University of Toronto; Argue Martin, member of the Legislative Assembly of Ontario; George B. McClellan, former Mayor of New York City; William McFee, novelist and engineer; Lucille Foster McMillin, United States Civil Service Commissioner; Allan Nevins, historian and editor; President John L. Newcomb of the University of Virginia; Albert Bigelow Paine, author and editor; G. R. Parker, engineer, banker, and author; Colonel E. Alexander Powell, author and journalist; Admiral William V. Pratt, U. S. N.; Captain H. H. Railey, author, editor, publicist, New York; Warren D. Robbins, Minister to Canada; Reeve Schley, New York banker; Representative James G. Scrugham of Nevada; Maud Slye, pathologist, Chicago; Major General George O. Squier, U. S. A., retired; Representative Henry B. Steagall of Alabama; James G. Strong, treasurer of the Home Owners' Loan Corporation; President Clarence Howe Thurber of the University of Redlands, California; President Paul E. Titsworth of Alfred University, Alfred, N. Y.; Arthur S. Tuttle, state engineer, New York; Lawrence Veiller, secretary and treasurer of the National Housing Association; James P. Warburg, New York banker.

COMING EVENTS

AUSTRIA

SANKT-ANTON. December-March, Winter Sports, Ski Instruction.

BELGIUM

NATIONAL CELEBRATION. December 26, Boxing Day.

BRAZIL

RIO DE JANEIRO. January 20, Celebration of the Founding of Rio de Janeiro.

CHINA

NATIONAL CELEBRATION. March 12, Commemoration of the death of Dr. Sun Yat-sen.

CUBA

NATIONAL CELEBRATION. January 28, Anniversary of Marti's Birthday.

ENGLAND

NATIONAL CELEBRATION. December 20, Prince George's Birthday; 26, Boxing Day.

BOLTON. December 26, Men's Hockey: Lancashire v. Surrey.

BROOKLANDS. December 16, Men's Hockey: Cheshire v. Yorkshire.

CHELTENHAM. December 28, Racing.

DERBY. December 18-19, Racing.

DEWSBURY. December 20, Football: Dewsbury v. Australia.

DORCHESTER, DORSET. December 29, Cattistock Hunt Ball.

FALMOUTH. December 16, Football: Second English Trial.

GLASTONBURY, SOMERSET. December, Nativity Plays.

HASTINGS. December 20, Football: Sussex v. Hampshire; 23-January 6, International Chess Congress.

HULL. December 25, Football: Hull v. Australia.

HURST PARK. December 15-16, Racing.
KEMPTON PARK. December 26-27, Racing.

LACOCK, WILTSHIRE. December 28, Avon Vale Hunt Ball.

LONDON. December 16, Schoolboys' Boxing Championships at Stadium Club; 16-22, Cycling Exhibition at New Horticultural Hall; 18, Edwardian Party Ball at Grosvenor House; 19, Choral and Orchestral Concert at Central Hall, Westminster; 21-January 25, International Circus at Olympia; 23-January 27, Circus and World's Fair at Agricultural Hall; 27-January 3, 'Study of London' Vacation Course given by Le Play Society at College Hall, Malet Street, W. C.; 31, The Legion of St. Patrick's New Year's Eve Ball at Claridges; January 6, Folk-Song and Dance Festival at Albert Hall; February 19-March 2, British Industries Fair at Olympia and White City.

MANCHESTER. December 22-January 20, Circus.

NEWBURY. December 20-30, Racing.

NORWICH. December 28, Norwich Philharmonic Society Carol Service at the Cathedral.

NOTTINGHAM. December 16, Men's Hockey: Nottinghamshire v. Lancashire.

ST. HILARY, CORNWALL. December, Nativity Plays.

ST. IVES, CORNWALL. December, Guise Dancing.

SWINTON. December 16, Football: Third Test Match, Northern England v. Australia.

WARRINGTON. December 26, Men's Hockey: Lancashire v. Cheshire.

WEMBLEY. December 30, Football: Wales v. Australia.

WINCHESTER. December 15, Hampshire Hunt Ball.

COMING EVENTS

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WOLVERHAMPTON. *December 26-27,*
Racing.

WOODHALL SPA. *December 23-26,* Open
Christmas Golf Meeting.

WORTHING. *December 28,* Women's
Hockey: Midlands Tournament.

ESTHONIA

NATIONAL CELEBRATION. *February*
24, Independence Day.

FRANCE

NATIONAL CELEBRATIONS. *Decem-*
ber 24, Celebration of Christmas Eve
in Homes and Restaurants, Midnight
Mass in the Catholic Churches; *25,*
Christmas Day Celebration.

ALLAUCH. *December 24,* Procession
with candles.

BAUX, LES. *December 24,* Provençal
songs, Shepherds' Christmas.

BOURG-EN-BRESSE. *December 20,*
Poultry Fair.

PÉROUGES. *December 24,* Mass and pro-
cession in a mediæval setting.

GERMANY

LEIPZIG. *December 17,* Performance of
Christmas Oratorio of Bach at St.
Thomas's Church.

HOLLAND

GOES. *December 5, 12, 19, 26,* General
Market.

UTRECHT. *December 2, 9, 16, 23, 30,*
Cattle Market.

IRELAND

DUBLIN. *December 26,* Dog Show; *Feb-*
ruary 10, Rugby Football: Ireland v.
England.

LEOPARDSTOWN. *December 26-27,*
Racing.

LIMERICK. *December 26,* Racing.

ITALY

FLORENCE. *December 15-March 10,*
Course in Italian history and art for
foreigners.

JAPAN

NATIONAL CELEBRATIONS. *Decem-*
ber 25, Taisbo Tennosai, Anniversary
of the death of the Emperor Taisho
Tenno; *31,* Omisoka, Great Last Day
of Year.

MEXICO

NATIONAL CELEBRATION. *Decem-*
ber 18, Las Posadas, popular feasts cele-
brating the Nativity.

NORWAY

NATIONAL CELEBRATION. *Decem-*
ber 26, Boxing Day.

PORTUGAL

NATIONAL CELEBRATION. *Janu-*
ary 31, Dedication Day of the Founders
of the Republic.

RUMANIA

BUCHAREST. *December 23,* Interscho-
lastic Competition of Popular Cos-
tumes.

SCOTLAND

NATIONAL CELEBRATION. *Decem-*
ber 31, Hogmanay Celebrations.

EDINBURGH. *February 3,* Football:
Scotland v. Wales; *24,* Football: Scot-
land v. Ireland.

MELROSE. *December 26,* Freemasons'
Walk.

SPAIN

BARCELONA. *December 26,* Interna-
tional Football; Concert by Catalonian
Chorus.

PALMA DE MALLORCA. *December 21,*
Fair.

SWEDEN

STOCKHOLM. *December 15-23,* Christ-
mas Market at Stortorget.

YUGOSLAVIA

NATIONAL CELEBRATION. *Decem-*
ber 17, King Alexander's Birthday.

THE GUIDE POST

(Continued)

TO THE radio debate between two eminent British scientists—Julian Huxley and Hyman Levy—we have given almost the same title that Mr. Ward's department bears. Our reason is that both the department and the article discuss what is to our mind the great central problem of our time. Is human society, whose system of production is already governed by scientific processes, to submit its system of distribution to the same processes?

THE Editor's monthly essay in prophecy surveys the birth and death rates in those countries where these rates have undergone the greatest changes within the past century. Starting with the premise that changes in population are invariably accompanied by other changes, an attempt is made to indicate what will be the outcome of the present population trends in Europe, the United States, Japan, and Russia.

'THE Baker's Wife' by Jean Giono is a representative work of one of the most talented young French novelists. Set in the provinces, it deals with two topics dear to the Gallic heart—adultery and the rural life of France.

HAVING made several references to the declining prestige of Montagu Norman, governor of the Bank of England, we are only too glad to reproduce his latest address, made at a dinner in London at which Winston Churchill and Neville Chamberlain spoke before him. Mr.

Norman's office makes him one of the most powerful men of our time, and we suggest that his words be compared to what other great leaders have said at periods of crisis. The first two paragraphs of his speech we found in the *Week-end Review*, which complained that it had not been adequately reproduced in any London paper; the remainder appeared in the *London Times*. We cannot do better than quote the *Week-end Review* that certain passages 'throw a rare light on the psychology of the almost all-powerful governor of the Bank.'

QUITE a number of American college students, male and female, came in contact with 'Buchmanism' half a dozen years ago. The movement and its leader, F. N. Buchman, have now shifted their activities to Great Britain, where, as the 'Group Movement,' they have won many adherents among the upper classes. We emphasize the class nature of the movement because in spite of what the founder of Christianity had to say about Heaven, rich men, camels, and needles' eyes, the Buchmanites draw almost all their followers from the well-to-do.

W. J.'S account of Stalin at work is packed with revealing information about how the Communist bureaucracy in Moscow functions. It seems that party members have free access to many offices but that Stalin keeps himself aloof and does not receive more than two or three callers a day. He is represented as the originator of Russia's recently concluded series of alliances in Europe, and he seems to live in constant expectation of war with Japan.